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Abstract
This study is intended as a dialogue between literature and theology, utilizing selected
works of the playwright and novelist, Henry Fielding (1707-54). While historical
studies of Fielding have clearly yielded much of importance, a broader and less
deterministic assessment concerning the latent ambivalences of this, one of the
earliest novelists, has yet to be explored. Such an assessment has implications for the
current relationship between, and the separate study of, literature and theology.
The methodology is informed by an awareness of human frailty (what Fielding
described as HUMAN NATURE) and centres upon the use of a specific interpretative
tool that I call misplacement. By this, I mean the continuous parting with the ineffable
– the perpetual recognition that, in writing, there is always a sense of the other, be that
an alternative path not taken, the nagging sense of the numinous, or the coming to
terms with the ludicrous nature of the human condition. Such fragile, comedic alterity
provides a weak metaphysical root which is shared by both literature and theology. To
illustrate the effects of such misplacement, this thesis sets the novels of Henry
Fielding alongside works of contemporary philosophical theology such as the post
onto-theological critique of Gianni Vattimo and John Caputo, as well as alongside
postmodern works of fiction, such as those of Vonnegut and Calvino. In so doing,
common critical zones such as epistemology, ethics, mimesis, canonicity, and
revelation are investigated. The result of this analysis is that, in all these areas, the
novel form, in Fielding’s hands, displays a powerful comic resonance with a theology
which seeks to move beyond a strictly deterministic approach. Thus, we discover that
Fielding’s work, rather than simply being expressive of proto-Enlightenment
principles, actually subverts those assumed securities regarding the status of the
individual and his place in the world, before God.
In its conclusion, this study reveals the challenge of recognising the inescapably
theological nature of the novel and that theology itself, is fictive. This assessment
points to a greater need for further shared exploration of the relationship between
theology and literature - to their mutual benefit.3
To the memory of my father,
Robert Bain Robertson
(1936-2007)4
I compared you with a little bird of the heavens, created for the pleasure of
men and the adornment of nature. And then, Varenka, I thought that we
too, people who live in care and worry, should also envy the carefree and
innocent happiness of the birds of the heavens – well, and all the rest
likewise, and the same; that is, I kept making such remote comparisons.
I’ve got this book, Varenka, and it’s got the same stuff in it, all the same
things described in real detail. Why I’m writing is that there are different
dreams, you know my dear. And now it’s spring, so my ideas too are
always so nice, sharp, inventive, and the dreams I have are tender;
everything is rose-coloured. That’s why I’ve written all this; but actually I
got all this from the book.
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Poor People
‘Tis better to write of laughter than of tears,
Since laughter is the property of Man.
Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel5
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Introduction
He would […] reflect, in the manner that only literature and religion
teach, on the puniness and nobility of mankind.
1
Overture
In this study, my aim is to present a theological response to the issues raised by the
literary form known as the novel, and specifically the fiction of Henry Fielding (1707-
54). My argument is that the experience of the novel, which one scholar has described
as Christianity’s ‘godchild’
2, offers an analogical route into that fragile literary space
which both theology and fiction ultimately occupy. The recognition of being found in
this communal space can, I suggest, serve to reinvigorate the integrity of a theology
which has been hitherto compromised by the enticement of determinism – an
enticement which can also bedevil the work of fiction.
The specific deterministic temptation, to which modern theology has succumbed, is
that of closing off the questionable nature of human existence, chiefly by positing a
Cartesian paradigm which elevates humanity to a reified place in which knowledge of
God can be confidently appropriated.
3 The same temptation can be said to affect the
study of the novel. The idea that the novel is, itself, the result and confirmation of the
same Enlightenment thinking which affects theology, is an enduring one. The place of
the individual as a primary focus in the rise of the novel has been an obvious and
long-lasting sphere of exploration.
1 Ian McEwan, Atonement (London: Jonathan Cape, 2001), p. 93.
2 Valentine Cunningham, ‘The Novel and the Protestant Fix: Between Melancholy and Ecstasy’, in
Biblical Religion and the Novel 1700-2000, ed. by Mark Knight and Thomas Woodman (Aldershot,
Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), p. 53.
3 By the term ‘determinism’, I am recalling an enduring complaint in theological enquiry. For example,
one can point to Schleiermacher’s On Religion (1799) where, in contrast to those ‘who have
communicated their discoveries in a more delicate – be it also more fragile – form’, he berates ‘the
schools, which are nothing but the habitations and nurseries of the dead letter’. Friedrich
Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, ed. by Richard Crouter, 2
nd edn.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 14. Such an emphasis on ‘fragile form’ resonates
well with current approaches to theological endeavour as a ‘weak’ enterprise. See, for example, John
D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 2006).10
However, this situation is now being challenged through the postmodern questioning
of the subject. The confidence in the central position of humanity as supreme overlord
which the Enlightenment project appeared to secure is, at this time, on the wane. This
has inevitable implications for both theology and the novel. Indeed, as intellectual
activities which gravitate around the fragile human subject, it may not be too much to
say that their fortunes are closely intertwined. I suggest, then, that the novel, rising, as
it were, on the wave of the Enlightenment, serves as the artistic concomitant of a
similar development of theological thinking. The artistic and theological crises which
centred upon the Enlightenment project actually produced the radical form known as
the novel and, at the same time, provided the challenging environment for what we
call modern theology.
4
Similarly, I believe, we can argue that theological thinking, tried in the fires of the
Enlightenment, paradoxically now faces a new crisis, namely the collapse of that self-
same Enlightenment confidence. This crisis provides an opportunity for a hopeful re-
examination of the relationship between literature and theology and, moreover, a
moment to study the scope and influence of both, as artistic activities, sharing a
common, fragile vision. Consequently, I wish to argue that the practice of theology is,
in reality, a fictive exercise, while that of fiction is a deeply theological one.
Both fiction and theology share a number of fundamental structural and philosophical
concerns. At the most basic level, both theology and fiction are modes of discourse,
using words which, when released, inevitably constitute fictional and theological
‘worlds’. As Vattimo puts it with respect to theological discourse, ‘To profess faith in
Christianity is first of all to profess faith in the inevitability of a certain textual
tradition that has been passed down.’
5 In the same way, the novel has a certain
canonicity of its own, which bespeaks of a discernable literary form. Each, then, has
to adopt language in order to become what they are. Their mutual use of language,
however, also serves as an immediate admission of the fragile nature of the discrete
projects each purports to perform. This constitutive element in both theology and
fiction serves as both their greatest strength and most obvious weakness.
4 George Newlands has argued that, in many respects, theology has, even now, not come to terms with
the challenge of the Enlightenment. See his, Theology of the Love of God (London: Collins, 1980), p.
98.
5 Gianni Vattimo, ‘Toward a Nonreligious Christianity’ in After the Death of God, ed. by Jeffrey W.
Robbins (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 36.11
Moving from the constitutive element of both theology and literature, to the focus of
their inquiry, we see that theology’s reliance on words to exercise its talk about God
(theo-logos) can be regarded as analogous to the work of the novel in its task to point
to ‘another world’. In this sense, both theology and fiction, through language, point
beyond themselves to ‘the other’.
An immediate and shared consequence of this ‘pointing to the other’ is what I
describe as ‘parting with the ineffable’. Both fiction and theology attempt to articulate
an understanding of ‘the other’. In so doing, they inevitably fall prey to the temptation
to domesticate that very otherness. What redeems both theology and fiction, however,
is the awareness that their attempts at communication or understanding are infused by
fragility. In their common task of communicating, there is the recognition that there is
always more to be said. As Julian Barnes has it, ‘Religion decays, the icon remains; a
narrative is forgotten, yet its representation still magnetizes.’
6 In other words, in the
exercise of theology and fiction, the parting with the ineffable, rather than a
completed process, is better understood as a continually present withdrawal. Indeed, it
is this continually present withdrawal which provides the hopeful space within which
theology and fiction are best able to communicate together.
It is at this point where we recognise the contribution of comedy. For comedy, if
nothing else, illustrates that the hopeful space is created in and through frailty. To this
extent then, I am arguing that both fiction and theology are ultimately comic forms.
Both theology and fiction exist, in a broad sense, to provide answers to the questions
of existence. Such a lofty aspiration is, in reality, a futile one. Indeed, it is a desire that
can only fail insofar as it is continually attempted. Such a description may, at first
glance, appear as more a definition of tragedy than of comedy. However, the
understanding of comedy that I offer in this study goes beyond the strict boundaries
which have hitherto frequently prescribed both tragedy and comedy. As Terry
Eagleton has pointed out:
It is, in fact, oddly difficult to make grandly general propositions about
tragedy without suddenly finding to one’s embarrassment that they apply
to comedy as well; and this duality may also be true of the modern
subject, which is buoyantly comic in its look-no-hands ability to conjure
6 Julian Barnes, A History of the World in 10½ Chapters (London: Picador, 1990), p. 133.12
itself up out of nothing at all, yet stricken for just the same reason with a
sense of tragic solitude and futility. Both comedy and tragedy result from
the fact that it is its own foundation.
7
One can cite a supporting source for Eagleton’s remarks in no less than Aristotle
himself. In the Poetics the distinction between tragedy and comedy is a very precise
one, as Golden argues:
The essential difference between tragedy and comedy for Aristotle lies in
the opposed kinds of character and action both represent, and not in the
circumstance that one is allegedly serious and the other allegedly
nonserious.
8
What links tragedy and comedy is as important as what appears to distinguish them.
Both, Aristotle tells us, ‘developed from improvisations’.
9 Both are ultimately rooted
in mimesis.
10 Both exhibit an analogous emotional response in relation to pity and
fear.
11 Both share the same goal, namely the cathartic experience of the ‘illumination
of human action’.
12 It seems clear, then, that tragedy and comedy share a concern for
the universality of human experience and, as consequence we must not be too quick to
circumscribe either.
A theological example of this temptation to circumscription can be found in a
discussion by Donald MacKinnon. He has helpfully drawn attention to the importance
of the tragic element of the Christian message and particularly that surrounding the
atonement. In so doing, he challenges the temptation to triumphalism which can
bedevil this particular theological exploration. As he puts it, ‘There is no escape from
contingency.’
13 However, while in sympathy with MacKinnon’s specific goal, my
contention is that it is precisely the contingency that he describes as tragic which
7 Terry Eagleton, ‘A Response’, Literature and Theology Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2005), 132-138 (p. 136).
8 Leon Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1992), p. 67.
9 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. by Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin, 1996), 3.3.8.
10 Ibid., 3.4.9 and 4.2.11.
11 Golden, pp. 91-97.
12 Ibid., p. 72.
13 Donald M. MacKinnon, ‘Philosophy and Christology’, in Borderlands of Theology and Other
Essays, ed. by George W. Roberts and Donovan E. Smucker (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), p. 81.
See also the comments of Kierkegaard in Chapter 2 (p. 95) on the relationship between comedy and
tragedy.13
actually forms the lifeblood of the comedic. In this sense, as I will argue in the course
of this study, comedy itself is misplaced from any straight-forward deterministic
understanding.
It is this misplaced background noise of futility and fragility which, I suggest,
constitutes the comedy that is shared by both fiction and theology. Each, in a variety
of modes and guises, recognises to a varying degree the inadequacy of its own
projects but at the same moment seeks a control that its own fragile existence cannot
provide.
More specifically, the work of Henry Fielding demonstrates that very capacity for
fiction to undermine, or in my terms, misplace the apparent securities so beloved of
determinists, both secular and religious. It is through the activity of comic
misplacement that we discover, for example, that key areas such as art, epistemology,
morality, theology and, of course, the presentation of reality itself, are put in question.
Writing, as he was, at the advent of the Enlightenment, Fielding offers us the clearest
example of the ability of comic fiction to confound the assumptions which that
particular period set in motion.
I argue that, in his fiction, Fielding presents to us the waywardness of human
experience, which is closely linked to a theology not bound by determinism. This is
witnessed most clearly in both Joseph Andrews (1742) and Tom Jones (1749) where
there is, in the travel narrative, a literal sense of the convoluted journey made by the
protagonists. Yet, that same waywardness is present and, in fact, to a more disturbing
degree, in Fielding’s last novel, Amelia (1752). In this way, I will argue that the novel,
in Fielding’s hands, rather than being in the vanguard of modernity, is itself
misplaced, insofar as it shares the hallmarks of postmodernism.
As a result, theological reflection can only but gain from an examination of just how
comic misplacement operates in his hands. Above all, it will recognise, as Fielding
does, the need for a sense of humility and a sense of humour in the face of human
frailty.14
Dialogue, Compassion and Unknowing:
Marking the Theological and Literary Terrain
Fifty years ago, Amos Wilder described what he saw as the ‘historic divorce’ or the
‘cleavage between religion and the arts’.
14 More recently, and in a similar vein, John
Coulson has written:
The mutual dependence of religious awareness and imagination is
recognized for what it is only as each begins to go its own way. This […]
has had disastrous consequences for religion.
15
Though numerous important works investigating the philosophical and artistic
connections between literature and theology have appeared since Wilder and,
especially, Coulson wrote, the relationship between the disciplines remains a
complicated one.
16 For example, in the recently published Oxford Handbook of
English Literature and Theology,
17 the size of the type face given to the word
‘Theology’ on the front cover led to some heart searching as to whether this was
indicative of an unjustifiable claim to a superior status! Though undoubtedly a matter
of amusement, lurking behind such frivolity a nervous tension remains. The tension is
partly determined by socio-historical circumstances. The study of English Literature
has come late to the Academy, while Theology, long regarded as the so-called Queen
of the Sciences has a rich and ancient pedigree. Time can heal, but it can also wound.
And so, curiously, the difficulties that English Literature experienced in finding an
intellectual home are now being visited upon Theology, at least in the United
Kingdom. With ever-diminishing congregations leading to a less secure ecclesiastical
footing in society, the place of theology as a meaningful discipline with anything
14 Amos Wilder, Theology and Modern Literature (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1958), pp.14-15.
15 John Coulson, Religion and Imagination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 3.
16 I am referring, for example, to works such as Nathan Scott’s The Broken Center (New Haven &
London: Yale University Press, 1966), Northrop Frye’s The Great Code (New York & London:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1982), Michael Edwards’ Towards a Christian Poetics (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1984), Stephen Prickett’s Words and The Word (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) and David Jasper’s The New Testament and the Literary Imagination (London:
Macmillan, 1987). There are, of course, numerous critics and philosophers who share an interest in
matters theological such as George Steiner, Frank Kermode, Bernard Williams, D. Z. Phillips and Paul
Ricoeur.
17 Andrew Hass, David Jasper, Elisabeth Jay, eds., The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and
Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).15
practical to offer, is now an active matter of debate. And this debate is taking place
within the theological community itself.
Part of this discussion that I personally believe to be a vital component, is the
discernment of a renewal of the interdisciplinary nature of a subject which, for
centuries, though clearly dependent to a large extent upon other disciplines, has found
itself, wittingly or otherwise, retreating from just such an interdisciplinary stance.
Once again, one can appeal to socio-historical circumstances that may mitigate this
retreat. One can cite the reformists’ zeal for a pure religion which distances itself from
the image, and therefore from art in general. One can point to the aggresive piety of
the puritans in their suspicion of anything remotely resembling levity or, later, the
Victorian religio-morality which confined artistic expression. More recently, we could
cite the Barthian neo-orthodoxy which sought to overturn what Barth saw as the
prevailing weakness of liberal theology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. This is nowhere better exemplified than in his Epistle to the Romans (1918)
where, in the second edition, Barth criticises those commentaries which appear
‘merely the first step towards a commentary’.
18 In so saying, he seeks to place the so-
called scientific school of interpretation in its proper dialectical context. Useful
though philological and archaeological and other historical research may be, it cannot
be of sufficient aid in Barth’s concern over ‘the true nature of interpretation’. This is
to be found in the crisis of the human condition, located between infinity and
temporality:
‘God is in heaven, and thou art on earth.’ The relation between such a God
and such a man, and the relation between such a man and such a God, is
for me, the theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy.
19
The dialectic between God and man with Christ as the supreme event becomes, for
Barth, the focus of our critical understanding, with all ancillary disciplines, at the very
most, bowing the knee to this hermeneutical focus.
18 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. by Sir Edwyn C. Hoskyns, 6
th edn. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1933), p. 6.
19 Ibid., p. 10.16
Of course, in our own day, as we have noted, the decline of the socio-political
standing of the church, at least in the west, can lead to a threat to any broad-based
theological approach. Any institution which finds itself on the back foot is
understandably tempted to adopt a more defensive, reactionary stance. One need only
take a cursory glance at the output from certain religious broadcasters to recognise the
paucity of any meaningful engagement with the real world, let alone with any cultural
component of that world.
In an attempt to counter such solipsism, Graham Ward argues, however, that
transgressing boundaries is indeed the raison d’être of theology.
20 It cannot exist
without the other. Or, as George Newlands has it, ‘Creative theology comes from new
combinations rather than standing in entrenched positions.’
21
The recognition that our world is ever-shrinking and that hitherto secure intellectual
boundaries are, if not under threat, certainly less capable of remaining rigid, behoves
all in the intellectual community to increasingly ‘bear with one another’ in a way that
was probably never anticipated by those active at the cusp of the Enlightenment. The
rapid intellectual expansion which marked the long eighteenth century coincidentally
provided us with the fragmentation of those philosophical ties which had bound the
arts and sciences to a more secure, unified vision. While many may celebrate that
such secure boundaries which existed, after all, as little more than a political fiction,
were at last crumbling, others have been left uneasy over the results of the drive to our
modern world. Current political and theological tensions which threaten not only
ecclesial structures, but the very fabric of our society can arguably be seen as a
symptom of an increasingly fractured world – a world where dialogue is sacrificed on
the altar of deterministic rhetoric and a desire for hegemony.
As a result, there are calls for a renewed mode of thinking which cuts across religious,
cultural and political barriers. One popular contemporary attempt at such a renewal is
to be found in Christopher Hitchens’s recent polemical God Is Not Great (2007)
where, in his concluding beatific vision, we read:
20 Graham Ward, Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory, 2
nd edn. (London: Macmillan Press,
2000), p.ix.
21 Newlands, Theology of the Love of God, p. 62.17
Above all, we are in need of a new Enlightenment, which will base itself
on the proposition that the proper study of mankind is man and woman.
This Enlightenment will not need to depend, like its predecessors, on the
heroic breakthroughs of a few gifted and exceptionally courageous people.
It is within the compass of the average person. The study of literature and
poetry, both for its own sake and for the ethical questions with which it
deals, can now easily depose the scrutiny of sacred texts that have been
found to be corrupt and confected. The pursuit of unfettered scientific
enquiry, and the availability of new findings to masses of people by easy
electronic means, will revolutionize our concepts of research and
development. Very importantly, the divorce between the sexual life and
fear, and the sexual life and disease, and the sexual life and tyranny, can
now at last be attempted, on the sole condition that we banish all religions
from the discourse. And all this and more is, for the first time in our
history, within the reach, if not the grasp of everyone.
22
What is remarkable about this passage is, firstly, the profoundly (some may say
overbearingly) optimistic tone. It appears to Hitchens that if we all would simply just
get along, everything – science, commerce, politics, ethics – everything that concerns
the human enterprise is resolvable in his grand unified panacea. Surely we have heard
this kind of rhetoric before? Indeed, it is not difficult to make the case that Hitchens’s
solution smacks of the very imperialistic attitude he seeks to condemn in the religions
which, in his opinion, ‘poison everything’.
23 Moreover, Hitchens’s presupposition that
the Enlightenment itself provided the unalloyed, progressive surge he wishes to be
replayed, is clearly a matter of some debate. One notable example in this respect
would be the infamous footnote to David Hume’s essay, Of National Characters:
I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for
there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.
There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white,
nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No
ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other
22 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), p. 283.
23 Ibid., p. 13.18
hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient
GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about
them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such
a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries
and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these
breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves
dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered any
symptoms of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up
amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In
JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning;
but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a
parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.
24
That Hume later revised these comments does not belittle their importance and,
indeed, it has been argued that the revision itself served to strengthen his already
established racist position:
The fact that Hume revised the note […] proves that Hume's racism was
deliberate rather than casual. The revision proves that Hume did seriously
consider objections to his racist position. His response, however, was to
sharpen his attack on blacks further. His racism should thus be read as
something he was willing to defend, rather than as an offhand remark.
25
We must, therefore, be cautious in bestowing an unqualified approbation upon every
aspect of the Enlightenment project.
26 Indeed, one can point to yet another even more
strident polemic, John Gray’s recent Black Mass (2008) where he argues apparently
contra Hitchens that ‘the Enlightenment ideologies of the past centuries were very
24 David Hume, ‘Of National Characters’ in Essays Moral, Political and Literary, ed. by Eugene F.
Miller, rev. edn. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 1987), p. 208.
25 John Immerwahr, ‘Hume's Revised Racism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Jul. -
Sep., 1992), 481-486.
26 There is evidence of racism, too, in Kant, in his early work, Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and the Sublime (1764). Chief among a number of critical accounts of an Enlightenment
tendency toward a more general absolutism is Max Horkheimer’s & Theodore Adorno’s Dialectic of
Enlightenment (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).19
largely spilt theology’.
27 In other words, the Enlightenment project itself can be
regarded, he argues, as a quasi-religious phenomenon that could never ultimately
succeed.
The second and more specific point of interest for our purposes lies in Hitchens’s
assessment of the responsibility of literature. Literature, it would seem, is to lay the
axe to the neck of Queen Theology, or at least Mother Church. Literature is seen as
the benign executioner of religion insofar as it serves to usurp the illegitimate
monarch of darkness and dogma and usher in an era of light and truth. Though in
broad sympathy with his contention that literature and poetry have much to offer (one
would have to be a book burner not to be), it is surely too much to suggest that
literature act as the judge and executioner of religion which, in the case of
Christianity, is itself founded upon literary texts. Christianity is a religion of the book.
Hitchens’s fundamental position is exposed at this point – he wants to be left alone.
He wants to be in his small corner and religion, if it must carry on at all, in an equally
small corner somewhere far, far away. But, as we have already noted, that is
something that theology, if it is to function in a meaningful way as the intellectual
enterprise borne out of religious reflection, simply cannot do – not because it
necessarily seeks to dominate (though it has tried hard enough over the centuries) but
because theology, like literature, remains a human discourse which cannot be wished
away.
The atmosphere, then, is not an easy one for relevant and enlightened inter-
disciplinary communication. Tensions clearly do exist. The rise of literary criticism,
Terry Eagleton informs us, was due to the failure of the church.
28 Such an assessment
is not likely to harmonize well with, for example, the theological ‘reaction’ known as
Radical Orthodoxy. This particular approach can be regarded as representative of that
same desire, outlined above, to restore the fortunes of theology within the Academy.
What is curious, however, is that the theological framework brought to bear in order
to achieve this restoration, appears somewhat at odds with the kind of rapprochement
27 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Penguin, 2008), p.
2.
28 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, 2
nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 20.20
I have sought to outline above and, indeed, to such an extent that Radical Orthodoxy
becomes an unwitting theological counterpart to the new atheism of Hitchens.
This temptation toward hegemony is precisely Steven Shakespeare’s chief concern
with the approach of Radical Orthodoxy. He argues that, in its, no doubt noble, desire
to reinstate theology to a place of eminence in the Academy, it unfortunately presents
itself as authoritarian and unwilling to accommodate itself to the wider world.
Shakespeare defines his criticism thus: ‘Neither the Christian story, nor the ways in
which that story is articulated through doctrine, can be sealed off from other stories,
theories and discourses.’
29 However, it appears the Church, for Radical Orthodoxy’s
champions, cannot be gainsaid. They do not go so far as to describe it as infallible,
(mainly because it is unclear exactly what is meant by ‘Church’) but in their push to
recharge the failing theological batteries of an institution bedevilled by the competing
voices thrown up by secularism, they, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes
deliberately, find themselves speaking with an imperious tone. This is ironic because
it is the power of the secular (or the pagan, as it is sometimes described) which
Radical Orthodoxy claims to seek to disarm. Quoting Althaus-Reid, Shakespeare
reinforces this particular charge:
Liberation theology takes account of the fragility of God in history, while
radical orthodoxy seems to have a God-ideal, outside failures and plateaus
of destitution.
30
Shakespeare’s assessment is that, in the agenda of Radical Orthodoxy, one power
broker has been exchanged for another. The proponents of Radical Orthodoxy have
failed to recognise what David Klemm describes as ‘the fatal flaw for theology
today’, namely ‘the failure to recognise the tragic defeat in the cultural domain of
truth by power’.
31 This exchange that Shakespeare alludes to comes about because
there can be no rapprochement between theology and the secular world. There are two
different languages that are being spoken and only one can ultimately speak for God.
29 Stephen Shakespeare, Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction (London: SPCK, 2007), p. 173.
30 Ibid., p. 159.
31 David Klemm, ‘Back to Literature – and Theology?’, in Postmodernism, Literature and the Future of
Theology, ed. by David Jasper (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), p. 182.21
And it is this latter point – the claim to speak authoritatively and exclusively for God
– which leads to the charge of solipsism, a church existing only and for itself.
More positively, towards the end of his study, Shakespeare provides his own broad
canvas upon which the future of theological studies might be painted. Having wrestled
with the tensions which appear endemic in the Radical Orthodoxy schema,
Shakespeare states:
Dialogue, Compassion and Unknowing might be the three marks of a
theology to come, because they are also ancient and woven into the texts
of Christian theology and the textures of Christian experience.
32
As a consequence, instead of speaking univocally, theology must be carried out in
dialogue. Instead of the apparent isolationism of the theological project as witnessed
in Radical Orthodoxy, the theological task is to be carried out, not only with an acute
awareness of the needs of the wider world, but with an active, compassionate
engagement with it. Lastly, instead of an overbearing sense of its own importance and
uniqueness of vision, the future theology must recognize its own epistemological
frailty and operate within a more humble framework.
What is striking about Shakespeare’s ‘marks’ is how they resonate with the nature and
activity of the novel form. The same marks of dialogue, compassion and unknowing
can be found in this, the most accessible and, despite the numerous prophetic calls
concerning its imminent demise, enduring works of art. Take, for example, the keen
insights of the novelist and critic, Milan Kundera. In his assessment of the fate of the
hero in the novel form he concludes:
Don Quixote is conquered. And with no grandeur whatever. For it is clear
immediately: human life as such is a defeat. All we can do in the face of
that ineluctable defeat called life is to try to understand it. That – that is
the raison d’être of the art of the novel.
33
32 Shakepeare, Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction, p. 180.
33 Milan Kundera, The Curtain, trans. by Linda Asher (London: Faber & Faber, 2007), p. 10.22
While one may wish to argue philosophical semantics with Kundera regarding the
nature and extent of the defeat faced by humanity, what is undoubtedly clear is his
sense of humility in the face of the human condition, and that the novelist’s task is to
seek in some small but vital way to come to terms with that state of affairs. Kundera,
in my view, succeeds here where the Radical Orthodox theologians have failed. He
recognizes the frailty of the human project. And it is frailty which serves as the
emotional, epistemological and artistic backcloth for all that follows in this study.
Without the sense of frailty, the work of art is but an ornament for display. Without
the sense of frailty, the artist is but another voice clamouring for attention in the
marketplace of competing voices. Without the sense of frailty the spiritual
connections that art strives, however fleetingly, to supply, are lost in the chaos of the
humdrum and banal.
The same can be said for theology. Without the sense of frailty, theology merely
attracts the dust of history with no living testimony to communicate. Without the
sense of frailty, the theologian becomes a clanging cymbal, occasionally resonating,
but more usually clashing, with the rest of the human orchestra. Without the sense of
frailty, the spiritual connections so often claimed are dissolved into an esoteric
language which serves no-one.
Such a relationship, rooted as it is in frailty, can be regarded as a practical
interdisciplinary outworking of Vattimo’s concern to offer a ‘weakening of Being’,
that is, the recognition that ‘reality is “reduced” to the conflict or play of
interpretation’.
34 Such an understanding shares much in common with Derrida’s
appreciation of play as ‘the disruption of presence’.
35 Vattimo is concerned to show
that such a play or conflict must inevitably cross cultural boundaries. His disavowal of
a metaphysics of presence and his adoption of what he describes as an ‘ontological
hermeneutics’ leads Vattimo to not only question the philosophical basis of atheism,
but also the status and activity of theology. Both are tempted by the same
misunderstanding of Being and, as a result, find themselves unable to communicate
34 Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. by Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia University Press,
2002), p. 51.
35 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’, in Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London:
Routledge, 2001), p. 369.23
meaningfully with one another – bound as they are by their own disciplinary
boundaries which are themselves sustained by a mutual adherence to a metaphysics of
presence. Vattimo, with his ‘weakening of Being’, opens the door, as it were, to a
mutual surrender to the play of interpretation. Such a surrender, he argues, asks
searching questions regarding the boundaries that have hitherto been set in place to
define and separate cultural disciplines, theology and literature included:
The fact is that it seems difficult to bring the issue to closure within such
restricted and precise (disciplinary) boundaries. Is ours a “religion of the
Book”, which we will leave eventually behind through the irresistible
process of secularization? Or, more important, do we belong to a culture
or civilization of the Book that still affects us deeply, even when we think,
or might think, that we no longer have anything in common with the
religion of the Book? Does this culture or civilization of the Book not
have any relation – at the same time both vague and deep – with the
religion of the Book, so much so that it becomes difficult to confine our
“history of interpretation” to the history of the interpretation of
Scripture?
36
Vattimo’s notion of a weakened ontology, or more accurately, an ontological
hermeneutics, paves the way for us to recognise the mutual frailty which constitutes
both theology and literature. Each can be of service to the other only when such
mutual frailty is discerned.
Literature generally, and the novel in particular, rather than adopting the judgmental
role that Hitchens envisions, becomes instead a fragile bearer of meaning. As such it
can, I believe, serve as a cultural partner to more persuasively achieve at least one of
the stated aims of Radical Orthodoxy, namely the reinstatement of theology as a
serious player in the Academy. This reinstatement cannot be at the expense of other
disciplines. Indeed, the mark of this study is to reinforce the lines of communication
between the arts and theology, and chiefly in the relationship between the novel and
36 Vattimo, After Christianity, p. 61.24
what I describe as a new, frail dogmatics. At all times the temptation toward cultural
hegemony must be resisted.
It is here, of course, that we are faced with the question of the metanarrative. Is the
rapprochement I am seeking, between theology and the novel, nothing more than a
shadowy attempt to sneak in by the back door simply one more grand unified and, by
extension, uncritical vision of reality? Certainly the idea of metanarrative has, since
Lyotard, lost much of its currency. For the postmodernist, notions of an overriding,
universal human experience which transcends the immediate text are, in reality,
regarded as representative of nothing more than politically interested rhetoric. There
are doubtless advantages to be had in the dismantling of such an idealistic schema, not
least the exposure of illegitimate hermeneutical strategies which serve only to
preserve an idiosyncratic ideological agenda.
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However, it seems to me that there is, when one attempts to engage in any kind of
meaningful dialogue between literature and theology, an unavoidable exposure to
metanarrative. We are inevitably forced to ask fundamental and uncomfortable
questions. Can literature, with all its hermeneutic potentiality sit comfortably with the
metaphysical and dogmatic baggage that theology brings in its wake? The risk is that,
paradoxically, the potentially fruitful interaction between theology (negatively
characterised as a dogmatic metaphysics) and literature (whose leitmotiv comprises
both freedom and frailty) is compromised by an equally dogmatic set of philosophical
presuppositions which preclude the oil of literature mixing with the water of
theology.
38 This study serves to provide, at least, a means to expose the prejudicial
tendencies which exist in both disciplines. Any meaningful rapprochement between
theology and literature, then, must reflect a willingness to, in Eagleton’s terms,
‘transgress discursive boundaries’.
39
37 See, for example, Anthony C. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1995), chs. 1 & 3.
38 On this particular tension see T. R. Wright, Theology and Literature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd,
1988), chapter 1.
39 Terry Eagleton, The Significance of Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 83.25
Overcoming the Separation Anxiety: Frailty, Imagination and Comedy
Terry Eagleton, himself, has recently noted that the assumption of literary theory as a
more-or-less secure cultural discipline in its own right has, in the light of current
socio-political shifts, found itself questioned. He recognises that ‘we need to imagine
new forms of belonging, which in our world are bound to be multiple rather than
monolithic’.
40 This, once again, seems a distance away from Hitchens’s ‘literature as
judge’ approach. Indeed, Eagleton goes further and, echoing Ward’s remarks above,
appears to recognise that the camp of literary studies needs to find its own cultural
partners:
To be inside and outside a position at the same time – to occupy a territory
while loitering sceptically on the boundary – is often where the most
intensely creative ideas stem from.
41
George Steiner, adopting a more quasi-metaphysical position, argues that ‘there is
language, there is art, because there is ‘the other’’.
42 That there is an audience for art,
or, to put it in Wittgensteinian parlance, the fact that there is no such thing as private
language, leads us remorselessly away from solipsism. Even the desire to hide one’s
art is only conceivable through the awareness that there is another from whom the
work of art is to be concealed. As Steiner puts it:
It is because the claims of the other’s presence reach so deeply into the
final precincts of aloneness that a creator may, in circumstances of
extremity, seek to guard for himself or for willed oblivion what are,
ineluctably, acts of communication and trials of encounter.
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What Steiner has helpfully pointed to here is a kind of artistic separation-anxiety
which inheres in all art. The creation stands alone and yet it is created to be, in some
sense, communicated to another. The work of art in this sense lies in a curious no-
40 Terry Eagleton, After Theory (London: Allen Lane, 2003), p. 21.
41 Ibid., p. 40.
42 George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), p. 137.
43 Ibid., p. 137.26
man’s land, both solitary and in communion. It is a thing in itself, and yet as
Heidegger well knew, it is something more.
Similarly, in the Oxford Handbook mentioned earlier, Elisabeth Jay recognises the
necessity of a corresponding geographical ambivalence on the part of theology, when
she states:
If ‘Theology’ can be translated as ‘discourse about God’ this begs a
number of questions as to what kind of ‘God-talk’ is permitted or implied,
and who, at any particular time, is entitled to do the talking.
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There is, then, between theology and literature a shared epistemological anxiety or
frailty. In the light of this, then, we are forced to ask: if there can be some kind of
rapprochement between literature and theology, what form would it take, and how
would it come about? As we have already hinted in our aversion to any form of
cultural hegemony, it is clear that we must be careful not to fall into the trap of
confusing the novel and theology. There are indeed two distinct narrative voices
which are in play in this study. It is how these voices interact with one another which
forms the key to any kind of potentially fruitful communion.
In this regard, Stanley Fish has informed us that such a ‘pure’ interdisciplinary
approach ‘is more than hard to do; it is impossible to do’.
45 This is a necessary
corrective in that it exposes those very perspectives and prejudices that one cannot but
bring along from one discipline in an attempt to engage with another. As he puts it,
we have to face the fact of ‘the unavailability of a perspective that is not culturally
determined’.
46 Paul Ricoeur makes much the same point, and indeed goes further,
with his important hermeneutical notion of ‘distantiation’ which, as Kearney claims,
‘demonstrates that understanding always labours within the historical horizon of an
intersubjective communication where we interpret meanings that have been
44 Elisabeth Jay, ‘“Now and in England”’, in The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and
Theology, p. 4.
45 Stanley Fish, ‘Being Interdisciplinary Is So Very Hard To Do’, in There's No Such Thing as Free
Speech, and It's a Good Thing Too (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 237-8.
46 Ibid., p. 238.27
‘distantiated’ from subjective consciousness.’
47 In other words, for Ricoeur, not only
is interdisciplinary activity hard to do, the act of interpretation itself cannot be guided
by some overarching transcendental subjective ego.
Clearly then, there are methodological difficulties when it comes to any kind of
meaningful interaction. Interdisciplinarity at all times threatens to become a practical
expression of the myth of Sisyphus. However, one cannot allow the potential hazards
to overwhelm any attempt towards meaningful dialogue. It is enough to be aware of
them and, in that awareness, to forge some kind of mutually beneficial contact.
Indeed, I would suggest along with Fish, that this awareness borne out of frailty is the
only context within which there can be any meaningful struggle for epistemological
coherence. As Fish, himself, states:
It is only because we cannot achieve an ‘authentic critique’ – a critique
free from any political or conceptual entanglements – that the critiques we
do achieve have their force, even if it is the nature of things for the forces
of those critiques to be as vulnerable and as transient as the conditions that
give them form.
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Additionally, we must emphasise that, in this dialogue born out of frailty, the mutual
use of the imagination to both literature and theology. As Gordon Kaufmann has it:
The proper business of theology (theos-logos) is the analysis, criticism
and reconstruction of the image/concept of God, therefore theology is (and
always has been) essentially an activity of imaginative construction.
49
The use of the imagination has a chequered history in theological circles. Human
fancy, one assumes, could lead to any number of heterodox positions. St. Paul
graphically illustrates this for us when he writes to Timothy:
47 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005), p.
31.
48 Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It's a Good Thing Too, p. 242.
49 Gordon D. Kaufman, ‘Theology as Imaginative Construction’, The Journal of the American
Academy of Religion Vol. 50, No. 1 (Mar., 1982), 73-79.28
The Spirit says expressly that in after times some will desert from the faith
and give their minds to subversive doctrines inspired by devils, through
the specious falsehoods of men whose own conscience is branded with the
devil’s sign.
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Aquinas, more specifically, as one might imagine, focussed this anxiety when he
observed that imagination makes ‘everything other than it is’.
51 The sense that
imagination was in some sense a maverick faculty persisted, as we shall see later, into
Fielding’s day, colouring much of the criticism of the period. And it is fair to suggest
that the suspicion of imagination has not entirely left our cultural subconscious. For
example, the analyses of the work of art by continental thinkers such as Barthes,
Foucault and Derrida, have left many uneasy as to the possibility of reaching any
general sense of the meaning of art beyond a poststructuralist abandonment of the
subject and its consequent adoption of the troublesome hermeneutic of a never-ending
play of signs. However, it is the contention of this study that, despite (and possibly
because of) the risks, imagination in the context of human frailty offers us a means to
forging a constructive dialogue.
Paradoxically, another continental thinker, Julia Kristeva, can be of assistance in this
regard. Known for her thesis of the melancholic imagination which finds its roots in a
bleak awareness of the separation of the individual from the other, Kristeva does
explore the possibility of approaching the imagination from another, more hopeful
angle – that of an imagination rooted in the comedic. Kearney, on Kristeva’s behalf,
asks the question, ‘Is it possible that our post-modern culture might produce works
capable of engendering in us a new imaginaire de la comédie?’
52 The motive behind
such a question is found in her desire to overcome the alienation Kristeva believes to
have blighted much of our post-war existence. The joyful potential of play with the
other becomes, for her, a key component in a recovered hermeneutic of love. In other
words, comedy and play become the means by which alienation is overcome.
50 1 Timothy 4:1. (New English Bible).
51 Richard Kearney, Poetics of Imagining, 2
nd edn. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p.
3.
52 Ibid., p. 200.29
This, in essence, and returning to Shakespeare’s three ‘marks’, is what I am offering
in this study, namely a theology which is in dialogue with the novel, a theology which
learns from the compassion of the novel, and a theology which sees in the novel a
partner in the ‘understanding of life’ as envisioned by Kundera. The novelist who
himself saw his work as precisely this ‘understanding of life’, and whose work will
form the focus of our study is Henry Fielding.
Why Fielding?
There are a number of reasons for selecting Henry Fielding as the focus for this study.
Firstly, and as we shall shortly examine in more detail, Fielding can be broadly
regarded as one of the pioneers of the art form we have come to know as the novel.
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Beyond such temporal priority, this historical dimension has a number of facets, not
least Fielding’s handling of the theological and ethical concerns of a period of
particular theological and philosophical ferment.
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, Fielding has left us with, not only his
fiction, but at the same time his own idiosyncratic interpretation of that fiction. He is
the most self-conscious of the early exponents of the novel form, providing us with,
even as he rides along with either Abraham Adams or Tom Jones, a critical analysis
of what he believes he is doing in writing. As such, he offers us considerable insight
into the relationship between, amongst other things, theology and literature.
Lastly, Fielding is a comic writer. The ‘ridiculous’ forms a large part of Fielding’s
literary focus and for our purposes provides an excellent example of the way in which
human frailty can become a means by which theology and literature can serve one
another. Even in his last major work, the darker Amelia, bears witness to this self-
same human frailty.
53 There are, of course, a number who dispute this claim and who, somewhat pedantically, wish to
regard almost every work of fiction ever produced as somehow ‘novel’. What is clear is that, like any
other art form, the novel did indeed have literary precursors who shared with the new genre stylistic
similarities of plot and characterisation. For one of the recent dissenting voices see Margaret Doody,
The True History of the Novel (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1996).30
I therefore intend to show that, in his fiction, Fielding offers us a way in to the cultural
space that Ward and others have described. This ‘way in’ is not intended as a
monolithic hermeneutical tool which serves to close off any other interpretative route.
Rather, it forms my own idiosyncratic avenue through which we can rediscover the
strong connections between theology and the arts, and literature in particular. This
idiosyncrasy forms a vital component in this study as its overarching hermeneutical
horizon is that of human fragility. In this respect, human frailty can be regarded as a
cultural catalyst towards a greater understanding between theology and literature. The
fiction of Henry Fielding, as we shall see, provides us with ample evidence of his
awareness that both literature and theology are bonded by the ludicrous nature of the
human condition. It is with this in mind, then, that we seek to explore what I have
called literary and theological misplacement – a term which we shall examine more
closely in due course, but which, at this stage, we have broadly defined as a parting
with the ineffable.
Such misplacement is illustrated for us in a number of ways in Fielding’s fiction. We
shall examine in turn the epistemological framework of Fielding’s fiction, the nature
of the comedic form in his hands, the creative act and its relationship to criticism and
blasphemy, particular ethical and theological issues which pertain in Fielding’s
fiction, i.e. virtue, providence and justice and, finally, Fielding’s understanding of
mimesis, canon and revelation. Each area, as I hope to show, serves to reinforce the
connections between literature and theology in such a way as to recognise the mutual
frailty through which both exercise their artistic activity.
At the outset, however, it is important to make clear that we will not be bound by a
purely forensic or historical assessment of Fielding’s fiction.
54 The scope of this study
is necessarily wide-ranging, involving as it does the disciplines of theology and
philosophy as well as literary studies. I hope, however, in this wide exploration, not to
dilute the distinctive part each has to play but, rather to enhance each of their roles in
their mutual service of the pursuit towards a greater understanding between theology
and literature. So, in pursuit of our goal of a rapprochement between literature and
theology, we will set in close proximity Fielding scholars such as Battestin and
54 See Chapter 1.31
Paulson and philosophers and theorists such as Heidegger, Derrida and Vattimo, as
well as theologians like Ward and Caputo. In addition, we will have occasion to
compare Fielding’s fiction with that of authors such as Murdoch, Vonnegut and
Calvino. These seemingly unlikely partnerships, I believe, serve to show the capacity
for Fielding’s fiction to provide for us the perfect example of a kaleidoscopic cultural
space wherein both literature and theology can more freely communicate.
Italo Calvino, himself, (though speaking in the context of the relationship between
philosophy and literature) summarises well the tension and any potential resolution
between the two disciplines of literature and theology when he states:
And so the wrangle goes on, with each side confident of having taken a
step ahead in the conquest of truth, or at least of a truth, and at the same
time perfectly well aware that the raw material of its own constructions is
the same as that of the opposition: words. But words, like crystals, have
facets and axes of rotation with different properties, and light is refracted
differently according to how these word crystals are placed, and how the
polarizing surfaces are cut and superimposed. The clash between
philosophy and literature does not need to be resolved. On the contrary,
only if we think of it as permanent but ever new does it guarantee us that
the sclerosis of words will not close over us like a sheet of ice.
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This unresolvability, which Calvino suggestively describes, provides for us a useful
launch point for our present discussion. Calvino’s assessment, at one level, may
appear somewhat fatalistic – we have to live with the tension. But that, he says, is the
way to contend with tension. Removing the tension between disciplines is, in many
respects, no more an option than removing liquid from water – it goes with the
territory. However, these territories can find themselves transformed from within in
such a way that communication between literature and theology becomes, not only
desirable, but vital to both camps. Such a re-visioning can be painful as well-loved
securities are challenged, but the resulting fruitful dialogue ought to be well worth the
struggle. Each partner – theology and literature - can engage on a common journey to
55 Italo Calvino, ‘Philosophy and Literature’, in The Literature Machine, trans. by Patrick Creagh
(London: Secker & Warburg, 1987), p. 40.32
a common, though insecure, space. Being found in that space, each is thus given room
to breathe a different air - and thereby be of service to the other in way which does no
violence to the integrity of either. And, as Calvino tells us, the prism of words will
guide our colourful steps.33
Chapter One
History, Hiddenness and Misplacement
The Historical Constriction of Henry Fielding
One evening there came into his soul the desire to fashion an image of The
Pleasure that abideth for a Moment. And he went forth into the world to
look for bronze. For he could only think in bronze.
But all the bronze of the whole world had disappeared, nor anywhere in
the whole world was there any bronze to be found, save only of the image
of The Sorrow that endureth for Ever.
Now this image, he himself, and with his own hands, fashioned, and had
set it on the tomb of the one thing he had loved in life. On the tomb of the
dead thing he had loved he had set this image of his own fashioning, that
it might serve as a sign of the love of man that dieth not, and a symbol of
the sorrow of man that endureth for ever. And in the whole world there
was no other bronze save the bronze of this image.
And he took the image he had fashioned, and set it in a great furnace, and
gave it to the fire.
And out of the bronze of the image of The Sorrow that endureth for Ever
he fashioned an image of The Pleasure that abideth for a Moment.
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The above is an example of what Oscar Wilde termed ‘Poems in Prose’, a form that
utilizes poetic intensity without adopting conventional structure such as metrical or
stanzaic patterns. Baudelaire appears to have been Wilde’s chief influence in this
regard. The form itself, Isobel Murray informs us, did not gain in popularity, and
remained, it would appear, the aesthetic choice of those disenchanted with, amongst
56 Oscar Wilde, The Artist in Complete Shorter Fiction, ed. by Isobel Murray (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), p. 253.34
other things, the neo-classical rules which governed various genres. It remained the
preference of radicals.
I mention this as an introduction to Henry Fielding, who, though by no means a
political, or indeed, broadly speaking, aesthetic radical, did introduce to us what he
described as his ‘comic epic poem-in-prose’, that somewhat clumsy catch-all term
which has come down to us as the precursor of the modern and dominant literary
term, ‘the novel’. As I hinted at in the Introduction, much ink has been spent on the
extent to which one can legitimately place Fielding at the vanguard of novelistic
history.
57 Since Ian Watt’s hugely influential study The Rise of the Novel (1957), there
has been a succession of studies either broadly affirming or sharply criticizing Watt’s
main thesis, namely that the success of the genre depended chiefly in its being placed
specifically in a socio-historical milieu which increasingly provided opportunity for
individual development. The novel, for Watt, becomes, as he put it in a later work, a
‘myth of individualism’.
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Without entering into the complexities of the historical debate as to the origin of the
novel, it seems clear enough that Watt recognised correctly (and, one has to admit,
obviously) that the significant key to the success of the novel is precisely this
individualistic component. More communal aesthetic productions, i.e. the drama,
were, with the rise of print culture, open to what amounted to an economic as well as
an aesthetic challenge. Political events, such as Walpole’s Licensing Act of 1737
(which had a direct detrimental effect on Fielding as a hitherto successful theatrical
writer/producer), were to further interiorize the artistic sensibilities. Within this
cultural space the novel found a home, and Fielding was one of the first to move in.
However, it would be a mistake to ground the success of the novel in purely Marxist
terms. The novel itself transcends those socio-historical boundaries which, at first
sight, seem to constrain it. I find myself in agreement with Iris Murdoch who argues
that ‘nothing is more paralysing than a sense of historical perspective, especially in
57 There are those who argue, for example, that the novel as we understand it only came into being in
the nineteenth century. See Homer Obed Brown, Institutions of the English Novel: From Defoe to Scott
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
58 For a summary of the critical reception of Watt’s Rise thesis, see Brean Hammond and Shaun Regan,
Making the Novel: Fiction and Society in Britain, 1660-1789 (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006).35
literary matters’.
59 This is what I believe E. M. Forster was suggesting, albeit in a
broader context, in his 1927 Clark Lectures at Cambridge, when he described the
novel as ‘that spongy tract’.
60 Forster was determined that the novel itself remain
unfettered by determinism. He was happy to proclaim the slogan: ‘History develops,
Art stands still’.
61 He was not, of course, thereby suggesting that art cannot be
informed by history – that would be literally fanciful. Rather, the work of art
generally and the novel in particular has to be, paraphrasing Eliot, ‘not consecrated by
time, but to be seen beyond time.’
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It is this approach I seek to follow in the present study. My argument is that the rise of
the novel, informed as we have seen by the concomitant rise of the individual, is also
informed by a theological component, which I describe as parting with the ineffable.
There are, in this argument, certain historical touchpoints that clearly need to be
acknowledged; for example, the basic facts that the novel as we understand it was
developing on the cusp of the Enlightenment, with all the philosophical and scientific
ramifications that this entails. However, what I am suggesting in this study, much as
Forster has in his Clark Lectures, is that the novel moves beyond those particular
historical constraints and must be examined, less as an artefact than as a living work
of art, renewed at every moment. Further, I am suggesting that theology, itself as an
informing component in the development of the novel, be viewed in exactly the same
way.
The temptation in theological circles is, like Jacob and the Angel, to consistently
wrestle with history. There is, of course, a certain inevitability about this insofar as the
Christian faith is concerned, defined as it is by the historical crisis of the Incarnation.
History determines faith and faith subsequently, as the somewhat ambiguous
experience of the Emperor Constantine attests, changes history. So, for example, we
find Max Weber, in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5),
pointing to a particular expression of the rise of individuality, in the guise of a
reformed, but self-interested spirituality, which leads to specific economic
59 Iris Murdoch, Under the Net (London: Vintage, 2002), p. 21.
60 E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 38.
61 Ibid., p. 36.
62 T. S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism (London: Methuen, 1960), p. 3.36
consequences.
63 Once again, however, as with Ian Watt’s explanation of the rise of
the novel, one can suggest that this is not a wholly representative picture of
theological experience. Theology, like the novel, cannot be bounded by history. There
is a transcendent element to theological experience which defies the temporal.
Nonetheless, what I am suggesting is that the incarnation of the novel form provides
for us a means by which we can recover not only a particular historical connection
between the novel and theology, namely the parting with the ineffable, but also, a
broader transcendent connection between the novel and theology which serves as a
means to understand more clearly the mysterious workings of both art forms.
And it is here that I am returned to the prose poem of Oscar Wilde. We discover in
this poem in prose the cost that must be borne for a work to be revealed; we
recognise, too, that, though there is sacrifice, there is a resultant hope, and that this
hope, though fleeting, is what drives the artist to move beyond himself to expose the
glorious and mysterious frailty of the human condition. What can be said of the work
of art, I believe, can and ought to be said for theology, and it is with this desire in
mind that I approach our study of Henry Fielding.
April 22
nd 2007 marked the 300
th anniversary of Henry Fielding’s birth. To celebrate
this tercentenary, Cambridge University Press published a volume dedicated to the
great man.
64 Each of the essays in the volume follows a broadly socio-historical
interpretative path. So we find pieces on Fielding’s theatrical, journalistic and legal
careers as well as, of course, his ‘new province of writing’ – the novel.
65 We have
essays on Fielding’s style and, to a lesser extent, on Fielding’s political and moral
sensibilities. Leaving aside Charles Knight’s contribution, ‘Fielding’s Afterlife’,
66
there is a broadly static examination of the man and his work. This volume followed a
conference held in 2004 at Yale University to mark the 250
th anniversary of Fielding’s
demise. What is of some note is the range of papers presented at this commemorative
63 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1987).
Weber’s thesis has, of course, been challenged in several key areas. For a more sophisticated
assessment see particularly the classic Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926) where it is argued
that one cannot confine the rise of capitalism chiefly to Calvinism, as Weber had suggested. R. H.
Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London: John Murray, 1964), especially pp. 319-321.
64 Claude Rawson,ed., The Cambridge Companion to Henry Fielding (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
65 Henry Fielding, Tom Jones, ed. by Sheridan Baker (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), II.i.53.
Hereafter, Tom Jones.
66 The Cambridge Companion to Henry Fielding, pp. 175-188.37
conference. Of the twelve papers read, all but two or three appear to present socio-
historical assessments of Fielding and his work. Of these, Joseph Roach’s, “‘The
Uncreating Word’: Silence and Unspoken Thought in Fielding’s Drama” seems to
suggest a less traditional approach.
67 It may be unfair to criticise this balance of
studies in the context of either a celebratory collection or an anniversary conference,
but it does appear to be symptomatic of the direction Fielding scholarship has taken
over these last two and a half centuries.
John Unsworth some time ago pointed out the tendency in Fielding scholarship to
approach his work in general and Tom Jones in particular, in a broadly synchronic
fashion.
68 Large numbers of critical studies testify to just such an approach.
69 There is
a common and understandable desire to seek to explore Fielding’s works within their
peculiar historical and cultural context and thereby provide a more or less prescribed
(not to say, ‘pure’) reading. Burke makes clear the extent of this temporal significance
when he states, ‘the chronological position [of Fielding’s works] alone indicates that
they somehow affected the direction prose fiction would take in the future.’
70 The
very weight of being first in what has become a long literary line behoves critics to
value that position and investigate it accordingly.
Thus, we have studies reflecting Fielding’s general approach to politics and more
particularly to the ’45.
71 Fielding’s perception of the authorial process in its specific
historical context has received massive coverage.
72 His attitude to religion (a factor, as
Porter points out, which was of no little import in the mid eighteenth century given
67 For the conference agenda, see the website:
http//beinecke.library.yale.edu/events/Henry%20Fielding%20Website/Fielding%20Agenda.htm
68 John Unsworth, ‘The Comedy of Knowledge’, Modern Language Quarterly, 48 No. 3 (1987), 233-
253.
69 See John A. Stoler and Richard D. Fulton, Henry Fielding: An Annotated Bibliography of Twentieth
Century Criticism (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1980).
70 John Burke Jr., ‘History Without History’, in A Provision of Human Nature: Essays on Fielding and
Others in Honor of Miriam Austin Locke, ed. by Donald Kay (University, AL: University of Alabama
Press, 1977), p. 45.
71 See, for example, Martin Battestin, ‘Fielding’s Changing Politics and Joseph Andrews’, Philological
Quarterly, 39 (1960), 39-55. Anthony Kearney, ‘Tom Jones and the Forty-Five’, Ariel 4 (1973), 68-78.
Thomas R. Cleary, ‘Jacobitism in Tom Jones: The Basis for an Hypothesis’, Philological Quarterly, 52
(1973), 239-51.
72 See, for example, Sheridan Baker, ‘Fielding and the Irony of Form’, Eighteenth Century Studies, 2
(1968), 138-54; Thomas Lockwood, ‘Matter and Reflection in Tom Jones’, ELH, 45 (1978), 226-35.38
that ‘practically everyone, in his own fashion, had faith’
73), has likewise been
extensively covered.
74
Fielding, himself, appears to confirm the validity of such a socio-historical
interpretative strategy when he describes his work as a ‘great Creation’.
75 This, it has
been argued, is suggestive of the immense influence of the Lockean epistemological
schema which finds its way onto the pages of Tom Jones.
76 In the preface, Fielding
sets out his goal in Tom Jones in the preliminary Bill of Fare: ‘The provision, then,
which we have here made is no other than HUMAN NATURE.’
77 This outwardly
empiricist agenda would inevitably suggest a subsequent literary execution based
upon similar principles.
Such a critique has clearly shed much light upon the socio-historical determinants
brought to bear upon Fielding and his work. It can safely be said that Fielding’s
almost unique position as an author at the nativity of the novel form led to his work
being studied in this way. The context, rather than the text, has served as the primary
key to exploring Fielding’s ‘new province’.
Approaching the issue from a less synchronic perspective, however, one may suggest
that many such critics are guilty of what Derrida describes as the ‘sin of
explicationism’.
78 So, for example, we find Ian Watt berating what he regarded as the
shallowness of characterisation within Fielding’s work and focussing upon the
mechanical intricacies of the plot which contrasted with earlier romance. The end
result of such investigation is Watt’s confirmation that novels like Tom Jones only
exist to preserve the social agenda of the privileged class.
79 Context comes before text
in this and many of the studies cited above, and such temporally driven interpretative
73 Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 168.
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Shesgreen, ‘The Moral Function of Thwackum, Square, and Allworthy’, Studies in the Novel, 2 (1970),
159-67.
75 Tom Jones, X.I.337.
76 Ronald Paulson, The Life of Henry Fielding (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 209-10.
77 Tom Jones, I.i.25.
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79 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (London: Pimlico, 2000), p. 269.39
strategies ignore, I believe, Fielding’s own subversive modus operandi at several key
areas of experience, as we shall discover in due course.
Unsworth is cognisant of this state of affairs and his particular critical strategy appears
to centre on a desire to move away from a straightforward didactic interpretation and
promote, to adopt Barthes’ terminology, a less ‘readerly’ approach to Fielding. He
argues that a critical component in such an open response is the awareness of the
discrepancy of knowledge within novels such as Tom Jones and Joseph Andrews. This
intellectual shortfall is not simply an empirical part of the plot of each work. It is
integral to our response as readers for we, too, in our reading, become acutely aware
of our own limited understanding. As Unsworth puts it, ‘We as […] readers, are
revealed to have had an epistemological status, a fallibility and a dependency, no
different from the characters.’
80 The shortfall in our epistemology is not confined to
the plot alone, but extends, I take it, to the multitude of ethical and metaphysical
judgements that are made throughout Fielding’s fiction. The consequences for reading
Fielding are thus opened beyond the essentialist approach of most recent scholarship.
Intriguingly, however, when one does adopt a socio-historical perspective, we
discover that Fielding’s comedy is being generated in the very century increasingly
occupied with system and classification, all of which, in Pope, has clear theological
overtones:
Vast chain of being, which from God began,
Natures æthereal, human, angel, man,
Beast, bird, fish insect! what no eye can see,
No glass can reach! from Infinite to thee,
From thee to Nothing!
81
However, all is not as secure as it may appear from the above and from other elegiac
pieces regarding the development of the scientific method such as Pope’s famous
‘Epitaph’:
80 Unsworth, ‘The Comedy of Knowledge’, p. 253.
81 Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle I.viii, ed. by Maynard Mack (London: Methuen, 1982), p.
45.40
Nature, and Nature’s laws lay hid in night.
God said, Let Newton be! And all was light.
82
The notion of the great chain of being, itself, came under attack from those who for
differing reasons remained unconvinced by this particular metanarrative. Bishop
Butler, for example, in his sermon Upon the Ignorance of Man attacks the
presumption of any complete control of God’s creation:
Creation is absolutely and entirely out of our depth, and beyond the extent
of our utmost reach. And yet it is as certain that God made the world, as it
is certain that effects must have a cause. It is indeed in general no more
than effects, that the most knowing are acquainted with: for as to causes
they are as entirely in the dark as the most ignorant. What are the laws by
which matter acts upon matter, but certain effects; which some, having
observed to be frequently repeated, have reduced to general rules? The
real nature and essence of beings likewise is what we are altogether
ignorant of. All these things are so entirely out of our reach, that we have
not the least glimpse of them. And we know little more of ourselves, than
we do of the world about us.
83
Voltaire is more specific and politically barbed in his criticism:
The gradation of beings which ascends from the lightest atom to the
supreme being, this ladder of the infinite, strikes one with wonder. But
when one looks at it attentively this great phantasm vanishes, as formerly
all apparitions fled at the crowing of the cock.
At first the imagination is gratified by the imperceptible passage from
brute matter to organized matter, from plants to zoophytes, from the
zoophytes to animals, from these to man, from man to spirits from these
spirits, dressed in little aerial bodies, to immaterial substances, and finally
to a thousand different orders of these substances which ascend from
82 Alexander Pope, Selected Poetry, ed. by Pat Rogers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 67.
83 Joseph Butler, Sermon XV. ‘Upon the Ignorance of Man’, in Butler’s Sermons (Oxford: The
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beauty to perfection and finally to god himself. This hierarchy much
pleases decent folk, who liken it to the pope and his cardinals followed by
the archbishops and the bishops, after whom come rectors, vicars, simple
priests, deacons, sub-deacons; then appear the monks, and the march-past
ends with the capuchins.
84
Can it be argued, however, that the chain found itself already threatened by the
development of the novel (and particularly the comic novel) which provided an
epistemological check upon the confidence of the system builders? These system
builders, it would appear, mirror the humourless agélastes described by Kundera,
85 in
that they are self-deluded into believing that their thinking actually forms a consistent
and stable foundation. Indeed, can it be suggested that such a uniform picture of the
broader philosophical Enlightenment and, more specifically, the artistic Augustan
milieu out of which the novel came to develop and ultimately flourish, was far from
secure? Pope’s confident assertions in his Essay on Man (1734) are somewhat
tempered by the earlier The Dunciad (1728), in which he ironically celebrates the new
Augustan Age:
This, this is He, foretold by ancient rhymes,
Th’Augustus born to bring Saturnian times.
86
The reference to ‘Saturnian times’ reflected, of course, the antithesis of the very
stability the Augustan age was intended to herald. The ‘new worlds’ that art can create
(An Essay on Criticism, 486) (1711), no longer reflect the providentially controlled
and benign world that we inhabit, rather, they are an echo of a strange and portentous
one. Henry Fielding, himself, suggested in his poem, ‘Of True Greatness’ (1743) that
there is ‘no Augustan Age’,
87 thereby implying a suspicion of any artificially re-
created stable society. On the contrary, art, as Fielding’s own experience as a
controversial dramatist amply illustrates, is a deeply subversive vehicle. Indeed, in
84 Voltaire, ‘The Great Chain’ in Miracles and Idolatry, trans. by Theodore Besterman (London:
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one of his earliest and best-known plays, Tom Thumb (1730), later turned into The
Tragedy of Tragedies (1731) we find Fielding explicitly attacking the notion of the
metaphor so commonly adopted to foster a sense of universal security:
Noodle. Sure, Nature means to break her solid Chain,
Or else unfix the World, and in a Rage
To hurl it from its Axletree and Hinges;
All things are so confus’d…
88
This seems more in tune, (though nowhere near so sourly put), with Matthew Arnold
in the next century, who, berating a preacher who advocated that mankind should be
in harmony with nature, wrote:
‘In Harmony with Nature?’ Restless fool,
Who with such heat dost preach what were to thee,
When true, the last impossibility –
To be like Nature strong, like Nature cool!
Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
And in that more lie all his hopes of good.
Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood;
Nature is stubborn, man would fain adore;
Nature is fickle, man hath need of rest;
Nature forgives no debt, and fear no grave;
Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest.
Man must begin, know this, where Nature ends;
Nature and man can never be fast friends.
Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!
89
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Rawson is ultimately led to state that Fielding ‘occupies a special ambiguous position
between an older world of aristocratic and neo-classic loyalties, and newer forces, one
of whose literary manifestations is the novel-form itself’.
90 One can sense, then, (as
has been previously alluded to in relation to Hitchens) that it would be presumptuous
to apply any kind of fixed optimistic agenda to the period in question, and to Henry
Fielding in particular. It would appear, rather, that the early eighteenth century itself
was a period of religious and philosophical ambivalence. Such ambivalence finds a
ready focus in the very nature of art itself, where we discern an inbuilt subversive
strategy which seeks to undermine those uniocular systems set up to enable us to
understand and thereby control our world. The novel, as part of that insidious artistic
activity, thus becomes the place ‘where no one owns the truth and everyone has the
right to be understood’.
91
Can it be, as a result of this, that the chain of being invoked to provide this controlling
presence has, in the form of the novel, been replaced by a less ambitious, but perhaps
more useful chain of messages? Assessing the hermeneutical strategy of Vattimo,
Luca D’Isanto argues that very point:
There is an awareness of belonging to a chain of messages as a moment in
a process, which can never come to closure, which includes and
transcends them. Such a chain is discontinuous insofar as it is interrupted
by the rhythm of mortal generations that come into being and then pass
away. The chain of messages consists in the historical-natural languages
that make every experience of the world possible.
92
It would appear that any so-called fixed frame of vision cannot be regarded as
legitimate. The static and powerful chain of being is reduced to a fragile and fleeting
chain of messages. In a word, metaphysics is reduced to story.
90 C. J. Rawson, Henry Fielding and the Augustan Ideal Under Stress (London: Routledge & Kegan
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Henry Fielding: Deconstructivist?
Developing from this broad historical and epistemological assessment, my specific
aim is to reap a harvest from Fielding’s work which is, as Doreen Roberts has
commented, ‘ripe for deconstruction’.
93 Given the weight of history which lies heavy
upon Fielding research, such an aim may appear, at first glance, presumptuous or
worse, a critical blasphemy. As a kind of preparatory defence, I would suggest that a
more general claim for deconstruction has already been made. Recently, Mary-
Elisabeth Fowkes Tobin pointed to the differing expectations held by generations of
readers separated, not merely by time, but by an apparently irreconcilable critical
discord.
94
The very design and narrative artfulness which delighted the likes of the eighteenth-
century Scottish philosopher-poet, James Beattie,
95 two centuries later became the
precise target of Frank Kermode who despised the narrative which comforts rather
than questions the reader. In her study, Tobin illustrates the cultural gap that
inevitably grows with the accretion of years. More significantly, however, she
attempts to reveal the cultural bias (one might say ‘fashion’) that is to be found in
every generation. The so-called post-modern mind, she argues, has little use for tight-
knit plots and obligatory cosy endings. What becomes precious is the dissonance
which, it is suggested, is closer to the lived human experience. As Tobin states,
‘Eighteenth-century readers made order in disorder. Arguably, we make disorder in
order.’
96
Despite finding myself disagreeing with her bald assertion that happy endings
inevitably formed a literary requirement of a world less ordered than our own,
97 Tobin
(it seems unwittingly) makes the valid point that it is all too easy for us to cut
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ourselves off from what we regard as competing or defunct ideologies. Her plea is to
seek out ‘subversive texts, or subversion within dominant ideological texts’.
98 It is
precisely such a search that is intended here.
Continuing my case for a deconstructive approach to Fielding, I would suggest that
rather being the relativistic, or indeed nihilistic caricature that some try to paint
deconstruction as,
99 there is a quality about this approach which is fundamentally in
harmony with the sense of fragility which characterises this particular study. Walter
Lowe makes the point clearly when he says that:
Deconstruction implicitly depicts the human condition as a condition of
radical brokenness and insecurity – and it (implicitly) depicts this situation
as true. As a depiction of the human condition, this provides a basis, albeit
a rather tragic basis, for human solidarity.
100
What I would wish to develop from Lowe’s sensitive analysis is that, echoing my
earlier comments, there is in fact a comedic as well as a tragic dimension to this
awareness of radical brokenness. Indeed, it is in the comedic form that I believe this
fragility is recognised at its most acute.
Further to this point, when we examine Fielding’s appellation of his work as a ‘comic
epic-poem in prose’, we surely find ourselves presented with not simply a convenient,
if somewhat clumsy technical term, but in fact a term that is understood through
difference. Fielding describes the term for us thus:
Now a comic Romance is a comic Epic-Poem in Prose; differing from
Comedy, as the Serious Epic from Tragedy: its Action being more
extended and comprehensive; containing a much larger Circle of
Incidents, and introducing a greater Variety of Characters. It differs from
the serious Romance in its Fable and Action, in this; that as in the one
98 Ibid., p. 220.
99 See, for example, Roger Scruton’s polemical Upon Nothing (Swansea: University College Swansea,
1993). In this lecture, Scruton describes Derrida as nothing less than the devil.
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these are grave and solemn, so in the other they are light and ridiculous: it
differs in its Characters, by introducing Persons of inferiour Rank, and
consequently of inferiour Manners, whereas the grave Romance, sets the
highest before us; lastly in its Sentiments and Diction, by preserving the
Ludicrous instead of the Sublime.
101 (italics mine)
While it is understandable that many have looked to Fielding’s preface in Joseph
Andrews for a deeper understanding of the nature of the new form known as the
novel, one can see immediately that one of the key characteristics lies in the fact that
Fielding saw it as different. The comic epic-poem in prose, as well as being an attempt
at the definition of the novel form, is also an exercise in difference. Though Fielding
informs us of the genres from which his comic Epic-Poem in prose differs, this does
not tell us precisely what his new province of writing is. There is a certain openness to
the new form which, despite even Fielding’s preface, defies any strict definition. To
this extent, I would suggest, that from the very first moment, there is opportunity to
regard the novel form in Fielding’s hands as worthy of deconstructive analysis.
In concluding for the defence, I do find myself agreeing with those who recognise that
the philosophical seeds of deconstruction were sown long before the likes of Lyotard
and Derrida. It can be argued that the very century which brought us the ‘Great
Creation’ known as the novel, also provided the epistemological framework upon
which the poststructuralist deconstruction was based. The novelist and critic, Milan
Kundera, in his 1983 essay, ‘The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes’, assesses the
milieu in which the novel emerges as a distinctive art form:
As God slowly departed from the seat whence he had directed the
universe and its order of values, distinguished good from evil, and
endowed each thing with meaning, Don Quixote set forth from his house
into a world he could no longer recognise. In the absence of the Supreme
Judge, the world suddenly appeared in its fearsome ambiguity; the single
divine Truth decomposed into myriad relative truths is parcelled out by
101 Henry Fielding, Joseph Andrews, ed. by Homer Goldberg (New York & London: W. W. Norton &
Co., 1987), p. 4. Hereafter, Joseph Andrews.47
men. Thus was born the world of the modern era, and with it the novel,
the image and model of that world.
102
Kundera’s contention is that the novel heralded a new world. But it was no
sympathetic herald. The world of Leibniz, the world of determination and
classification, the world of rationalisation was as fearsome as the old order of religion
and superstition which it sought to supersede. The novel, as the artistically ambivalent
and ambiguous herald to the grand project of progress and enlightenment,
endeavoured to temper the optimism of the period. The novel’s recognition of the
frailness of the human condition and its awareness of the importance of the old stories
which had moulded so much of human history were (and are) vital constituents in a
form which showed the world its true face. In so doing, it offered some sense of
security in a world of increasing diversity and change. The novel, then, holds a dual
faceted function. It points to the past, in that it tells stories, and it points to the
openness of the world by creating worlds of its own. Telling stories honours and
continues the tradition of the human propensity to remember. Stories, at their most
rudimentary are reflections on existence. They hold within them the seeds of the
human spirit. They are our memories writ large. The novel form progresses this
tradition in a new and potentially threatening context. This threat is found within the
created worlds of the novel. In these worlds readers find themselves. And yet the
world remains new and strange. There is indeed a rediscovery of humanity, and yet
there is always a horizon that is open to be explored or run away from.
Kundera’s assessment of the rise of the novel has merit in that it recognises both the
cultural context within which the novel form arose and the psychological and spiritual
roots from which the novel as an art form draws its energy and power. It is this
psycho-spiritual rootedness which allows the novel to be ever-open to the world. The
common denominator in Kundera’s thesis is the denominator par excellence – God,
the one in whom all existence has its source. And yet Kundera is distrustful of this
heritage. He sees any ideology as a threat to the freedom (for better or worse) which
the novel seeks to offer. The novel, he suggests, is not there to argue for a position;
that is the role of religion and ideology. As he puts it, ‘Man desires a world where
102 Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel, p. 6.48
good and evil can be clearly distinguished, for he has an innate and irrepressible
desire to judge before he understands.’
103 The novel, rooted in the absence of God, has
a different kind of wisdom, namely the wisdom of uncertainty.
However, Kundera has made the point himself when he argues that such a desire for
certainty is innate in the human psyche. We get a glimpse of this deep desire in a
novel like Iris Murdoch’s The Unicorn, where in an early exchange between Marian
Taylor and her employer, Hannah Crean-Smith we read:
‘Well – you know that I love you,’ said Marian. She was surprised to hear
herself saying this. It was not the sort of thing she came out with usually.
Yet it seemed quite natural here, or as if it were compelled from her.
‘Yes. Thank you. I think, don’t you, that one ought to cry out more for
love, to ask for it. It’s odd how afraid people are of the word. Yet we all
need love. Even God needs love. I suppose that’s why He created us.’
‘He made a bad arrangement,’ said Marian, smiling. Since uttering the
word she felt that she did love Hannah more: or simply that she did love
her, since she had given no name before to her affectionate feelings.
‘You mean because people don’t love Him? Ah, but they do. Surely we all
love Him under some guise or other. We have to. He desires our love so
much, and a great desire for love can call love into being. Do you believe
in God?’
‘No,’ said Marian. She felt no guilt at this admission, she was too firmly
held in the conversation. She had not realized that Hannah was a religious
person. She never went to church. ‘You do?’
‘Yes, I suppose I do. I’ve never really questioned it. I’m no good at
thinking. I just have to believe. I have to love God.
‘But suppose you’re loving – something that isn’t there?’
‘In a way you can’t love something that isn’t there. I think if you really
love, then something is there. But I don’t understand these things.’
104
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Leaving aside the complex and subtle psycho-sexual overtones which have an
important part to play in both this key passage and the novel as a whole, we can
discern here an awareness of the paradoxical human experience of the absent presence
of God, which serves as a critical and specific expression of the general tension
between security and insecurity, between certainty and doubt, which colours the
human condition. My contention is that it is this very tension between the desire for
certainty placed alongside the reality of human frailty that is reflected, not only in
modern works of fiction such as The Unicorn, but is in evidence at the rise of the
novel itself, and which is exhibited particularly at the heart of the work of Henry
Fielding. Indeed, I would suggest that the rise of the novel form itself posits a quietly
insurgent critique of the entire Enlightenment project. It becomes a Trojan Horse in
the house of rationalism. The novel itself is the joke that explodes the myth of
certainty. As Kundera has written elsewhere, ‘The novel is born not of the theoretical
spirit but of the spirit of humour.’
105 The novel, then, charges in as an ironic herald of
a postmodern understanding of the world at the very rise of modernism.
Kundera roots his analysis in the departure of God (and by extension, one assumes,
the lordship of human reason). But we must ask: is God truly removed from the
creation of these worlds? Have the new creators supplanted the Originator of all? A
cursory glance at the publishing history of the eighteenth century would indicate that
God appears to be very much present, albeit as yet another player in an increasingly
competitive literary market. Brian Young has indicated that the distinction we take for
granted between theology and other forms of literature, was less pronounced in
Fielding’s day. He argues that ‘although long interpreted as an inherently secularizing
genre, the eighteenth-century novel was also frequently a form of theological
literature’.
106 The attitude of the churches and clerics toward romances and other
forms of literature obviously varied. William Law would never have countenanced the
reading of ‘corrupt’ texts such as plays, but the substantial figure of William
Warburton more than compensated for such an enthusiastic rejection of unedifying
literature. The ambivalent attitude of the church merely reflected the impossibility of
attempting to confine the development of forms of artistic expression that, though
105 Kundera, The Art of the Novel, p. 160.
106 Brian Young, ‘Theological Books from The Naked Gospel to The Nemesis of Faith’, in Books And
Their Readers in Eighteenth-Century England: New Essays, ed. by Isabel Rivers (London: Continuum
Press, 2003), p. 84.50
grounded in the religious ferment of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, sought to honour and indeed emulate the erudition of the likes of Virgil,
Horace and Aristophanes.
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Fielding’s major works, themselves, are replete with scriptural reference and allusion.
His characters, particularly his most singular creation, Abraham Adams, have strong
connections with the church and overall the impression is that we are being drawn
into a world which has, at its core, a determination to foster ‘good nature’. Can we
then, so easily dismiss God from the picture of the rise of the novel?
Though in sympathy with Kundera’s broad assessment of the psychological/spiritual
substructure that underpins the rise of the novel, I would not submit to his summary
dismissal of God from this framework. Granted, he qualifies this dismissal by
describing himself as being attached ‘to nothing except the depreciated legacy of
Cervantes’, in other words, the recognition that the novel, as exemplified in Don
Quixote, seeks to present us with the complexity of existence. There is, however, a
difference between the absence of God and the hiddeness of God. I would argue that
the hiddeness of God is present in these novels. And it is precisely due to the tensions
that the Enlightenment project unleashed that the relationship between God and his
creation is also set in relief. That focus is found particularly in the written word and
especially in the newly created world of the novel.
These theological and artistic bases outlined above thus serve to indicate how
conducive a writer like Fielding is to the development of an understanding between
the novel and theology. However, like many a relationship, this one has to be forged
in the furnace of alienation. Each begins estranged from the other. The common root
of this estrangement, as we have noted, is to be found in the potentially perilous
107 Fielding, with the assistance of his friend, Rev William Young (most probably Fielding’s model for
Parson Adams), published a translation of Aristophanes’ play, Plutus in 1742. Fielding held mixed
views on Aristophanes. Whilst recognising his genius from an early stage in his own theatrical career,
Fielding was to later condemn Aristophanes for using his talents irresponsibly. Knight attempts to
reconcile the situation when he states that ‘Fielding’s rejection of Aristophanes […] may reflect not a
change in his basic view but a change in context and a redefinition of scope.’ Charles A. Knight,
‘Fielding and Aristophanes’, Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 21: 3 (1981: Summer), 481-498
(482).51
absence of God. It is here, in the hiddenness of God, that the activity of misplacement
is to be discerned.
Hiddenness
In his study, The Disappearance of God, J. Hillis Miller attempts to trace the
development of spiritual alienation with particular reference to the work of five
nineteenth-century writers. His broad thesis is that, since at least the post-medieval
period, there is evidence of ‘a gradual withdrawal of God from the world’. The once
close-knit relationship between God, man and nature emphasised in the ritual festivals
and particularly the Eucharist (the archetype of the divine analogy) has, in Miller’s
words, been progressively split apart. The cause of this rupture, Miller goes on to
argue, is mysterious. Wary of the various ideological explanations marshalled to
account for changes in human behaviour or belief, Miller appears content to offer the
tentative conclusion that ‘the disappearance of God has been caused not so much by
man’s turning his back on God, as by a strange withdrawal of God himself’.
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This withdrawal, if it is at all explicable, has at its source an epistemological crisis –
namely the expansion of human awareness of his universe and his own increasing
insignificance in that universe. The deepening sense of the grandeur or menace of the
infinity within which mankind finds itself, reinforces, if not a sense of isolation, then a
distance from all that would provide any unifying potential. For writers in the
increasingly industrialized, urbanized and subjectified nineteenth century, who mourn
the loss of that spiritual connectedness with the land and a more coherent society, the
spiritual sense of dislocation, not to say desolation, was acutely felt and subsequently
reproduced in their work.
Such dislocation, according to Miller, contrasts markedly with a writer like Henry
Fielding who, it is maintained, retains much of the spiritual confidence increasingly
diminished in his literary successors:
108 J. Hillis Miller, The Disappearance of God (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 4.52
In eighteenth-century English literature […] for example in Tom Jones,
the hero is initially in doubt about his identity, but it usually turns out in
the end that there is a place waiting for him in a stable society. In
eighteenth-century England the stability of the social order, sustained by
divine Providence, is a guarantee of the stability of selfhood.
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Miller’s thesis, I believe, appears to ignore two factors, one general and the other
more specifically related to his statement regarding Fielding. The first thing which
needs to be addressed is his presumption of the sense of spiritual isolation
encountered in nineteenth-century literature as a culmination of such a ‘gradual
withdrawal of God from the world’. While acknowledging his assessment of the
particular and obvious sociological factors which, in the period Miller is studying, led
to man’s increasing isolation from his land, his work and himself, such alienation
surely is not, I would suggest, a uniquely modern phenomenon, and is not merely
apparent in the literature of the nineteenth century. One can legitimately argue that the
sense of alienation outlined by Miller has some high profile literary precursors. The
Psalmist and the writer of the Wisdom books of Job and Ecclesiastes surely attest to
similar experiences of alienation:
Man born of woman is of few days and full of trouble. He springs up like
a flower and withers away; like a fleeting shadow, he does not endure. Do
you fix your eye on such a one? Will you bring him before you for
judgment? Who can bring what is pure from the impure? No one! Man's
days are determined; you have decreed the number of his months and have
set limits he cannot exceed. So look away from him and let him alone, till
he has put in his time like a hired man.
At least there is hope for a tree: If it is cut down, it will sprout again, and
its new shoots will not fail. Its roots may grow old in the ground and its
stump die in the soil, yet at the scent of water it will bud and put forth
shoots like a plant. But man dies and is laid low; he breathes his last and is
no more.
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One, of course, can argue that Job, despite his trials and tribulations, ultimately and in
traditional comedic fashion, receives his reward and lives happily ever after. But the
question must be asked whether such restoration negates the essential elements of loss
and alienation present in the text itself. If the complaints evident in the book of Job
merely serve to prefigure an inevitable blessed state then one cannot take those
complaints seriously. But there is clearly no evidence of this in the text. The
complaints are real; which is why the book of Job has been turned to again and again
over the centuries as a key text in the context of the perennial conundrum of human
suffering. That being the case, we must conclude that the literature of alienation has a
longer history than Miller would suggest.
What the book of Job illustrates is that very characteristic already introduced above,
namely the hiddenness of God. As Eaton, commenting on the above passage in his
monograph, Job, makes clear:
Job addresses the still hidden God. If only he would speak with Job
plainly and without overwhelming terror, and show him where he has
gone wrong! But he hides his face, treats him as an enemy, and leaves him
to wonder what follies of his youth still count against him. And the
suffering Job pictures himself as […] a storm-driven leaf, a fettered
prisoner, a moth-eaten garment.
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It is here in the Book of God itself that we discern the departure of the
anthropomorphic intervening God. It is notable, in a book so associated with the
perennial and tangible problem of human suffering, that we find the text wherein the
deity as the all-powerful, all-knowing one, is quietly ushered off the stage.
112 Indeed,
as Richard Elliott Friedman has provocatively suggested, it is the very discontinuity
with such visceral contact with God in the natural realm which inevitably leads to an
increasing sense of divine absence:
Now by moving the essence of divinity from the realm of nature to the
realm of history, Israelite religion made it possible for a deity to
111 J.H. Eaton, Job (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), p. 8.
112 See also my later related comments regarding blasphemy and Job in Chapter 4.54
recede…Whenever a biblical author lived, no matter how long after the
events he or she was narrating, his or her perception would be that God’s
visible acts had diminished. That is, the placement of God in history,
inevitably, meant departure.
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The Bible then, intriguingly, becomes less a crucible of the chemistry between God
and his people, than a testament to God’s increasing hiddeness from the story.
However, Friedman’s suggestion that history replacing nature is the key to God’s
departure has deeper implications. The history that Friedman is alluding to is, of
course, written history. It is in the very act of writing that the divine is gradually
written out. Friedman has pointed us to the reality that, even in a sacred text, the
principle of writing God out of the story cannot be avoided. It is this writing God out
of the story which I call the misplacement of God, to which we shall shortly return.
Moving into the post-biblical era, we find that the notion of hiddenness had a
particular resonance for Augustine, who, in a series of opening questions strives to
come to terms with the prime question, ‘How shall I call upon my God?’ So we
encounter this tortured series:
Is it that because all things cannot contain the whole of you, they contain
part of you, and that all things contain the same part of you
simultaneously? Or does each part contain a different part of you, the
larger containing the greater parts, the lesser parts the smaller? Does that
imply that there is some part of you which is greater, another smaller? Or
is the whole of you everywhere, yet without anything that contains you
entire?
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These, and others like them, emphasise Augustine’s recognition of his own inability
to come to terms with even the very fundamentals of God’s own existence. As
113 Richard Elliott Friedman, The Hidden Face of God (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1997), pp. 88-
89.
114 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),
I.iii.4.55
Chadwick puts it, for Augustine, ‘All words are inadequate for the expression of
divine mysteries.’
115 God is hidden, as it were, behind the cloak of words.
One of Augustine’s significant theological successors, Martin Luther, greatly
expanded upon the notion of the hidden God with his expansion upon the distinction
between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus. For Luther, the mysteries of
God serve to magnify his greatness and point us away from pride. So we find in The
Bondage of the Will (1525) Luther responding to Erasmus’s claim for human
freedom:
Diatribe, however, deceives herself in her ignorance by not making a
distinction between God preached and God hidden, that is between the
Word of God and God himself. God does many things that he does not
disclose to us in his word; he also wills many things which he does not
disclose himself as willing in his word. Thus he does not will the death of
a sinner, according to his word; but he wills it according to that
inscrutable will of his. It is our business, however, to pay attention to the
word and to leave that inscrutable will alone, for we must be guided by the
word and not that inscrutable will. After all, who can direct himself by a
will completely inscrutable and unknowable? It is enough to know simply
that there is a certain inscrutable will in God, and as to what, why and how
far it wills, that is something we have no right whatever to inquire into,
hanker after, care about, or meddle with, but only to fear and adore.
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Leaving aside the typical rasping tone of this text, Bernard Lohse recognises that,
here, Luther ‘came near to exceeding the limits of what we are allowed to think or
say’ about God.
117 The hiddenness of God, perhaps more than Luther intended or
115 Ibid., xxii.
116 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works Vol. 33, ed. by Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972),
p. 140.
117 Bernard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, trans. by Roy A. Harrisville (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1999), p. 215. For a brief but useful assessment of Luther’s Deus absconditus and its influence on the
literature of the period, see Paul R. Sellin, ‘The Hidden God: Reformation Awe in Renaissance English
Literature’, in The Darker Vision of the Renaissance, ed. by Robert S. Kinsman (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 147-196.56
realised, holds deeper implications than merely serving as a foil to human hubris. It
points us to the possibility of a God who is deconstructed.
Closer to the period under discussion in this study, and turning from theology to
literature, such hiddenness can be detected with equal force in the writing of Milton
where, in Paradise Lost, we read:
Some natural tears they dropped, but wiped them soon;
The world was all before them, where to choose
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide:
They hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way.
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This extraordinary dénouement highlights the deeply paradoxical nature of
humanity’s post-lapsarian condition. Adam and Eve find themselves both defiant -
‘tears wiped soon’, and yet dependent - ‘Providence their guide’. Their means of
opportunity though open and infinite, – ‘The world was all before them’ – becomes,
in fact, a source of spiritual torment – ‘where to choose’. The pair advance together -
‘hand in hand’, and yet are isolated from one another seeking stability in ‘their place
of rest’ and yet, it seems, destined to perpetually pursue ‘their solitary way’. Such
solitariness extends, of course, beyond merely the relationship of Adam and Eve,
itself, to include the God who had once walked with them in the cool of the evening.
If we move forward once more into the eighteenth century, Karl Barth has pointed to
the ‘characteristic of the time that alongside the study of the natural world the
favourite scientific objects were primarily the study of the nature and activity of the
human soul’.
119 Such study is clearly reflected in the nascent novel form and it is here
that we find possibly the most obvious example of the human experience of isolation
in the shape of Robinson Crusoe. Novak points out that fear was ‘the dominant
passion of a man in Crusoe’s condition’.
120 However, in his Serious Reflections
118 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. by John Leonard (London: Penguin, 2000), XII.645-649.288.
119 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, trans. by Brian Cozens and John
Bowden (London: SCM Press, 2001), p. 26.
120 Maximillian E. Novak, ‘Robinson Crusoe’s Fear and the Search for the Natural Man’, Modern
Philology, Vol. 58, No. 4 (May 1961), 238-245.57
(1720), Defoe makes clear that solitude founded upon ‘formalities, rigours, and
apparent mortifications was ‘a rape upon human nature’.
121 In other words, what
Defoe here emphasises is the specifically Protestant ‘purity’ of a solitude which,
unbound by convention and sacral legalism, serves as a means to self-improvement –
a signal aspect of Crusoe’s experience on the island. Solitude, for Crusoe is a harsh
but necessary teacher.
We are brought now to the second and more specific criticism of Miller’s assessment
of Tom Jones. In this text, which Miller points to as evidence of joyous security in the
providence of the divine, there is more than meets the eye. It is too easy to assume
that, due to the comic nature of the text, Tom Jones or, indeed, Joseph Andrews are
thereby precluded from displaying any of the alienation which, Miller stresses,
belongs chiefly to a later period. Rather, as we shall attempt to show, Henry Fielding
delighted in subverting those very cherished notions of Providence and Prudence
which appear at first glance to be the hallmark, if not as some would argue, the very
purpose, of his novel writing.
122 There is, as we shall illustrate in due course, a deep
awareness of the fragility of human existence even in his comic fiction. Such
awareness is undoubtedly borne out of personal tragedy, but more than this, Fielding’s
own sense of his task as Creator points to an inevitable realisation of the potential for
words and meaning to be misplaced. Isolation, in Fielding’s fiction, then, is
experienced, not only at the socio-historical plane, denied by Miller, but more
critically, at the textual plane itself. For Fielding, God’s place (and by extension
humanity’s) is not as secure as Miller would appear to suggest.
One, therefore, needs to be cautious when assigning such spiritual isolation to a
specific historical or literary period. As we have outlined, tensions have persisted in
the presentation of the divine in both theological reflection and literature through
countless generations and genres. Nonetheless, Miller recognizes the specific
contribution made by the novel form in this awareness of the hiddenness of God. It is
my contention however that the work of Henry Fielding exhibits elements of the very
alienation Miller would locate in the nineteenth century.
121 Daniel Defoe, Serious Reflections During the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe
with his Vision of the Angelick World (London: printed for W. Taylor, 1720), p. 7.
122 See below, Chapter 5.58
To summarise then, the experience of the hiddenness of God, I would suggest, is a
fundamental mark of all literature and is not merely confined, for example, to the
retreat of the Sea of Faith described by Arnold in Dover Beach. It is, as we have seen,
present in the sacred Judeo-Christian literature which purports to convey the very
interaction between God and Israel and God and the wider world. It is present in the
great tradition of literature which has come down to us over the centuries. And it is
present in the work of the great early exponents of the English novel generally, and in
the creations of Henry Fielding in particular.
Looked at in a more dynamic fashion, by the term hiddenness I am partially following
Pascal who, in his Pensées, states: ‘What can be seen on earth points to neither the
total absence nor the obvious presence of divinity, but to the presence of a hidden
God.’
123 Pascal, however, like Luther before him, appears to regard the notion of the
hiddenness of God as a necessary component in a broader salvific strategy whereby
some are blessed while others remain in darkness. So we read: ‘We can understand
nothing of the works of God unless we accept as a matter of principle that he wished
to blind some and enlighten others.’
124 For Pascal, as in Luther, the hiddenness of God
is a means to puncturing the pride of humanity. In this respect it is a rather passive
exploration of God’s nature and his activity in the world.
My understanding of hiddenness, however, has a more active character and this finds
its clearest expression in Dietrich Bonhoeffer:
We cannot be honest unless we recognise that we have to live in the world
etsi deus non daretur. And this is just what we do recognise – before God!
God himself compels us to recognise it. So our coming of age leads us to a
true recognition of our situation before God. God would have us know
that we must live as men who manage our lives without him. The God
who is with us is the God who forsakes us (Mark 15. 34). The God who
lets us live in the world without the working hypothesis of God is the God
123 Blaise Pascal, Pensées 449, trans. by A.J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin, 1966), p. 170.
124 Pensées 232, p. 101.59
before whom we stand continually. Before God and with God we live
without God.
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I find in Bonhoeffer’s formulation a much livelier understanding of the mutuality
engendered by the concept of hiddenness. The tension that is created by the present,
yet absent God, the hidden God before whom we stand, and not only stand but grow
and mature, reflects precisely those selfsame tensions that the Enlightenment project
unleashed. For, as we have noted, it is at this particular moment that the relationship
between God and the creation is set in relief. That focus is found particularly in the
written word and especially in the newly created world of the novel.
Misplacement
The notion of misplacement will form the fundamental interpretative tool in the
present study and so it is incumbent upon me to point out the usefulness of the term.
However, prior to establishing the hermeneutical force of misplacement for our study
it is appropriate to trace its philosophical echoes. The two main antecedents of the
term are to be found in Heidegger and Derrida. Indeed, we can discern a natural
development from the one to the other. Heidegger, in his desire to excise the
technological fixation of modernity, and move to a deeper appreciation of the being of
the work of art, argues that art does not merely resemble or reflect the world (in this
sense he rejects the fundamental notion of mimesis). Rather, art sets up an overall
‘world’ which allows us to see the work of art as something which transforms our
whole consciousness of the context within which the art object has its being. The
famous example Heidegger offers is a painting of peasant shoes by Van Gogh. He
states:
As long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, or simply look at
the empty unused shoes as they merely stand there in the picture, we shall
never discover what the equipmental being of the equipment in truth is.
From Van Gogh’s painting we cannot tell where these shoes stand. There
125 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘Letter to Eberhard Bethge, dated 16
th July 1944’, in Letters and Papers from
Prison, 3
rd edn., ed. by E. Bethge, trans. by Reginald Fuller (London: SCM Press, 1971), p. 360.60
is nothing surrounding this pair of shoes in or to which they might belong
– only an undefined space. There are not even clods of soil from the field
or the field-path sticking to them, which would at least hint at their use. A
pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet -
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This ‘and yet’, for Heidegger, forms the power of self-disclosure which inheres in the
work of art. This power is not something produced by the artist. It is a creation ex
nihilo. Heidegger makes the point explicitly:
Does truth, then, arise out of nothing? It does indeed if by nothing is
meant the mere not of that which is, and if we here think of that which is
an object present in the ordinary way, which thereafter comes to light and
is challenged by the existence of the work as only presumptively a true
being. Truth is never gathered from objects that are present and ordinary.
Rather, the opening up of the Open, and the clearing of what is, happens
only as the openness is projected, sketched out, that makes its advent in
thrownness (Geworfenheit).
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Truth, in this sense, is not to be confused with mere correctness. Heidegger adopts the
Greek term aletheia which he translates as ‘uncoveredness’ or ‘unconcealment’ to
point to the fact that truth cannot be commoditised. The corollary of this is that art,
itself, is not merely to be ‘explained’ or ‘understood’, for this would be, in some
sense, to domesticate it and reduce one’s capacity to actively engage with, in the case
of poetry for example, the language of the work of art and its power to reveal so-
called ‘deep history’ (Geschichte). In the case of the poet, Hölderlin, for example,
Heidegger claims that his works actively discloses a nihilism which defies
contextualization. As Heidegger states:
This essence of poetry belongs to a definite time. But not in such a way
that it merely conforms to that time as some time already existing. Rather,
by providing anew the essence of poetry, Hölderlin first determines a new
126 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (London: Harper Collins,
2001), pp. 34-5.
127 Ibid., p. 69.61
time. It is the time of the gods who have fled and of the god who is
coming.
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The poem itself, then, becomes the act in which this nihilism is discerned. It thus
defies history and thereby becomes a vehicle for the transformation of the reader.
What is, of course, interesting about this last quotation from Heidegger is how readily
it resonates with Kundera’s assessment of the novel as being rooted in the
absence/presence of God. Both appear to share a common sense of the work of art as
somehow inhabiting a fragile sacred space.
It is this latter point regarding space which Derrida utilizes in his own deconstructive
project. He does so, however, in such a way as to leave no room for Heidegger’s
apparent idealization of the text and his distinction between Dichtung (‘poetizing’)
and other (lower) forms of ‘literature’. Indeed, this is symptomatic of Derrida’s
broader criticism of Heidegger in that the latter remains, in Derrida’s view,
‘logocentric’ to the extent that he appears to reserve a place for truth lying in the
difference between being and Being, (and thereby engenders a reductive metaphysics
he claims to avoid). More specifically, at the literary level, for Derrida, all literature is
equally contaminated. It exhibits the very frailty we have seen as a mark of our study
thus far. Nevertheless, the Heideggerian notions of ‘throwness’, aletheia and
‘destruction’ lead Derrida to develop his own assessment of the being of the work of
art. This assessment avoids the idealism of Heidegger but nonetheless embraces the
undecidability and openness that the work of art in its creation ex nihilo offers.
Further, Derrida embraces the term khora from Plato’s Timaeus to emphasise this
sense of the abyss between words and meaning. This abyss, Kamuf describes as the
‘penumbral space in which writing survives to go on playing beyond the exhaustion of
a living intention’.
129 As Derrida, himself, puts it, ‘a text is not a text unless it hides
from the first comer, from the first glance, the law of its composition and the rules of
its game.’
130 The world of the text is, it would seem, for Derrida, a playful shadow
128 Martin Heidegger, Elucidations on Hölderlin, quoted in Timothy Clark, Martin Heidegger (London:
Routledge, 2005), p. 108.
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63.62
world devoid of the idealistic overtones in the Heideggerian schema. This shadow
world is generated through his utilisation of the term ‘displacement’ which teases out
for us the sense of dislocation that the act of writing/reading produces.
From this, and related to Husserl’s phenomenological work on representation,
Leonard Lawlor has coined the term Verstellung that is, a ‘replacing which is a mis-
placing’. Such a mis-placing, haunted as it is in the very abyss Derrida describes,
defies those boundaries of time and space and reveals the ever open, ever fragile
nature of human experience. As Lawlor puts it, ‘This mis-placing is life, and insofar
as life is always misplaced, it goes over the limit and includes death – or memory.’
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Taking Lawlor’s assessment on board, I would wish to add a further component,
namely the comedic nature of human existence. As a consequence, misplacement, as I
envision it, offers a means to experience the world in what I would describe as a
grounded transcendental fashion, that is, an experience of fragile hope based upon an
awareness of the potential that amongst other things, the work of art, and particularly
comedy, can provide.
Integral to this comedic fragility is the aspect of forgetfulness. Gadamer describes the
embarrassment of the philosophical community in its ‘essential forgetfulness of
being’.
132 The problem of nothingness lay at the root of this embarrassing
forgetfulness. This problem of nothingness, I would suggest, is constitutive of
comedy. Roy Eckhardt says as much when he outlines what he describes as ten
‘proto-jokes’ which force us to examine the human situation:
1. Being-amidst nothingness
2. Order versus chaos
3. The absence of any say in one’s birth
4. Death amidst life
5. Is versus the ought
6. Self abnegation versus self-centredness
131 Leonard Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence: Toward a New Concept of Life (New York:
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7. The human thrust/will to partake of or relate to infinity
8. Body in juxtaposition to Spirit
9. Clothing vis-à-vis nakedness
10. Humans as against domestic animals
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One recognizes immediately in the first of these examples the deep connection
between comedy and being/nothingness. Eckhardt elaborates on the primary proto-
joke when he writes:
How could there be such an incongruity as this? How could it be that there
is something rather than nothing? How could it be that there is nothing
where something has been? Here, perhaps, lies the Urgrund, the ultimate
ground of all human comedy (as of all human weeping) - not to mention
public performances of magic, a first cousin of comedy. In the game of
peek-a-boo the very small child already apprehends something of this
primordial joke.
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As has become a cliché by now, we are here reminded once again that comedy is a
serious business. One can see in the examples above that the notion of what I describe
as fragile comedic misplacement blurs the Aristotelian distinction between comedy
and tragedy. As Eckardt indicates, ‘The shortcoming in such differentiation is that
comic laughter is never safe from despair, while the tears of tragedy just may be dried
by the sunshine.’
135 In this respect, we recognise that misplacement shares with
Derrida’s displacement a subversive function. It is, however, in the critical context of
a fragile, comedic hope where we witness that which distinguishes misplacement in
this study from Derrida’s voided ‘displacement’.
It is important to recognise that the term misplacement, located as it is within the
broader interpretative framework of human frailty, carries with it connotations of
commission and omission. In the same way that sin can be thought of as either an act
of will or neglect, so, too, we can witness to misplacement’s activity in ‘positive’ and
133 A. Roy Eckhardt, ‘Divine Incongruity: Comedy and Tragedy in a Post-Holocaust World’, Theology
Today 48, No. 4 (January 1992), 399-412.
134 Ibid., p. 400.
135 Ibid., p. 402.64
‘negative’ categories. In this sense we can clearly see, once more, the link with
forgetfulness. We must be clear, however, that, in using the terms ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ we are not making any value, let alone moral, judgement but are simply
delineating the sphere of operation for the activity of misplacement.
Firstly, then, the act of writing is indeed an act – there is a determination, even a
wilfulness to the activity no matter how difficult or demanding. Writing, be it
theological writing, or novel or fictive writing, is always an artifice. It involves effort
which, however many claims to inspiration are made, is inevitably and necessarily
premeditated. Indeed, one can suggest that even an apparently idle doodle can have
profound thought, however subliminal, lying at its root. Who, to use a scriptural
example, could pretend that nothing lay at the back of Jesus’s mind as he scribbled in
the sand before the Pharisees and the woman caught in the act of adultery? Indeed, is
it not possible that the very material he chose to write with – the finger and the dirt –
pointed so clearly to the fragility of the human condition –‘dust you are and to dust
you shall return’?
136 Can we not see in this otherwise innocuous act, a profound and
purposeful rebuke to those who saw themselves as superior to the one caught in an act
of weakness?
To misplace, in my terms then, in the first instance, is to bring to pass. The narration
of a text, be it written or read involves this ‘bringing to pass’. It results in revelation.
This revelation can, of course, adopt several forms from the simple statement of fact
(we are using the term ‘simple’ extremely loosely!), to the more profound and
intricate parabolic or metaphoric narrative. In either case, misplacement implies the
active transmission of narrative. However, it is vital to recognise that this
transmission, though premeditated, is never sure of the reception it will receive.
Misplacement is a deliberate act which can only take place in the context of
uncertainty, or more properly (as I have previously indicated) fragility. Indeed, I
would go further and suggest that the very deliberate act of transmission is, in itself,
constrained by fragility. Such constraint is not simply brought about through the
anxiety of any potential reception but lies at the core of all communication.
136 Genesis 3. 19.65
Secondly, while it seems clear that misplacement is, indeed, a deliberate act there is,
nonetheless, in the act itself, a by-product – a parting with the ineffable. I use the
continuous tense to suggest that the misplacement is once more not merely confined
to the physical act of writing or narrating but carries on into the experience of reading
the ‘finished’ text. It is in writing that we witness the simultaneous incorporating and
incorporeal activity of misplacement. The physical and deliberate act leaves us with
words and yet there is always more to be said. The gap between the activity of writing
with the coincidental parting with the ineffable and any final meaning is a space of
sacred and eternal dimensions. James Byrne captures a sense of this space when he
briefly recapitulates his understanding of God:
If the premodern worldview focused on God in a realist sense, and if the
modern focused on the human subject as a replacement for the divine,
then the post-modern worldview focuses on the space wherein God and
the self – no longer understood as entities capable of being confined by
concepts – might be encountered anew. This cultural space, or clearing,
offers a renewed possibility for us here and now, at this time and in this
cultural context. It is a possibility which presents an opportunity for hope;
not hope for some future state of being, but hope for an encounter in and
of the present.
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What is interesting about Byrne’s assessment is his description of the resultant space
as ‘cultural’. By this, I take him to mean not only the broad sense of the word culture
to describe a particular historico-sociological context, but also the more specific sense
of artistic achievement and possibility. The encounter with God, for Byrne is found,
then, in the creative space. Quoting Jean-Luc Marion, Byrne reinforces his argument
thus:
Concerning God, let us admit that we can think him only under the figure
of the unthinkable, but of an unthinkable that exceeds as much what we
cannot think as what we can; for that which I may not think is still the
concern of my thought, and hence to me remains thinkable.
138
137 James Byrne, God (London: Continuum, 2001), p. 138.
138 Ibid., p. 151.66
The space of unthinkability/thinkability is concomitant with Byrne’s ‘cultural’ space
and, as a result, resonates deeply with the sacred and eternal space brought about by
the act of misplacement already outlined above. Milan Kundera, intriguingly, offers
us a specifically artistic parallel to Byrne’s analysis of the history of God when he
remarks: ‘For the history of art is perishable. The babble of art is eternal.’
139 Any
attempt to encounter the divine involves entering the sacred, eternal, cultural space
provided by misplacement. This is a space which contrasts with that suggested by
Hillis Miller:
The artist is the man who goes out into the empty space between man and
God and takes the enormous risk of attempting to create in that vacancy a
new fabric of connections between man and the divine power.
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It seems, for Hillis Miller, this space is merely a void to be taken up by the artist to
create a work that is radically new. It is, admittedly, a peculiarly romantic
understanding of the space created by their experience of the abandonment of God.
The assumption is that God has indeed finally gone. I would suggest, however, that
the space is not a void but is already taken up with the potentiality that misplacement
provides. The space itself is informed by the same coincidental activity of creation
and parting with the ineffable. It is these two components which engender the space.
Rather than being a place of abandonment, therefore, the space becomes a place of
hope. Misplacement, therefore, provides a hopeful space where the word spoken by
the artist and the theologian can be heard without prejudice.
Two obvious examples of this misplacement can be found in the pages of the Bible
and in the New Testament particularly - the parables of Jesus, and the resurrection of
Jesus. In the parables one discovers stories which contain kings, servants, widows,
judges, landowners, and others including non-human characters such as mustard
seeds, nets and vines – all of which point to the kingdom of God. And yet God is not
mentioned in these parables except in some cases by way of explanation. The parable,
the story itself exhibits the misplacement of God in order that there be a space for the
receiver of the word (be it the original hearer or the later reader) to discern the
139 Kundera, The Curtain, p. 168.
140 Miller, The Disappearance of God, pp. 13-14.67
hiddenness of God, and so be continually confronted with a point of decision. The
parables exhibit the misplacement of God in so far as they perpetually offer a crisis in
the life of the listener/reader. I shall return later to the parables to see how this
particular expression of misplacement is worked out in the fiction of Henry
Fielding.
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The second example, that of the resurrection of Jesus, holds for us a paradigmatic
outworking of the notion of misplacement. In the Gospel story, Jesus’s body is
literally misplaced. In the words of Mary Magdalene, we find the comic crisis: “They
have taken away my Lord, and I don’t know where they have put him.”
142 Here the
hiddenness of God reaches its ultimate dynamic and comic climax in the misplaced
body of the Incarnate One. The Gospel writer increases the comic tension by
providing us with a conversation between Mary and the very one who has been
misplaced. Mary, believing that she is speaking to the gardener, asks Jesus to return
what amounts to his own body. The irony, of course, is that this is precisely what has
happened in the resurrection event – the body has been recovered. Mary, however, is
seeking to secure the body of Jesus, and so, at the moment of revelation, when Mary
hears her own name spoken, she attempts to do precisely this by holding on to Jesus.
And it is at this moment where we encounter the practical outworking of
misplacement, namely a parting with the ineffable. Jesus responds to Mary thus:
‘Don’t hold on to me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father, but go and tell my
brothers that I am going…’
143 The intimacy with which this comic moment of
misplacement is concluded is immediately set in its proper context of a departing.
We find, then, in the resurrection story, a profound sense of the purpose and scope of
comedy to provide for us a space whereby we witness both intimacy and otherness. It
is this dual witness which is a mark of the comic mode. We shall now move to
examine more specifically how comedy is utilised by Henry Fielding as a means to
further exploring the notion of misplacement.
141 See Chapter 2
142 John 20. 13.
143 John 20. 17.68
Chapter Two
Henry Fielding: Subversive Comedian
People who seek metaphysical causes for laughter are not cheerful.
Voltaire
Humour can be dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process
and the innards are discouraging to any but the pure scientific mind.
E. B. White
In a word, the Opinions and Practices of Men in all matters and especially
in Matters of Religion, are generally so absurd and ridiculous that it is
impossible for them not to be the Subjects of Ridicule.
Anthony Collins
Some Theories of Comedy
Already in this study, I have made mention of Unsworth’ paper, ‘The Comedy of
Knowledge’ in which we acknowledged the temptation in Fielding scholarship to
follow a broadly synchronic route. Though in broad sympathy with Unsworth’s thesis,
I find myself wishing to go further. In so doing, I seek in this chapter to develop an
understanding of the comedic which transgresses those traditional socio-historical
boundaries by which it has hitherto been confined. I aim to show that the comedic is
evidence of the misplacement, introduced earlier, which lies at the heart of human
experience.
Returning, however, briefly to Unsworth, we must find the epistemological bearings
for our discussion. It appears that, in his interpretative strategy, though intending to
avoid a narrowly straight-forward empirical approach, he appears to concentrate in a
similarly Lockean fashion upon the absence of knowledge in particular situations
throughout a novel like Tom Jones. Unsworth’s essay provides example after
example of scenarios in which the absence of complete knowledge can be
demonstrated but fails to acknowledge that, within these and other areas of confusion,69
there is a yet more insidious force at work. Unsworth’s title betrays more than he
intends. The absence of knowledge may well be a source of comedy but, I would
suggest, knowledge, itself, is comedic. As we shall see in our discussion of parable
later in this chapter, comedy is intimately connected with metaphor insofar as it is
through the mediating trope of metaphor that we actually experience our world. By
definition, then, as Unsworth makes clear, all knowledge is partial in that an
individual cannot experience all truth about any given phenomena at any time. The
awareness of this state of affairs at any one time can be revelatory and therefore
amusing, but this in itself, I would argue, is merely symptomatic of more fundamental
concerns regarding the fragility of the human experience at critical levels.
144 It is the
contention here, as in the rest of this study, that our epistemological frame of
reference is grounded in and informed by the comedic and that this is expressed
clearly in the novel form. Moreover, this comedic frame of reference has a
fundamental association with the religious experience of humanity. As Kundera has
suggested, ‘the art of the novel came into being as an echo of God’s laughter’.
145 In
the light of this, let us examine some of the significant critical thinking on the
comedic.
Northrop Frye has indicated how the epistemological grounding mentioned above
takes place, when he writes that the nature of comedy is:
A movement from pistis to gnosis […] a movement from illusion to
reality. Illusion is whatever is fixed or definable, and reality is best
understood as its negation: whatever reality is, it’s not that.
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There is then, in the comedic form, an inherent concern with the disruption of our
sense of order, be that spatial, temporal, philosophical or theological.
Indeed, it is precisely at this last theological frame of reference that we find comedy
to have its most telling and disturbing effects. For comedy to point out to us that
144 Such fragile knowledge has clear resonance with TeSelle’s assessment of ‘metaphorical knowledge’
which she describes as ‘a highly risky, uncertain, and open-ended enterprise’. Sally TeSelle, Speaking
in Parables (London: SCM, 1975), p. 44.
145 Kundera, The Art of the Novel, p.158.
146 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp.
169-70.70
whatever reality is, it is not that, illustrates for us the deep connection between
comedy and one of the potential by-products of metaphysical enquiry, namely the
unsettling awareness that we are not in control of our own existence. Comedy’s
disruptive capability has long been recognised. Elaborating on the Aristotelian model,
the disputed Coislinian Tractate (c. fourth – c. second century BCE), points to one of
the characteristic figures of comedy as being that of the impostor.
147 In chapter 4 of
this study, I will elaborate on this specific comedic trait in relation to blasphemy,
suffice it to say at this point, that such a facet significantly amplifies the theological
implications of the comedic.
However, prior to any elaboration of this comedic-theological claim, we must
acknowledge, of course, that there are those who would seek to deny any such
metaphysical connection and ground the subversive effects of comedy solely within
the human sphere. For example, Olson in his Comedy after Postmodernism, drawing
upon the work of Lyotard and Deleuze writes:
Comedy is an immanent form that does not make us look into the heavens
or to God for answers to questions… Comic theory traces a larger
discourse over politics of the body and, within that discourse, between
orthodoxy and heresy. Like desire, laughter is strangely fluid and cannot
be contained by rational thought.
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What I find interesting in the above statement is the broad assumption that is made
concerning the so-called ‘heavenly’ and ‘bodily’ realms. Despite Olson’s later
remarks that comedy ‘is precisely a certain freedom from definition’ (original
emphasis),
149 comedy appears to be confined to what is regarded as its proper place,
i.e. the here and now. Any question of legitimacy or otherwise can only be debated
within the human, secular arena. It is the joke itself which allows us to move between
the shadowy realms of the rational and the irrational. Indeed, there are those who
147 Quoted in Paul Lauter, Theories of Comedy (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964), pp. 21-23.
Interestingly, in his theological analysis of Derrida’s différance, John Caputo describes its activity as
similar to that of an agent provocateur. ‘Différance’, he argues, ‘is the very idea of instigating the
subversion of kingdoms wherever they appear.’ John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God, p. 26.
148 Kirby Olson, Comedy after Postmodernism: Rereading Comedy from Edward Lear to Charles
Willeford (Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press, 2001), p. 5.
149 Ibid., p. 6.71
would see comedy tending to prefer to inhabit the latter of these two kingdoms.
150
Nonetheless, for Olson, there is no-outside-of-the-irrational. Irrationality belongs to
the human sphere as much as rationality. Here comedy stands, it can go no further.
We are, however, forced to ask the question, does the, presumably, artificial
dichotomy which Olson describes really represent the extent of comedy’s potential? I
would suggest that the very desire to postulate such a heavenly/bodily dichotomy, if
only in order to explode it, expresses an unnecessary limitation upon our
understanding of both environments as spheres equally capable of expressing comedic
activity. We will shortly revisit this question, but let us look at the subject briefly from
another perspective.
Curiously, one can look to both Scripture and the Christian tradition to see evidence
of a similar desire, though doubtless springing from a competing motivation, to
separate the ‘heavenly’ from the ‘bodily’ or to put it more viscerally as the religious
are prone to do – the ‘fleshly’. So, for example, we find in the wisdom literature of the
Old Testament:
The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning; but the heart of fools is
in the house of mirth. It is better to hear the rebuke of the wise, than for a
man to hear the song of fools. For as the crackling of thorns under a pot so
is the laughter of the fool: this also is vanity.
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The desire to view the imminent coming of a kingdom beyond this one (although it is
unlikely that the writer of Ecclesiastes himself was motivated by such a desire) as the
filter by which one should live now prompted an abrogation of the body to such an
extent that even marriage itself was considered as superfluous. Believers were
continually encouraged to be ‘sober’ and ‘vigilant’ and the question as to whether the
founder of the faith actually laughed himself remained a matter of serious debate even
to as late as the end of the sixteenth century.
152 The most celebrated expression of this
in recent literature, of course, is Umberto Eco’s postmodern novel, The Name of the
150 See for example, Morton Gurewitch, Comedy: The Irrational Vision (London: Cornell University
Press, 1975).
151 Ecclesiastes 7. 4-6.
152 See Jacques Le Goff, ‘Laughter in the Middle Ages’, in A Cultural History of Humour from
Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. by Jan Bremmer & Herman Roodenburg (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1997), pp. 40-53.72
Rose (1980). Here we find the old monk, Jorge, so determined that the supposedly lost
second book of Poetics (whose focus was comedy) remain secret that he is prepared
to murder to that end. Laughter was, next to idleness, the chief threat to any self-
respecting monk’s spiritual harmony.
It is not my purpose at this point to offer a detailed history concerning the relationship
between comedy and the church.
153 Suffice it to say that there remains in much, if not
most of our post-enlightened, and even postmodern if not post-postmodern religious
world a significant residual attraction to the heavenly/bodily dichotomy which mirrors
that secular fascination outlined above.
Comedy, then, finds itself in a curious position. To adopt a rather weak pun, it appears
to fall between two schools – the rational school and the metaphysical school. The
former would seek to enslave comedy as a means to serving the body and the latter
would seek to confine comedy within the body in order to redeem it for the proper
joys of the next world. It is suggestive of the freedom from definition which
constitutes both the comedic and the theological. As Aichele puts it, ‘Just as the
modern comic theorist can no longer be precise about what comedy is, so the modern
theologian can no longer be precise about his definition of theology.’
154 Another way of
describing this state of affairs is to say that both comedy and theology exhibit the
fragility characteristic of misplacement.
Is such misplacement necessarily a problem for us? A means of answering that
question, I believe, is to be found in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975). A
significant component of the place of comedy in the life of the religious has been
documented by Bakhtin in his Rabelais and his World (1965). We refer, of course, to
the carnival. Events such as the ‘Feast of Fools’, argues Bakhtin, serve to create for
the people of the Middle Ages another world. Bakhtin describes the effect of these
festivals:
153 For further elucidation see Howard Jacobson, Seriously Funny: From the Ridiculous to the Sublime
(London: Viking, 1997).
154 George Aichele, Theology as Comedy: Critical and Theoretical Implications (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1980), p. 59.73
They offered a completely different, non-official, extra-ecclesiastical and
extra-political aspect of the world, of man and of human relations; they
built a second world and a second life outside officialdom.
155
Bakhtin’s ‘two worlds’ postulation helpfully reflects the heavenly/bodily dichotomy
mentioned earlier. But it does more than merely reflect. I would suggest that in the
creation of these worlds through comedy, the dichotomy which appeared to confine
the role of the comedic is actually transformed into a conjunction of both the heavenly
and the bodily into a comedic metaphysics. Such a comedic metaphysics revels in the
frailty of the human condition and, as a result, all interpretative strategies must
subsequently be regarded as provisional. Comedy becomes the nemesis of system. It
is, in the words of Paul Lauter,
[The] ludicrous schoolmaster […] leading man’s élan vital against the
bondage of imposed and unreasonable constraints, directing us toward
freedom from the false claims of absolute validity made by finite
categories and theorems.
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Such comic subversion, rather than directing us in an aimless or worse, nihilistic
direction, actively encourages us to rediscover what David Cooper describes as ‘an
inexpressible, mysterious ‘background’ as the ‘measure’ of what we say and
believe’.
157 In so saying, Cooper is asking us to recognise the aphasic nature of our
experience of the world. There is an ineffable element to human experience which
only a hubristic or thoroughly deterministic approach would seek to deny. As he
himself puts it:
Humanists are right to say that any discursable world is a human one, but
wrong to equate reality with a discursable world. Absolutists are right to
155 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, trans. by Hélène Iswolsky (Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1984), pp. 5-6.
156 Lauter, Theories of Comedy, p. xx.
157 David E. Cooper, The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility and Mystery (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2002), p. 287.74
say that reality is independent of ‘the human contribution’, but wrong to
suppose that it is discursable.
158
Cooper, of course, recognises the dilemma of apparently speaking about that which
cannot be spoken about. This precisely constitutes the perennial problem for theology,
as Smith writes, ‘Theology is a discourse attended by constant prohibition.’
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However, Cooper attempts to resolve this dilemma in a rather laboured way by
distinguishing the uses of the words ‘about’ and “about”. The textual example he
offers is the expression: ‘heroes are rare’ which provides us with some information
about the class of heroes without offering us anything by way of a definition as to the
true nature of the hero. By this linguistic turn he suggests that we can speak of the
ineffable without in any way assuming to describe or confine it.
160 The difficulty
Cooper is confronted with here, I believe, can be faced rather less prescriptively and
without recourse to any kind of semantic strategy by accepting the benign subversive
nature of comedy itself. The aphasia which Cooper ironically attempts to defend
semantically corresponds rather to a comic space whereby the mystery of human
experience is received unselfconsciously. For it is through the comedic that the
freedom to recognise limits is at its most acute. As Simon Critchley puts it:
Laughter is an acknowledgement of finitude, precisely not a manic
affirmation of finitude in the solitary, neurotic laughter of the mountain
tops… but as an affirmation that finitude cannot be affirmed because it
cannot be grasped.
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Such recognition must not be construed as an attempt to systematize the specific
nature of either the epistemological limits which define the human experience, or the
broader metaphysical limits which would otherwise define the ineffable. Rather, one
can view this comedic vision as an expression of both the substantial frailty and the
158 Ibid., p. 279.
159 James K. A. Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation (London:
Routledge, 2002), p. 3.
160 James Smith attempts to resolve the problem in a different way by recourse to the Incarnation as a
means by which God can appear phenomenologically. He thereby distinguishes between the
transcendent God who cannot be spoken of and the ‘worldly God’ of the incarnation who can. Speech
and Theology, pp. 54-5.
161 Simon Critchley, Very Little… Almost Nothing, 2
nd edn. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 187.75
insubstantial presence which inheres in the hermeneutical experience called life. This
mediating position avoids the necessity of choosing between the ineffable and the
concrete.
In this respect, it is even possible to describe this misplaced comedic metaphysics as a
fictional metaphysics. Literature, and particularly fiction, can be said to have no
ontological hang-ups.
162 The distracting heavenly/bodily dichotomy is overcome
through the active and necessary subversion which takes place in another heavenly
body, namely the world of fiction. In this world the boundaries between tangible and
intangible can be blurred, perceived certainties are recognised as provisional, gods are
demonised and demons divinised.
It is this textual subversion which, at every moment, exposes us to the reality of our
own epistemological frailty. However, the temptation to domesticate such subversive
activity is evident in the work of a number of scholars. For example, Robert
Polhemus, in his assessment, roots the comic form deeply in the Christian
philosophical milieu. The basic plot of comic form, he says, ‘grew out of the process
and hope of regeneration.’
163 We have already alluded to Northrop Frye’s
understanding of the positive nature of comedy, or as he calls it, the ‘Mythos of
Spring’ – a genre that moves toward a happy ending. This broader movement holds
within it as one of Frye’s six ‘phases of comedy’ a further more specific movement
from the normal world to a green world and back again. This green world, Frye says,
‘charges the comedies with the symbolism of the victory of summer over winter.’
164
The audience or reader is, in tracing this journey, prepared to enter into the resolution
or, as Frye himself puts it, the redemption of the comic narrative. Comedy, for Frye is
part of a grander redemptive strategy which overcomes all obstacles and indeed, in
many instances, mirrors the structure of the central Christian myth.
Maintaining this overarching theme, Murphy has interpreted Frye’s assessment of the
comedic mode as:
162 I am grateful to Professor David Jasper for this resonant expression.
163 Robert Polhemus, Comic Faith: The Great Tradition from Austen to Joyce (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 17.
164 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 184-5.76
[A]n upward moving U. In its downward graph – the first stroke of the U -
the plot moves away from a good situation and toward conflict and
suffering. In its upward-graph, the second stroke, the plot turns toward
happiness and communal festivity.
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Recognising the importance of the classic comedic upturn (the happy ending) and
without wishing to be pedantic, I wish to extend Murphy’s U analogy by pointing out
the open-endedness of that particular image. The origin and end of the U may be
regarded as indeterminate, and, as Terry Eagleton wittily puts it, ‘sheer pointlessness
is a deeply subversive affair.’
166 It is just such open-endeness that, even in the face of
apparent resolution, the comic mode illustrates. It is at this ever-open space where we
witness Fielding’s comedy become for us a subversive comedy of life itself.
But what constitutes this subversive comedy of life? What is Fielding’s comedic
understanding, and does it resonate with anything of what has been discussed thus
far? Fielding, in the Covent-Garden Journal of 1752, indicated how difficult the
comedic was to analyse objectively:
Of all Kinds of Writing, there is none on which […] Variety of Opinions
is so common as in those of Humour, as perhaps there is no Word in our
Language of which Men have in general so vague and indeterminate an
Idea.
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Fielding’s assessment is a sound one in that the understanding of humour as an artistic
tool or style had, by the time he came to write, no fixed form. The very subjective
nature of the form engendered a plethora of opinions both artistic and
philosophical.
168 Fielding, in a later essay, remarks with some frustration that writers
165 Francesca Aran Murphy, The Comedy of Revelation (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), p. 4.
166 Eagleton, After Theory, p. 39.
167 Henry Fielding, Covent-Garden Journal and A Plan of the Universal Register Office, ed. by
Bertrand A. Goldgar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 130. Hereafter, Covent-Garden Journal.
168 For example, in Hobbes’ Leviathan we read that the passion known as Sudden Glory is defined as
‘the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused by some sudden act of
their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.’ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Richard
Tuck, rev. edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 43.77
such as William Congreve (1670-1729) appear able to explain the nature of the
comedic despite protesting otherwise:
Some of these have spoken of the Word Humour, as if it contained in it
some Mystery impossible to be revealed, and no one, as I know of, hath
undertaken to shew us expressly what it is… But what is more surprizing
is, that we find it pretty well explained in Authors who at the same Time
tell us, they know not what it is.
169
In the Preface to Joseph Andrews, Fielding attempts to more sharply focus his rather
laboured description of his ‘comic Epic-Poem in prose’ by arguing that comedy must
focus its attention upon the ‘ridiculous’. He then advances to define what he means:
The only source of the true Ridiculous (as it appears to me) is
affectation… Now, affectation proceeds from one of these two causes,
vanity or hypocrisy: for as vanity puts us on affecting false characters, in
order to purchase applause; so hypocrisy sets us on an endeavour to avoid
censure, by concealing our vices, under an appearance of their opposite
virtues. And though these two causes are often confounded (for there is
some difficulty in distinguishing them), yet as they proceed from very
different motives, so they are clearly distinct in their operations: for
indeed, the affectation which arises from vanity is nearer to truth than the
other, as it hath not that violent repugnancy of nature to struggle with,
which that of the hypocrite hath […] From the discovery of this
affectation arises the Ridiculous, which always strikes the reader with
surprise and pleasure.
170
Given that Fielding is clearly guided by Aristotelian paradigms
171 and is also writing,
albeit warily, within the Augustan tradition, can we nonetheless bring another
169 Covent-Garden Journal, p. 298.
170 Joseph Andrews, pp. 6-7.
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hermeneutical strategy to bear upon his approach to comedy? Is it possible to discern
in Fielding’s fiction the same traces of frailty that lie at the heart of a comedic
metaphysics? I believe so. The quotation offered above illustrates for us just those
qualities of subversion which breaks down the heavenly/bodily dichotomy and which
prohibits any move towards a broader epistemological vision. The key term for
Fielding is affectation. This clearly lends itself to the same kind of analysis outlined
earlier. For affectation brings with it resonances of ‘show’ or ‘performance’ which
can be supplemented by and contrasted with terms such as ‘concealment’ or
‘disguise’. Affectation in itself becomes, in Derridean parlance, a binary opposite. No
doubt other expressions may be found to augment the ones already offered – ‘reality’
and ‘unreality’ immediately spring to mind – but the point is clear that, for Fielding,
the source of the Ridiculous and thus the root of comedy lies in the subverting nature
of language within the frailty of lived human experience. Affectation is an act and yet
it is not. It is a performance and yet the individual in so performing is revealed as real
to the point of transparency.
The comedy in all of this, Fielding reminds us, is precisely in our coming to
awareness of this state of affairs. This awareness smacks not of a simple transfer of
intellectual information – it is a veritable revelation which is attended with visceral
surprise and pleasure. Indeed, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that we, as
readers, actively enter into this revelation. The revelation becomes our activity and as
a result the affectation which we ourselves assumed as passive receptors is exposed in
our active response to the text. In other words, in our reading we are subversively
called to the comedy of life.
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Such an assessment is clearly in line with a critical tradition that has its source in
Aristotelian poetics, which itself is closely linked to Plato’s argument in the Philebus
that comedy stems from a recognition of self-limitation or as we have described it
throughout this study, human frailty. So in summing up his argument, Socrates states:
In the strong, ignorance of self is odious and repulsive – it and its
counterfeit presentiments are injurious to a man’s neighbour as well as to
172 For further elucidation upon revelation, see Chapter 6.79
himself; - where it is weak, we see the proper place and true character of
the comic.
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In contrast to Plato’s dismissive attitude towards comedy, we find that, in Aristotle,
there is a concern to see that comedy is utilised justly. As we noted above, Aristotle
seeks to forensically determine the content and purposes of comedy. His assessment is
that true comedy demands that it not be used gratuitously to the extent that it causes
pain.
174 This concern for justice implies the very resolution that Frye and, in his
subverted way, Fielding himself, have outlined for us above.
We will, in due course, look more specifically at this notion of comedic justice,
175 but
at this stage I wish simply to assess how writers in the eighteenth century constituted
comedy. Thereafter we will seek to ask ourselves the question: Just how happy are
Fielding’s happy endings? To lead us there, however, we must firstly discern two
critical motifs in the eighteenth century understanding of the comedic which will, I
believe, resonate not only with Fielding’s own understanding but also with our
guiding notion of misplacement.
Comedy and Balance
The first of these motifs is that of the humours. It is, of course, to the ancient
physician Galen (AD 129-99) that we trace our understanding of the humours. The
healthy body, it was believed, was regulated by four essential humours or, more
strictly, fluids – blood, phlegm, black bile and choler. These fluids, for the body to
remain healthy, had to be held in balance. Any imbalance in these humours led to
disease. It was but a short step from this physiological analysis to apply the activity of
the humours to the sphere of the psyche. As a result, one can assign particular
humours to particular psychological traits. Stott summarises the possibilities:
173 Plato, Philebus, trans. by A.E. Taylor (London: Nelson, 1956), p. 169.
174 Aristotle, Poetics, 3.4.9.
175 See Chapter 5.80
A preponderance of blood produced sanguinity, or a brave, hopeful, and
amorous disposition; too much phlegm resulted in apathy; black bile led to
melancholia; and disproportionate choler caused irascibility and hot-
headedness.
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Such graphic clinical diagnoses were taken up to apply to the practice of comedy. So
we find William Congreve explain:
Thô I make a Difference betwixt Wit and Humour; yet I do not think that
Humorous Characters exclude Wit: No, but the Manner of Wit should be
adapted to the Humour. As for Instance, a Character of a Splenetik and
Peevish Humour, should have a Satyrical Wit. A Jolly and Sanguine
Humour, should have a Facetious Wit.
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What lies behind Congreve’s graphic yet, (one supposes given Galen’s massive
influence), traditional remarks is that there is, in the execution of comedy, a balance to
be struck. It is with this notion of balance that we are most concerned here. Despite
the obvious competing critical claims for comedy that Fielding has alluded to, a clear
suggestion which persists amongst most critics and exponents of the form is its
relationship to this concept of balance. An example of just such balance, which was
considered critical in the execution of comedy, is witnessed in the desire of many of
the poets and dramatists of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century for the
promotion of virtue and the concomitant restraining of excess. A useful example of
this tendency is the distinction to which John Dryden (1631-1700), amongst others,
drew attention, namely that between high and low comedy. For Dryden, although he
concedes that his assessment is entirely subjective, it is high comedy which is to be
considered superior based as it is upon an understanding of wit that had developed
throughout the previous century. As Gelber puts it:
Wit increasingly came to stand not for broad intellectual gifts or skill in
the major literary genres but a talent of a different order: a capacity for
176 Andrew Stott, Comedy (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 45.
177 William Congreve, A Letter to John Dennis, concerning Humour in Comedy, reproduced in
Comedy: Developments in Criticism, ed. by D. J. Palmer (London Macmillan, 1984), p. 40.81
ingenuity, an ability to make unexpected unions or contrasts of generally
diverse ideas.
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For Dryden, the exercise of such wit led to high comedy which inspired ‘a pleasure
that is more noble’. By contrast, low comedy aimed at ‘natural imitation’ and
observed ‘only what is ridiculous’. One can see straightaway how Dryden differs from
Fielding in this high/low distinction. Fielding, as we have noted, aims directly at the
ridiculous. But he sees a high motive which lies behind this comedy, namely the
exposure of vanity. We will, in due course, focus upon the ethical dimension that this
notion of comedic balance offers us, but in the meantime it is sufficient for us to
recognise the broader implications.
It would appear from this disparity between Fielding and Dryden above, that any
notion of balance, be it based upon the physiological or psychological humours
themselves or upon any critical taxonomy, is actually an illusion. One can, with the
benefit of hindsight, recognise the futility of effecting any kind of resolution to the
assessment of comedy. In the same way that the heavenly/bodily dichotomy failed, so
here at the critical level with the rise of the novel, no apparatus can be provided which
will succeed in confining the purposes of comedy. The high/low distinction favoured
by Dryden merely serves to show the subjective variances and downright critical
prejudices that exist at the artistic level. Fielding himself was, of course, subject to
these variances but, I suggest, was as unaware in his fiction of his flouting them as he
was in his more critical writings, of expounding them. This has implications for the
entire project of resolution which, in many ways, is the raison d’ être of the comic
novel, viz. the happy ending, as we shall shortly examine.
Comedy and Mask
The second motif I wish to adopt in our study of comedy is that of mask. Terry Castle
has argued that the overriding form of Fielding’s presentation of the masquerade is the
carnival moralisé – ‘it stands as the living emblem of a wider decay, a theatre of
178 Michael Werth Gelber, ‘Dryden’s Theory of Comedy’, Eighteenth Century Studies 26, no.2 (1992-
1993 Winter), 261-83.82
excess in which modern society enacts its own perversity.’
179 It is a motif that
Fielding had used in his ‘An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men’
(1739-40) where it becomes the summation of a ruinous society. At the very least it is
an indicator of the idea ‘that Man is a deceitful Animal’:
The whole World becomes a vast Masquerade, where the greatest Part
appear disguised under false Vizors and Habits; a very few only shewing
their true Faces, who become, by so doing, the Astonishment and Ridicule
of the rest.
180
This forms part of his somewhat static theological assessment of human virtue and
vice.
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What is interesting, however, is just how such static characterisation is transformed in
Fielding’s fiction. Those theological types, which fitted so easily in the formal setting
of a didactic essay, find themselves destabilised in the less controllable fictional
arena. It is as if the characters themselves, when given room to breathe, actually
inhale a less rarefied mixture in order to carry on existing. Fielding hints as much in
his early poem, The Masquerade (1728) where we read of those ‘Who masque the
Face, t’unmasque the Mind’.
182 But this is more clearly in evidence in Tom Jones
where, in the chapter entitled Containing the Whole Humours of the Masquerade
(XIII.vii), we find what, at first glance, appears to be a similar didactic frame of
reference. We are presented with a title which purports to encapsulate the whole
sordid nature of the masquerade. Indeed, the masquerade in the title is here
personified and is linked to those humours mentioned earlier. Tom’s disappointment
at failing to meet with his beloved Sophia at the masquerade suggests to us that those
distractions offered by the masquerade as ‘Antidotes against the Spleen’ (XIII.vii.461)
179 Terry Castle, Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English
Culture and Fiction (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 190.
180 Henry Fielding, ‘An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men’ in Miscellanies Vol. I, ed.
by Henry Knight Miller (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 155.
181 In the ‘Essay’ noted above, Fielding adopts such characters as ‘the Flatterer’, ‘the Professor’, the
Promise’ and typically, ‘the Saint’. By the time Fielding is acting in his position as magistrate, he is
recorded on at least two occasions leading a band of officers to break up a masquerade, before
examining them. See Martin C. Battestin with Ruthe R. Battestin, Henry Fielding: A Life (London:
Routledge, 1993), pp. 502-503; 522-523.
182 Henry Fielding, The Masquerade in The Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon, Shamela, and Occasional
Writings, ed. by Martin Battestin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.14-27 (p. 17).83
are revealed for the shallow entertainments they are. Fielding goes further and adopts
an ironic theological motif describing the opening scene:
Our Cavaliers now arrived at that Temple, where Heydegger, the great
Arbiter Deliciarum, the great High Priest of Pleasure presides, and, like
other Heathen Priests, imposes on his Votaries by the pretended Presence
of the Deity, when in Reality no such Deity is there.
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The masquerade here becomes an embodiment of that other great revel from the Old
Testament – The Worship of the Golden Calf. Here, too, we are presented with an
empty deity. While the true God is hidden with his true representative, the sensuous,
tactile false god provides the relief the masses crave.
And yet, for all the obvious points of didactic resonance, there remains in this chapter
a measure of ambivalence. This is obviously an inevitable consequence of the subject
matter itself. The masquerade is defined by hiddenness. The ontology of the
masquerade is, as it were, compromised by its very existence. What allows Fielding to
demarcate the masquerade in this chapter actually and, paradoxically, releases the
masquerade to be the enigmatic cipher that it is. Castle argues that it is Fielding’s use
of the masquerade in a broader plot structure which secures its ambivalent status.
Though this suggestion fulfils the traditional requirement of the building of narrative
tension which thus provides a final comic resolution, there lies a deeper ontological
implication of masquerade itself, namely that fiction (itself a masquerade) can escape
its own supposed confines.
This ‘escape’ occurs at the more obvious level of character as Castle points out:
Like a kind of textual vortex…[the fictional representation of the
masquerade] is that locale through which the characters cannot pass
without exposing what is uncharacteristic – how they differ, as it were,
from themselves.
184
183 Tom Jones, XIII.vii.460.
184 Castle, Masquerade and Civilization, p. 198.84
A good example is to be found in Amelia, where it can be legitimately argued that the
motif of the mask plays a central role. Early in the story, we find Booth in prison and
we are introduced to Blear-Eyed Moll, a prostitute who has lost her nose (most likely
through syphilis). The fact that we later discover that Booth’s own wife, the saintly
Amelia, also has a damaged nose, provides us with a disturbing symmetry. As a result
of her accident (‘the overturning of a chaise’), Amelia has for a time to wear a mask
and Booth recounts the incident for us:
We were alone together, and I begged her to indulge my curiosity by
shewing me her face. She answered in a most obliging manner, “Perhaps,
Mr Booth, you will as little know me when my mask is off as when it is
on;” and at the same instant unmasked. – The surgeon’s skill was the least
I considered. A thousand tender ideas rushed all at once on my mind. I
was unable to contain myself, and eagerly kissing her hand, I cried –
“Upon my soul, madam, you never looked so lovely as at this instant.”
185
Fig. 1.
Henry Fielding, frontispiece to Fielding's Works (1st ed., 1762),
engraving by James Basire after a drawing by William Hogarth
Courtesy of the trustees of the British Museum; photograph, J.R. Freeman & Co., Ltd
185 Henry Fielding, Amelia, II.1.59, ed. by David Blewett (London: Penguin, 1987). Hereafter, Amelia.85
Amelia’s apparently self-deprecating remark provides, firstly, a dark commentary on
Booth’s own inability to discern character behind the various guises he confronts in
life. Booth reveals this piece of information about Amelia in the prison where he has
already exhibited a measure of naïveté concerning the identity of his fellow inmates.
The fact that he also reveals his tale to the seductive and designing Miss Matthews,
with whom he is later to have an assignation, amplifies the sense of Booth’s inability
to truly encounter the other. This inability, as we shall note later, even extends to his
contact with God.
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Secondly, and more disturbingly, Amelia’s comment leaves us wondering about
Amelia herself. Do we, indeed, ever reach beyond her mask in this novel? She is
repeatedly revered as virtuous and in various terms, ‘the finest woman in England’
and yet does that very virtue not present us with a disguise? Her decision, for
example, not to attend the masquerade on moral grounds and in her stead to send Mrs
Atkinson, (who is subsequently mistaken by everyone including Booth for Amelia),
surely points to a guile that does not chime with the traditional view of her.
187
She is described by the devout Dr Harrison (the ‘divine policeman’ as Amory calls
him),
188 as ‘an Israelite indeed, in whom there is no guile’.
189 On the face of it, this
appears to be a compliment and yet Nathaniel, the first recipient of this epithet,
instead of being a faith-filled individual, is presented as someone who is sceptical
regarding Jesus’s credentials – ‘Can anything good come out of Nazareth?’
190 Here in
the gospel and, by extension, in Amelia, itself, we are presented with a somewhat
murkier presentation of character.
This ambiguity extends to the transmission of Amelia’s own religious experience. We
are told that she ‘never let a day pass, without instructing her children in some lesson
186 See below, p. 113f.
187 John Coolidge draws our attention to the question as to how innocent Amelia can be if she has to
genuinely counter evil. He asks, ‘Can good admit the participation of evil without ceasing to be itself?’
John Coolidge, ‘Fielding and “Conservation of Character”’, Modern Philology 57 (1959-60), 245-259,
(p. 253).
188 Amory, Hugh, ‘Magistrate or Censor? The Problem of Authority in Fielding’s Later Writings’, SEL:
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 12, no. 3 (1972 Summer), 503-18 (p. 513).
189 Amelia, IX.8.395, quoting John 1. 47.
190 John 1. 46.86
of religion and morality’.
191 And yet, later in the novel, when Dr. Harrison enters into
conversation with one of the Booth children regarding forgiveness, we learn that
things are not so straight-forward:
Whilst Booth and his wife were feasting their souls with the most
delicious mutual endearments, the doctor was fallen to play with the two
little children below-stairs. While he was thus engaged the little boy did
somewhat amiss; upon which the doctor said, ‘If you do so any more I
will take your papa away from you again.’ – ‘Again! sir,’ said the child;
‘why, was it you then that took away my papa before?’ ‘Suppose it was,’
said the doctor; ‘would not you forgive me?’ ‘Yes,’ cries the child, ‘I
would forgive you; because a Christian must forgive everybody; but I
should hate you as long as I live.’
The doctor was so pleased with the boy's answer, that he caught him in his
arms and kissed him; at which time Booth and his wife returned. The
doctor asked which of them was their son's instructor in his religion;
Booth answered that he must confess Amelia had all the merit of that
kind. ‘I should have rather thought he had learnt of his father,’ cries the
doctor; ‘for he seems a good soldier-like Christian, and professes to hate
his enemies with a very good grace.’
‘How, Billy!’ cries Amelia. ‘I am sure I did not teach you so.’
‘I did not say I would hate my enemies, madam,’ cries the boy; ‘I only
said I would hate papa's enemies. Sure, mamma, there is no harm in that;
nay, I am sure there is no harm in it, for I have heard you say the same
thing a thousand times.’
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Prior to discussing the substantive issue this passage reveals, we notice immediately
the carnal setting within which it is set. We discover, here, a favourite ploy of
Fielding, namely the placing of a spiritual interaction against a very physical one.
Harrison and the child are deep in theological cogitation below, while Booth and
Amelia are ‘feasting their souls’ in an altogether different fashion above. This
191 Amelia, IV.4.162.
192 Amelia, IX.9.365-6.87
theological/carnal mirroring becomes itself a kind of mask which paradoxically
reveals the equivocal nature of the discussion on forgiveness itself.
Moving to the conversation between Dr. Harrison and the boy, we are left somewhat
confused as to the content and extent of Amelia’s religious influence. Fielding allows
us to speculate in the person of Dr. Harrison as to precisely who is the teacher of such
a lusty form of Christianity. Harrison attributes the boy’s response regarding hatred of
enemies to the influence of Booth, but we discover from the boy himself that, in fact,
it is Amelia who has encouraged her son in this spiritual direction, a direction which
flies in the face of any traditional form of Christian charity that we would assume
Amelia would choose to inculcate. Jill Campbell attributes this scenario to a
patriarchal motive when she writes:
Amelia’s personal authority as a living paragon of Christian virtue, her
active, persuasive power over others is radically circumscribed and
ultimately dependent on the authority of men, whose characteristic values
of military or classical virtue strangely mix and meld with the Christian
wisdom Amelia herself is allowed to purvey.
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In other words, it is Fielding’s Christianity which has intervened here. Amelia,
according to Campbell, merely becomes the channel by which this muscular faith is
disseminated. However, I would suggest that this is to minimize the depth of
ambiguity that this passage offers. It seems too easy, in the face of Amelia’s apparent
inconsistency, to transplant Fielding (or ‘patriarchal belief’) into that worrisome state
of affairs. Instead, we should recognise that, in this important respect, Amelia is as
much affected by mask as anyone else in the novel. She becomes the personification,
not of a muscular Christianity, but of the unstable truth that there is no single
unalloyed understanding of forgiveness that is expressed in Amelia. We are
confronted with an unsettling many-faceted (many-masked) comedic Christianity
(what Rawson describes as a ‘“serious” reconstitution of the comic’)
194 which defies
fundamental analysis.
193 Jill Campbell, Natural Masques: Gender and Identity in Fielding’s Plays and Novels (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 239.
194 Claude Rawson, Henry Fielding and the Augustan Ideal Under Stress, p. 93.88
Indeed, one might go further and suggest that Amelia provides us with such a display
of ambiguity that she becomes almost ethereal. She is not, like Richardson’s
eponymous Clarissa, a protestant martyr bent on moral incorruption via bodily decay.
Rather, Amelia is, in a sense, a masked martyr insofar as it is impossible to penetrate
the veneer of spirituality which shapes her. This is not to suggest that her spirituality
or character is superficial. If anything, it is quite the opposite. She is a spiritual cipher,
and in the strictest sense of that word, a spiritual zero which becomes a vital key in
our coming to terms with Amelia as an individual and this work as truly postmodern.
One of Fielding’s more illustrious and avid readers, Immanuel Kant, recognising the
duplicity which takes place in so-called virtuous society, was led to write, ‘on the
whole, the more civilised human beings are, the more they are actors.’
195 Kant appears
to regard this ‘naturally implanted willing self-deceit’ as nothing more than a
necessary evil out of which a more virtuous society can develop. Masking, for Kant
becomes a moral training.
By contrast, however, Castle proffers a less sanguine understanding, when she
indicates how relationships and, indeed, society itself is subverted by the masquerade:
The masquerade provokes a revelation – the unmasking – of hidden
potentiality in the fictional world. It is that stage upon which the
individual loses his or her incorrigible specificity – and the textual site at
which the disparate stories of self and other merge, and become
indistinguishable.
196
Stott offers an overarching historical gloss to all of this when he points to the post
Civil War disillusionment with absolute order of whatever colour. He writes:
Authority had disgraced itself, it seemed, and sincerity and conviction
were currencies debased by ideology. […] This would account for the
centrality of artifice and ‘playing’ as themes in the comedy of this era,
195 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. by Robert B. Louden
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 42.
196 Castle, Masquerade and Civilization, p. 249.89
confirmed by its extravagant use of masks, disguises, impersonations and
subterfuges that focus attention on the theme of credibility.
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Both of the above, it would seem, tell only a part of the story. It is the story itself that
is subverted by masquerade. It is not merely character that is thrown into the vortex, it
is plot too, and more than this, fictionality itself. It is, all of it, misplaced through the
ontological filter of the masquerade. Neither, too, can we be confined by a purely
historical analysis. Both Stott and Castle seem content merely to describe the
immediate effects of masquerade within a particular literary or historical context. I
would go further and suggest that it is the notion of credibility itself which is exposed
in the fictional world as incredible.
A stunning and theological example of this is found in Amelia in the form of a sermon
delivered at the Masquerade at which both Booth and Amelia attend. The sermon
itself is in the form of a letter which has been sent by the saintly Dr. Harrison to the
scheming Colonel James. However, the letter is misplaced by him and finds itself on
the floor of the Haymarket Opera House in which the masquerade is taking place. The
letter/sermon is subsequently picked up by some rakish fellows who proceed to
deliver it to the assembled throng:
‘Here beginneth the first chapter of – Saint – Pox on’t, Jack, what is the
saint’s name? I have forgot.’
‘Timothy, you blockhead,’ answer’d another – ‘Timothy.’
‘Well, then,’ cries the orator, ‘of Saint Timothy.’
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We realise at once that Saint Timothy is not actually referred to in the sermon (it is in
the form of a letter after all), but he is invoked by the orator as the patron saint of
drunks.
199 The rake proceeds to expound with great vigour against the social and
personal dangers of adultery, and after fourteen rowdily interrupted paragraphs,
comes to the end of the ‘dismal ditty’. Fielding, here, extends the mask motif to cover
197 Stott, Comedy, p. 56.
198 Amelia, X.2.418.
199 St. Timothy was invoked in order to alleviate stomach upsets, hence the association with alcohol.
See Alison Jones, The Wordsworth Dictionary of Saints (Ware, Herts: Wordsworth Editions Ltd.,
1995), p. 220.90
the nature of text itself. Indeed, he goes as far as he can in this regard, given that he
uses as his text that which ordinarily would, of course, have no place at such an
occasion, but also in that he disguises it in the shape of a dramatic and sensual address
delivered by the most unlikely of preachers. The mask becomes, then, an exemplar of
misplacement, a parting with the ineffable, insofar as that which is seen as sacred is
rhetorically reduced or weakened. The result of such misplacement in this case is that
the power that inheres in the text is exploited in an atmosphere which, to say the least,
would be considered uncongenial. Johnson, focussing upon the moral implications of
this writes:
For both the imaginary Dr. Harrison and Fielding the magistrate and
moralist, the sermon at the masquerade was a serious exhortation directed
at the private and public conscience. For Fielding the novelist, the sermon
at the masquerade is also an amusing incident, an ingenious device, and a
manifestation of the constructive power of genius. It is the feigning of a
moral masquerade.
200
I would go further than Johnson, here, and eliminate the distinction he casually makes
between Fielding ‘the magistrate and moralist’ and Fielding ‘the novelist’. For surely,
one can extend the effect of masquerade to those very roles of ‘magistrate’, ‘moralist’
and ‘novelist’ that Johnson would seek to so firmly ascribe. What Fielding does in this
passage (and Johnson recognises) is that we are left floundering as to the nature of
both fiction and reality. Which parts of the sermon are we to take seriously? All of it?
None of it? How do we detect that element of truth behind the comic façade which
surrounds it? This is the genius of Fielding in this passage which, in the space of a
short sermon, breaks open the unfixability of human experience. In this respect the
sermon has a deadly comedic effect.
201
200 Maurice Johnson, Fielding’s Act of Fiction (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1961), p.
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Clarissa where the vehicle of correspondence not only heightens psychological tension but more
specifically illustrates the risks of misplaced trust.91
A further example found in Joseph Andrews involves the masking of sermon as
theatrical production. Parson Adams, desperate to sell his sermons, finds himself
confronting a potential buyer in the shape of a world-weary bookseller:
As soon as he had seated himself, the stranger began in these words: ‘Sir,
I do not care absolutely to deny engaging in what my friend Mr Barnabas
recommends; but sermons are mere drugs. The trade is so vastly stocked
with them, that really, unless they come out with the name of Whitefield
or Wesley, or some other such great man, as a bishop, or those sort of
people, I don't care to touch; unless now it was a sermon preached on the
30th of January; or we could say in the title-page, published at the earnest
request of the congregation, or the inhabitants; but, truly, for a dry piece
of sermons, I had rather be excused; especially as my hands are so full at
present. However, sir, as Mr Barnabas mentioned them to me, I will, if
you please, take the manuscript with me to town, and send you my
opinion of it in a very short time.’
‘Oh!’ said Adams, ‘if you desire it, I will read two or three discourses as a
specimen.’ This Barnabas, who loved sermons no better than a grocer doth
figs, immediately objected to, and advised Adams to let the bookseller
have his sermons: telling him, ‘If he gave him a direction, he might be
certain of a speedy answer;’ adding, he need not scruple trusting them in
his possession. ‘No,’ said the bookseller, ‘if it was a play that had been
acted twenty nights together, I believe it would be safe.’
Adams did not at all relish the last expression; he said ‘he was sorry to
hear sermons compared to plays.’ ‘Not by me, I assure you,’ cried the
bookseller, ‘though I don't know whether the licensing act may not shortly
bring them to the same footing; but I have formerly known a hundred
guineas given for a play.’ – ‘More shame for those who gave it,’ cried
Barnabas. – ‘Why so?’ said the bookseller, ‘for they got hundreds by it.’ –
‘But is there no difference between conveying good or ill instructions to
mankind?’ said Adams: ‘Would not an honest mind rather lose money by
the one, than gain it by the other?’ – ‘If you can find any such, I will not92
be their hindrance,’ answered the bookseller; ‘but I think those persons
who get by preaching sermons are the properest to lose by printing them:
for my part, the copy that sells best will be always the best copy in my
opinion; I am no enemy to sermons, but because they don't sell: for I
would as soon print one of Whitefield's as any farce whatever.’
202
There is, of course, a specific historico-theological context here insofar as George
Whitefield (1714-70) is seen as the target for Fielding’s humour. Methodist preachers,
like Whitefield and John Wesley (1703-91), were widely regarded as an unwelcome
and dangerous diversion (much like the unlicensed theatres of the period) for working
people. To this end, a number of satirical drawings and poems were produced making
the comparison between Methodist activities and the theatre or, more specifically, the
pantomime (see Fig 2. below).
Fig. 2.
Minister dressed as Harlequin. Detail from Credulity, Superstition, and Fanaticism, (1762) William Hogarth
Image courtesy of
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John O’Brien spells out the blurring of the boundaries between the entertainment
industry and religion:
Now, religion was perceived to be following the example of the
entertainment culture it had once excoriated, appealing to the masses by
mimicking the theatre, and by this means moving into its physical,
conceptual and psychic spaces.
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However, the deeper point being made here in Joseph Andrews is that the sermon (and
possibly other religious activity) can be regarded as not only entertainment, but in a
certain sense, fictional. It becomes an artifice which can be sold like any other artistic
commodity. This does not imply (as Adams believes) a cheapening of the sermon.
Rather, it is suggestive of the very ambivalence of so-called religious language and of
what that language purports to display and ultimately achieve.
The masquerade becomes, then, an important example of the subversive activity of
comedy. In the work of fiction, and particularly comic fiction, the boundary between
the physical and the metaphysical becomes translucent. In the comic we are carried
beyond the ontological, beyond the realm of being, beyond concepts of reality and
unreality.
In this regard, we find that Peter Berger, in his Redeeming Laughter, helpfully teases
out some of this unsettling activity of comedy. He describes the work of humour as an
intrusion which ‘conjures up a separate world different from the world of ordinary
reality, operating by different rules’.
204 We are here, of course, led back immediately
to Bakhtin and to our heavenly/bodily dichotomy. There is in the work of comedy a
danger of uncontrollability or excess. Such a danger has resonances with the
Dionysian or Bacchian cults. This association by itself can account for the negative
reaction of the church authorities to expressions of mirth which we outlined earlier in
this chapter. However, I do not wish to remain fixated, as it were, upon the associative
dangers of the comic. Rather, I would seek to get to the heart of what it is that leads us
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to suggest that comedy is itself misplacement – a parting with the ineffable. It is here
that we enter into the contrariness of the comic metaphysic.
Pharmakomedy
Baudelaire in his essay, Of the Essence of Laughter, after amusingly outlining the
orthodox position on the lapsarian roots of laughter, points out the profound
contradictions inherent in the comedic experience of humanity:
Laughter is satanic; it is therefore profoundly human. In man it is the
consequence of his idea of his own superiority; and in fact, since laughter
is essentially human it is essentially contradictory, that is to say it is at one
and the same time a sign of infinite greatness and of infinite wretchedness,
infinite wretchedness in relation to the absolute being, of who man has an
inkling, infinite greatness in relation to the beasts. It is from the constant
clash of these two infinities that laughter flows.
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Baudelaire here follows, at first blush, the Aristotelian understanding of the comic in
that laugher is appropriate insofar as it exposes the weakness of the other. However,
he clearly goes further in utilising laughter as a kind of generic glue, by which the
demonic is tightly bonded with the human. What does this mean? And more
significantly, how can we hold this in the light of Baudelaire’s subsequent statement
that ‘the comic dwells in us Christians’?
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A means to resolve this apparent tension can be found in the term pharmakon and its
synonyms which Derrida has taken up from Plato’s writings, chiefly the Phaedrus.
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The word can hold within itself a pair of apparently contradictory meanings, namely
‘medicine’ or ‘poison’ and ‘wizard’ or ‘scapegoat’. Derrida utilises this etymological
ambiguity to stress the binary oppositions which are inherent in language itself. For
our purposes, however, it is useful to specifically apply the term pharmakon to the
205 Charles Baudelaire, ‘Of the Essence of Laughter’, in Baudelaire: Selected Writings on Art and
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realm of the comedic and to the work of the comedian. Applying Derrida’s
methodological approach, one can see that the comedic can be regarded as a source of
both health and disease, of pleasure and pain, of life and death. Comedy in this binary
sense, then, transcends the individual positive or negative categories which would
otherwise seek to confine its activity. By its gently insidious nature it can override the
realities we care to set up and thereby inhabit the separate world which we have been
alluding to. It is this ‘transcendence in a lower key’ as Berger describes it, which
enables comedy to break the chains of the rational and truly enter into the realms of
the metaphysical.
However, at the risk of appearing either pedantic or obfuscatory, it is important to
stress that this ‘transcendence in a lower key’ also works, as it were, in the opposite
direction. Not only are we to recognise the ineffable glory beyond or behind the
fragile nature of the comedic, we are also brought to see the fragile glory of the
human condition which, at all times, is confronted by the ineffable nature of the
comedic.
Recognising this, we can then say with Baudelaire that laughter (or comedy) is both
satanic and human. It is, as Blake would have it ‘of the devil’s party’ and, at the same
time, it offers not only insight into human nature, but a temporary suspension of the
vicissitudes of life to the extent that it can offer the potential at least for an experience
of joy. And, of course, it is at this point that the comedic and the religious come into
close contact.
The risk of comedy can be described as similar to the Kierkegaardian ‘leap of faith’.
Indeed, one can trace in Kierkegaard that this gulf between finitude and infinitude is
what constitutes comedy itself:
What lies at the root of both the comic and the tragic in this connection, is
the discrepancy, the contradiction, between the infinite and the finite, the
eternal and that which becomes.
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The fact that comedy points to another world, a separate sphere, however fleetingly,
open us to a choice. The choice exits because there is, it would appear, something for
us to perceive as comedic. As Berger puts it:
The subjective aspect [of the comic phenomenon] is intended by what is
commonly called a sense of humour… This is the capacity to perceive
something as comical or funny. But there is also a putative objectivity in
this perception. That is, there is the assumption that there is something out
there, something outside one’s own mind, that is comical.
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That ‘something out there’ is paradoxically co-existent with an awareness of the
incongruity of lived experience. In other words, it is through the comedic that we
come to recognise the other. And, of course, it is here that we are brought round once
more to the focus of Henry Fielding’s own comedy, namely HUMAN NATURE
itself. This we can also examine through the unlikely filter of Derrida’s ambiguous
pharmakon.
Having established comedy’s relationship with the transcendent, we can at once see
how the work of the comedian can be regarded as potentially sacramental or even
magical. Derrida recognised the irony in the fact that Socrates who had railed against
the pharmakon of writing was himself condemned as pharmakos – wizard, magician,
poisoner. We are also reminded, too, of Plato’s less than sympathetic attitude to the
poets of his day.
Poisoning Plato
In the Phaedrus, we are given the impression that the artist is a special kind of sophist
who beguiles and pretends to ‘doctor’s talk’. Plato feared the instability of poetic
inspiration, describing it as a kind of divine or holy madness.
210 The focus of art is not
the simple or the good but what is earthy and complex, as Murdoch states:
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Purity, simplicity, truthfulness and the absence of pretence or pretension
are the marks of sound art, and such art is universally understood, as are
simple folk tales and moral stories. Ordinary people know instinctively
that art becomes degraded unless it is kept simple.
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Beauty and art are, for Plato two separate spheres. The former is to be honoured, the
latter suspected. Without entering too deeply into Plato’s reasoning here, we can at
least do no better than hear Iris Murdoch’s assessment, not least for its resonance with
my thesis:
Art as the great general universal informant is an obvious rival, not
necessarily a hostile one, to philosophy and indeed to science, and Plato
never did justice to the truth-conveying capacities of art…Art, especially
literature, is a great hall of reflection where we can all meet and where
everything under the sun can be examined and considered. For this reason
it is feared and attacked by dictators, and by authoritarian moralists…
Plato feared the consolations of art. He did not offer a consoling
theology... To present the idea of God at all, even as myth, is a
consolation, since it is impossible to defend this image against the
prettifying attentions of art. Art will mediate and adorn, and develop
magical structures to conceal the absence of God or his distance…
Sophistry and magic break down at intervals, but they never go away and
there is no end to their collusion with art and to the consolation which…
they can provide.
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Ironically, Plato, himself, becomes a figure of comedy in Iris Murdoch’s Fire and Sun
where she explains that Plato, in the Republic did not in fact banish all the poets, but
merely suggested that they be politely escorted to the border!
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Plato is, of course, highly regarded by Fielding but this in itself does not hinder him
from poking fun at the philosopher. In the dedication of Tom Jones to his old school
211 Iris Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
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friend, benefactor and Member of Parliament, George Lyttelton, Fielding defends his
main purpose ‘to recommend Goodness and Innocence’. In this particular apology he
marshals Plato into service:
And to say the Truth, it [the recommendation of Goodness and Innocence]
is likeliest to be attained in Books of this Kind; for an Example is a Kind
of Picture, in which virtue becomes as it were an Object of Sight, and
strikes us with an Idea of that Loveliness, which Plato asserts there is in
her naked Charms.
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The problem with this reference to Plato is that, in the Phaedrus, Plato never spoke of
‘naked Charms’ at all.
215 This has fallen out of Fielding’s imagination. One can, of
course, argue that it is a genuine misquotation of Plato, after all, there are a number of
these misquotations throughout the work. I would, however, suggest that this is a
‘deliberate misquotation’, a misplaced quotation, which actually subverts the very
defence Fielding is attempting to mount. As the Grand Creator, Fielding well knows
the content of his own work and such an insertion would chime remarkably well with
the robust expressions of sexuality found in the novel. Plato, then, the lover of Form
who saw the flesh as ‘mortal trash’ (Symposium 211) is implicated in the very
fleshliness he would seek to deny.
Later in the novel, we find another instance of Plato being comically subverted. In the
debate between Mrs Western, her brother Squire Western and Sophia regarding her
niece’s matrimonial future, Mrs Western in exasperation at what she regards as
Sophia’s stubbornness at not wishing to marry Blifil, declaims:
‘Niece, have I not endeavoured to inspire you with a true Idea of the
several Relations in which a human Creature stands in Society? Have I not
taken infinite Pains to shew you, that the Law of Nature hath enjoined a
Duty on children to their Parents? Have I not told you what Plato says on
that Subject? – A Subject on which you was so notoriously ignorant when
214 Tom Jones, p. 7.
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you first came under my Care, that I verily believe you did not know the
Relation between a Daughter and a Father.’ ‘’Tis a lie,’ answered
Western. ‘The Girl is no such Fool, as to live to eleven Years old without
knowing that she was her Father’s Relation.’
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Mrs Western is earlier described as:
Well skilled in the Doctrine of Amour: A Knowledge she the more easily
attained, as her Pursuit of it was never diverted by any Affairs of her own;
for either she had no Inclinations, or they had never been solicited; which
last is indeed very probable: For her masculine Person, which was near six
Foot high, added to her Manner and Learning, possibly prevented the
other Sex from regarding her, notwithstanding her Petticoats, in the Light
of a Woman.
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Mrs Western’s skill is of a technical nature. Regardless of her intellectual perspicacity
she remains blind to the realities of life and love. She is a perambulatory ivory tower.
In other words, she becomes emblematic of the fleshless Puritanism which Plato
himself advocated. There is little of the goodness of heart which Fielding desires to
communicate to his readers, particularly in the character of the ignorant Squire, who
in the above incident serves, as he does elsewhere in the novel, to puncture the
pretensions of those who assume to understand fully what is required in any given
situation.
Further evidence of this artificial knowledge is to be found in Joseph Andrews and
once again Plato becomes Fielding’s focus. On their discovery of the duplicity of a
con-artist whom Parson Adams had believed to be a gentleman set on assisting them,
we hear the cleric attempt to understand the subterfuge which on the surface appears
pointless:
‘What Wickedness is there in the Christian World? I profess, almost equal
to what I have read of the Heathens. But surely, Joseph, your Suspicions
216 Tom Jones, VII.iii.217.
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of this Gentleman must be unjust; for what a silly Fellow must he be, who
would do the Devil’s work for nothing? And can’st thou tell me any
Interest he could possibly propose to himself by deceiving us in his
Professions?’ ‘It is not for me,’ answered Joseph, ‘to give Reasons for
what Men do, to a Gentleman of your Learning.’ You say right,’ quoth
Adams; ‘Knowledge of Men is only to be learnt from Books, Plato and
Seneca for that; and those are Authors, I am afraid Child, you never read.’
‘Not I, Sir, truly,’ answered Joseph; ‘all I know is, it is a Maxim among
the Gentlemen of our Cloth, that those Masters who promise the most
perform the least.’
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Indeed, Joseph has not read Plato, but the reality is that he enjoys a greater grasp of
the situation as it is than Parson Adams whose whole existence, though enveloped in a
joyful and generous innocence, is nonetheless peppered by an artificiality based on
paper – the very medium through which Fielding himself seeks to not only understand
the world, but earn himself a living.
So we discern running through Fielding’s comedy a subtle subversion. Riffaterre
obliquely refers to this subversive activity when he writes:
Humour… rests on the existence of another way of seeing or of being that
exists prior to the application of its distorting system or lexical grid to that
representation.
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This is a rather prosaic way to speak about comedy; however, the point is well made.
There needs to be a sense of the other in order for comedy to engage in its clandestine
activity. That other way of seeing or being which Riffaterre points to is, in my view,
another way of describing an awareness of misplacement – the endless possibility that
the text and particularly the comic text, provides.
So we recognise that Fielding, in all of the examples mentioned above, is able to both
defend and disrupt the Platonic philosophical framework. In the very act of promoting
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Plato he becomes the pharmakos, the poisoner or wizard who subverts the structure of
a safe society. As we have noted, art for Plato was closely allied to the inferiorities of
the body. The pharmakos as poisoner must, then, take full account of the body if he is
to be successful. At the same time, as wizard or magician, the pharmakos must
perform the miraculous - his work must be in some sense transformative, not merely
destructive.
In this way we can discern that, in an important sense, the subversive comedy of
Fielding enfleshes the disembodied. Such enfleshing can, indeed, be regarded as
sacramental. Ordinary things take upon themselves a refined, reified quality. So, the
asexual schema of Plato is overtaken by a vision of sexualized wisdom; the ignorant
Western punctures the prognostications of a de-sexualized Platonic disciple, and the
unread, worldly Joseph reads the situation more clearly that the well-read, unworldly
Adams. In these examples the idealized image of Plato and his philosophical system is
the target for Fielding’s comedy, but it would be a mistake to reduce the power of
Fielding’s work to a simple instance of lampooning. What Fielding’s comedy does is
intoxicate (‘poisoner’) the hitherto sober and, at the same time, enchant (‘wizard’) the
hitherto mundane. In this sense it is an exemplar of Berger’s notion of ‘transcendence
in a lower key’. Through comedy’s very subversive nature, both heaven and earth are
joined in a sacramental dance.
Parable, Metaphor and Meaning
In moving to our discussion of the parabolic, we notice at once that the comedic link
between pharmakon and parable is centred upon a common destabilising function.
Given the temptation to look towards the meaning or meanings of parable it is often
assumed that in the parable form we are offered an unambiguous hermeneutical
platform. So we find Hunter defining parable as:102
A comparison drawn from nature or daily life and designed to illuminate
some spiritual truth, on the assumption that what is valid in one sphere is
valid also on the other.
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Again, in his own analysis, C. H. Dodd, while carefully directing us away from the
danger of allegorizing in our interpretation of the parabolic, only succeeds in leading
us to a ‘single point of comparison’.
221 The very avoidance of the perilously wide
allegorical path, forces us in Dodd’s schema to the apparently safe but narrow
alleyway which ultimately tapers to a dead end.
Such exposition fails to do justice to the ambiguity which we find in some of the
parables in the Gospels. There is a failure to recognise that parables, at the very least
are ‘paradoxical, shattering, exploding, and disclosing narratives’.
222 In the parables
we are consistently provided with an unsettling view of the universe and the human
condition within that universe. The parabolic is a world of injustice, of violence, even
of the unhygienic. The characters which dwell in that world are misfits, losers, victims
and comedians. This, in itself, is a strong pointer to the definition that David Jasper
offers when he states that:
The parable, like all irony, is inherently unstable and destabilising,
performing a disjunctive act between its ontological promise (that we may
find out something, if only by analogy, about heaven) and its theological
overturning.
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David Tracy concurs with this analysis and outlines what he regards as the strategy
required when approaching the parabolic:
However the parabolic metaphors are interpreted, the exegete must
employ some theory of tension or interaction, not a theory of substitution,
to understand fully what “The Kingdom of God is like”. When the
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interpreter applies a theory of substitution to the parables, she or he will
inevitably either remove the limiting character of the mode of life
disclosed by these heuristic fictions or will replace it with an alternative of
her or his own theological or ethical choosing.
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Nietzsche summed up Tracy’s argument many years earlier when he wrote: ‘To know
is to work with one’s favourite metaphors.’
225 In other words, the assumption that we
can close off the question, what is truth? or, what is being? is, to say the least, an
optimistic one. As Robert Funk has said, ‘The parables have a way of thwarting the
best laid agendas.’
226 This is because ‘parable transcends conceptualization, borders
the ineffable, cannot easily be exhausted of meaning. Something is said in the parable,
which cannot quite be said another way’.
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More recently, Tom Thatcher has discussed this latent ambiguity in the parable form.
Thatcher prefers the term ‘parable-riddle’ as this more adequately suggests the
element of incompleteness found in the parable itself. Whereas a parable may, in
Dodd’s parlance, have a single point of reference, the riddle is far less easy to
circumscribe. Bringing parable, then, into the same hermeneutical orbit as riddle, as
Thatcher does, generates a far wider field of interpretative possibility. In other words,
we are left with a greater sense of the ambiguous nature of the parable form and, at
the very least, we can begin to recognise Jeremias’ description of the parables as
‘weapons of controversy’.
228 I would further suggest that they can equally be
described as ‘tools of comedy’.
It has been long recognised that these ‘weapons’ or ‘tools’ are actually vital examples
of metaphor.
229 It is important, therefore, that we briefly reconnoitre the semantic
territory around this particular form before we look at how Fielding uses parable in
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his comic fiction. What I hope to show is just how aware Fielding is of the ambiguous
nature of the parabolic form and that it does, indeed, point to a new vision of reality.
The activity of metaphor, as I. A. Richards, indicated some time ago, resides more
than simply in the fact that, in Dr Johnson’s words, ‘the particulars of resemblance are
so perspicaciously collected.’
230 Metaphor, it is clear, moves beyond mere adornment
and, as Richards says, one can discover that dissimilarity is as important to the action
of metaphor as similarity.
231 However, in addition to the similitude and dissimilitude
which inheres in metaphoric activity, we discover that metaphor actually constructs a
new reality. This new reality is, according to Thatcher, precisely what Jesus offers us
in his own parabolic teaching:
Jesus’s riddles, parables, and parable-riddles all functioned in a similar
way: to confront his audience with something ambiguous or absurd,
something that would force them to redefine key terms and realign mental
boundaries.
232
In stripping down Jeremias’ ‘weapons’, Thatcher utilizes a linguistic tool he describes
as an ‘empty metaphor’. By this he means that, in many of the parables that Jesus
offers in the New Testament, a void exists in the traditional semantic triangle of
things, words and ideas within which the metaphor or parable is ordinarily intended to
operate. For example, he suggests that in the Parable of the Mustard Seed, the element
or referent to which the parable is intended to point, namely the ‘Kingdom of God’ is,
at the very least, ambiguous. Thus, while Jesus’s audience may have understood the
tangible element in the parable (what Richards calls the ‘vehicle’ of the metaphor), in
this case the mustard seed itself, the idea to which it points (what Richards calls the
‘tenor’ of the metaphor) is not only less tangible, it is also unclear as to its precise
meaning in any case. Moreover, Thatcher indicates that the growth of the mustard
seed in the parable presents both legal and logical problems. Questions arise, firstly,
as to whether the mustard seed ought to have been planted at all, as it would appear to
violate rabbinic law. Secondly, we are troubled by the growth of the mustard plant – it
is clearly not the largest of plants, and as to the cover it provides for birds, this can
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hardly be assumed to appeal to the very farmers or gardeners to whom the parable
would be ostensibly directed. As a result, we become aware that both the ‘tenor’ of
the parable (the meaning of the ‘kingdom of God’) and the ‘vehicle’ (the seed and its
growth) which illustrates the parable’s ‘tenor’ are somehow misplaced.
Paradoxically, such ‘emptying’ (or, in my terminology, misplacement) must find itself
alongside the plenitude that metaphor provides. Insofar as metaphor, as TeSelle makes
clear, is not merely confined to the poetic but is inextricably linked with ordinary
language, we are provided with a strong hint to the new reality which metaphor brings
in its wake.
233 That metaphor is so much a part of the reality of human thought and
expression means that it can, indeed, must be a vehicle to point beyond that reality to
a new vision, a new experience, a new world. This metaphoric or parabolic
connection between these two worlds, of course, reminds us of the same image which
Bakhtin provides for us in his assessment of the carnival. It can also helpfully blur the
artificial distinction between sacred and secular parables.
In a recent study, Hillis Miller usefully sets up just such a distinction in order to
explode it. He argues that, while one can discern that the parables of Jesus can be seen
as constative, in that they point to something already existing (the kingdom of God), a
secular parable, on the other hand, is truly performative insofar as its use of language
actually brings something into existence. As he puts it, ‘secular parable is language
thrown out that creates a meaning hovering there in thin air, a meaning based only on
the language itself and on our confidence in it.’
234 However, this distinction is
subsequently nullified by the recognition that both kinds of parable ultimately tend to
be about parable. The paradox which infects sacred parable is that it cannot speak
about what it purports to speak of. In Scripture it is Jesus, the Word made flesh, who
speaks the word of the kingdom. However, the fact that the kingdom of God cannot be
spoken of directly, even by the Word itself, begs the question as to how any genuine
kingdom communication can be achieved. The same dilemma is to be found at the
area of reception. Only those who have ‘ears to hear’ will understand the parable. But
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how can this be if the efficacy of the parable as a communicative medium is itself in
doubt?
This same conundrum must be faced by secular parable. Even though the parable is
not spoken by the Word in this case, but by a human agency which highlights the
capacity of language to execute its performative function, we are left with the
inescapable conclusion that we cannot actually escape the parabolic into some pure
explicative utopia. An example from Kafka serves us well:
A man once said: […] If you only followed the parables you yourselves
would become parables and with that rid of all your daily cares.
Another said: I bet that is also a parable.
The first said: You have won.
The second said: But unfortunately only in parable.
The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have lost.
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The seemingly impenetrable point being made here is that there is, in reality, no
escape from the parabolic. One must begin with everyday language in order to follow
the parabolic path to ‘a better world’. But to state that one has genuinely followed the
parable is itself to adopt the very everyday language utilized in the first place. The
result is a ‘no win’ situation. It appears one can merely submit to this as typical
Kafkaesque nihilism or, on the contrary, engage with this as a more positive means to
blurring the distinction between the secular and the sacred. I would suggest that the
latter strategy, more specifically, offers us a way to recognising how fiction can be
regarded in legitimately theological terms. For it seems clear that we can discern a
fundamental link between the activity of metaphor or parable and that of comedy.
Both open up for us a new reality which is fraught with risk. At the same moment,
however, we recognise that this is a necessary risk in the sense that our experience of
life without metaphor or comedy is diminished or even destroyed.
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Fielding’s Good Samaritan
Let us now apply these broad interpretative principles to Fielding’s comic fiction. Can
we discover evidence of Fielding’s awareness of both the ambiguity endemic in the
parabolic and the concomitant openness to a new reality that the parable encourages?
To answer this, we must turn immediately to Fielding’s ‘re-visioning’ of The Good
Samaritan as it is found in Joseph Andrews.
In Fielding’s story, we are presented with, ostensibly, a very similar series of events to
that of the original Good Samaritan parable. The eponymous Joseph is set upon by
robbers, stripped and left for dead, and is subsequently discovered by a coach party
who debate amongst themselves as to the most prudent form of action. Ultimately,
Joseph is rescued, taken on board the coach, and is able to continue his journey. This
broad outline, itself, however, must not be ‘taken on board’ as a means to providing
us with a definitive reading. Given that, as we have noted, there are obvious parallels
with the original Good Samaritan story, to suggest that Fielding is merely re-telling
the parable is to remove his story from the metaphorical to the analogical. On this
account, Fielding’s story merely becomes a simile of the original. This is a natural
enough temptation, given the familiarity the reader would have with the Good
Samaritan story itself. However, this, it sees to me, is to read Fielding’s version as a
mere mirroring of the original and thereby a dilution of its own unique parabolic
power. Fielding’s story itself is a comic parable in its own right and must be read as
such in order for us to become aware of the ambivalences which his comic fiction
reveals to us. It is, therefore, worth taking a little time to look at this re-visioning more
closely.
Jesus provides his listeners with a secure orientation. He begins his story with the
words, ‘A man was on his way down from Jerusalem to Jericho.’ This statement by
itself would indicate to Jesus’s audience the risk that the man was taking, given that
this particular road was notorious for ‘brigandage from “the Arabian in the
wilderness”, i.e. the Bedouin robbers who infest the unfrequented roads’.
236 Jesus,
thereby, sets the scene clearly and concretely. In his tale, the boundaries are familiar,
236 Alfred Plummer, The Gospel According to St. Luke, 5
th edn. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1953), p.
286.108
the terrain well-known. The hearer is immediately made aware of the direction the
tale is heading. This, Fielding does not provide.
Fielding’s tale begins in Bk I.xii with the words, ‘Nothing remarkable happened on
the Road.’ This can be taken, of course, at face value as an indication of events thus
far on Joseph’s journey to meet his beloved Fanny. However, one cannot but wonder
at the placement of such a bland statement at the head of a narrative which is about to
illustrate the very contrary state of affairs. Here, I would suggest, is Fielding’s first
foray into the subversion of the traditional Good Samaritan parable, and with parable
in general. Fielding is, as is his wont, playing with his readers. The sentence itself
disguises and thereby accentuates the ensuing action. One can point to the element of
surprise that this particular strategy brings the reader (particularly the eighteenth-
century reader). However, one can also point to a deeper reality (a new world, if you
like) which this simple sentence provides. That ‘nothing happens’ is precisely the
experience of the novel. Nothing does happen in reality. And yet everything happens.
The fictive world is, in this sense, deeply metaphorical. The novel becomes, in a
sense, an extended parable of human experience. Nothing happens and yet,
paradoxically, everything happens. The reader, too, though confronted with unreality
is opened to a new reality. We are, then, at the opening of the tale, exposed to
Fielding’s strategy of re-visioning which moves beyond the merely ethical
expectations that the traditional parable provides.
Jesus, in his version of the tale (which Drury has suggested has its own Old Testament
antecedents)
237 is content to present the man as a complete and defenceless victim.
We are simply told that he fell among robbers who beat him and left him for dead.
Fielding, however, in his version of the attack, has Joseph ‘who was expert at Cudgel-
playing’ returning blow for blow with his assailants. There is, it would seem, no room
for ‘turning the other cheek’ in Joseph’s theology. There is no doubt, for Fielding, that
Joseph is indeed a victim, but he is not a passive one, and, as a result, we are opened
to a greater awareness, not only of the ethical implications of self-defence, but the
broader issue of the representation of truly fleshly character as a means to move to the
237 John Drury, Tradition and Design in Luke’s Gospel (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976), pp.
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new reality that parable can provide. This fleshly nature or HUMAN NATURE, as
Fielding would have it, is what colours his entire re-visioning of the parable.
Moving to the next stage of Fielding’s re-visioning, we encounter the coach party
who, of course, adopt the role of the passers-by in the traditional story. Their first
indication of Joseph’s plight is introduced by the postillion who tells the coachman,
‘he was certain there was a dead Man lying in the Ditch, for he heard him groan.’
Once again, the status of the victim is enlivened here, one might even say,
resurrected, through comedy insofar as this humorous act of detection, presents us,
paradoxically, with the serious reality of a living human being and not merely a two-
dimensional victim. This sense of the physicality of the victim as a means to transport
the parable to a new level is seen yet again in the discovery of Joseph’s nakedness.
This particularly fleshly revelation leads the Lady in the coach to cry out, ‘O J-sus, a
Naked Man!’ Fielding’s juxtaposition of this epithet with the image of the innocent
victim is both humorous and, of course, at the same moment, extremely affecting. We
are immediately confronted not only with the amusing (and, one suspects, merely
affected) social mores of the lady herself, but with the naked and crucified Christ. By
drawing attention to both Joseph’s nakedness and the lady’s religious outburst (which,
unlike the postillion later on in the tale, she is not upbraided for) Fielding fleshes out
the new reality to which the parable is intended to point.
The resolution to this part of the story and indeed the heart of the tale is the re-
clothing of Joseph. How does it take place? True to the spirit of the original parable,
none of those who could easily afford to accommodate Joseph are, for a variety of
reasons, inclined to do so. It falls, as in the original story, to the unlikeliest of
characters, namely the young postillion, himself, to provide clothing for Joseph. Yet
even here, in the fulfilment of the original, Fielding finds room for comic
misplacement. The lad hands over his greatcoat ‘his only Garment, at the same time
swearing a great Oath, (for which he was rebuked by the Passengers)’. The act of
Christian charity is allied to an expletive which not only exposes the mixed
motivation which lies behind most acts of benevolence but, moreover, emphasises the
true sacrificial nature of the act itself. This is made all the more stark when, in an
aside, we discover that the boy is later transported to the colonies for robbing a hen-
roost. Fielding is, in a comedic mode, asking in this episode not only the most obvious110
question regarding charity and love for one’s neighbour; he is also asking us the
serious question: Is the boy a Bad or Good Samaritan? The question, however, is not
asked in such a way as to receive a definitive answer. If anything is revealed at all, it
is the ambiguity of human nature itself.
This fleshliness is exacerbated in the coach by the ribaldry of the Lawyer. The less
than subtle innuendo transforms the salvific vehicle. We have here, then, not an
innocent colt (a prefiguring of the entry into Jerusalem), but a portable bordello. And
there appears as little security at the inn. Fielding extends the uncharitable motif into
the character of the Surgeon who, upon hearing of Joseph’s predicament from the
servant-girl, promptly goes back to bed. Things only worsen with the dawn, when,
news of their ‘guest’ reaching her ears, Mrs Tow-wouse, the innkeeper’s wife, refuses
a shirt to be offered to Joseph and exclaims to her husband:
‘Common Charity, a F—t!... Common Charity teaches us to provide for
ourselves, and our Families; and I and mine won’t be ruined by your
Charity, I assure you.’ ‘Well,’ says he, ‘my Dear, do as you will when you
are up, you know I never contradict you.’ ‘No,’ says she, ‘if the Devil was
to contradict me, I would make the House too hot to hold him.’
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Nothing but the insertion of Satan himself could contrast more dramatically and
amusingly with the magnanimous ‘official’ Good Samaritan who offers to provide all
that the innkeeper requires and more besides. Fielding, by bringing us into the inn, has
misplaced the parable in a bewildering array of economic, theological and, ultimately,
sexual vortices.
Indeed, it is the comedy that is played out in this scene which paradoxically opens up
to us the transformative nature of the parable itself. Via has suggested that the Good
Samaritan be regarded, not as a parable in the strictest sense, but as an example story.
While there is obvious merit in this approach (“go and do likewise”), I believe Via, in
his analysis, restricts the story to the merely ethical and avoids the broader
implications that the form opens us to, not least, as Ricoeur has pointed out, the
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tension that exists between two ways of being.
239 It is precisely this tension which
Via seeks to mitigate by means of a dogmatic schema which attempts to define the
ultimate purpose of both the parabolic and the comedic. He writes:
In Jesus’s comic parables it is not that a man has within himself the
resources for the reassertion of his whole humanity but rather that there
comes from beyond himself a new possibility that was not at his disposal.
When these parables are seen as defining the divine-human relationship,
then it is the grace of God which enables the passage from death to life.
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It is this ‘defining’ of parable which I would argue is comical. That there can be,
albeit, in Via’s schema, a broad dogmatic and secure claim for the outworking of the
parabolic, seems to fly in the face of the recognition that the form remains resolutely
resistant to just such visions. One must be prepared to limit oneself to the tension that
the form both inhabits and engenders. This tension can only be played out, it seems to
me, by means of the comedic. Evidence of such comedic amplification is, of course,
found in Jesus’s own parables to a degree (for example, The Friend at Midnight or
The Unjust Judge). However, in these cases, as in others, what we are asked to do is
contrast two broad principles, i.e., the goodness of God as opposed to the evil of
humanity. In Fielding, the world is a lot less clear and, as a result, more colourful.
We could, of course, look to other instances of the parabolic that Fielding provides for
us, for example his re-working of the story of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife, which
plays, strictly speaking, as a straight narrative, nonetheless, when brought into
Fielding’s hands (as he did with Samuel Richardson’s Pamela), provides metaphoric
connections that are ruthlessly and humorously applied. One could, of course, include
the entire plot of Tom Jones as a re-visioning of the parable of the Prodigal Son. It is
enough, however, for our purposes to recognise that Fielding seeks in the parable
form not only a means to comically misplace any straight-forward assessment of
traditional Christian teaching, but also and more significantly, to illustrate the new
world that his comic fiction actually provides for us, It is, I would suggest, all too easy
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to describe Fielding as a didactic or moral writer, and to miss, in the ambiguous nature
of his comedy, a broader vision of human experience which appears less constrained
by tradition or dogma.
Happy Endings?
To this extent, I would argue that Fielding’s comic fiction defies the traditional
understanding of the happy ending. One can acknowledge that there is, to a degree, a
resolution of events, after all, both Joseph and Fanny, and Tom and Sophia (as well as
Partridge and Molly Seagrim) are wed in the end. However, as we have witnessed in
the re-visioning of the parable of the Good Samaritan, there is evidence that, despite
the traditional marital conclusion, throughout Fielding’s comic fiction, much is left
unresolved. For example, in the conclusion of Joseph Andrews, having witnessed the
marriage of Joseph and Fanny (with Parson Adams next to drunk) we not only have a
brief account of various stock resolutions, but we are immediately taken beyond the
novel completely with Fielding’s final reference to High Life.
This is a barbed comment concerning the now famous furore which surrounded the
publication of John Kelly’s Pamela’s Conduct in High Life (1741). The publisher,
Richard Chandler, was a friend and colleague of Fielding, and the publication led to
much ill-feeling on the part of one Samuel Richardson who sought in his own way to
respond to Kelly’s work. What Fielding does here is, in a single phrase, move us from
the traditional realm of comic resolution, to a contemporary literary battle. There is no
happy ending at this point, merely another salvo fired in the direction of Samuel
Richardson.
Likewise, in Tom Jones, there is one final piece of Fielding’s creation which is left
unaccounted for, namely Tom’s final status. We readily accept and rejoice in the
various reconciliations and just recriminations which take place and, of course, in the
final matrimonial bliss shared by Tom and his beloved Sophia. But what of Tom,
himself? The knowledge of his true parentage (his mother being Bridget Allworthy
and the father, a certain Mr Summer, the son of a clergyman of great learning and
virtue) though ostensibly bringing Tom truly into the Allworthy familial orbit does113
not remove the stigma of illegitimacy. Tom Jones, the foundling, remains as far as the
law is concerned ‘unfound’. While Ian Watt may criticise Fielding for turning Tom
into a gentleman after all, the reality as the novel concludes is that Tom’s status is
undetermined.
The same argument applies to Amelia, the novel which, at a surface level, proffers the
most fantastical of happy endings (Battestin describes it as a ‘comic apocalypse’),
241
with the Booths miraculously finding themselves in receipt of Amelia’s mother’s
estate. However, if we examine the ‘conversion’ of Booth which precedes this
providential windfall, there is little in the way of evidence that he has in reality
changed at all. Once more in the debtor’s cell, we hear Booth confess:
‘Since I have been in this wretched place I have employed my time almost
entirely in reading over a series of sermons which are contained in that
book (meaning Dr Barrow's works, which then lay on the table before
him) in proof of the Christian religion; and so good an effect have they
had upon me, that I shall, I believe, be the better man for them as long as I
live. I have not a doubt (for I own I have had such) which remains now
unsatisfied. If ever an angel might be thought to guide the pen of a writer,
surely the pen of that great and good man had such an assistant.’ The
doctor readily concurred in the praises of Dr Barrow, and added, ‘You say
you have had your doubts, young gentleman; indeed, I did not know that--
and, pray, what were your doubts?’ ‘Whatever they were, sir,’ said Booth,
"they are now satisfied, as I believe those of every impartial and sensible
reader will be if he will, with due attention, read over these excellent
sermons.’ ‘Very well,’ answered the doctor, ‘though I have conversed, I
find, with a false brother hitherto, I am glad you are reconciled to truth at
last, and I hope your future faith will have some influence on your future
life.’ ‘I need not tell you, sir,’ replied Booth, ‘that will always be the case
where faith is sincere, as I assure you mine is. Indeed, I never was a rash
disbeliever…’
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This conversation seems to revolve around doubt, but the nature of the doubt is never
frankly expressed, and the fact that the doubt existed at all is a veritable revelation to
the otherwise omniscient Dr. Harrison. As a result, we are left questioning the
difference between the Booth prior to this ‘conversion’ and the Booth we encounter
after the blessed event. Scholars such as Battestin and Campbell, though recognising
the unresolved tenor of the sequence, nonetheless argue that Booth’s conversion has
either philosophical or social implications.
243 However, I am persuaded that the
diverse results which accrue from this searching for a post-conversion scenario,
merely serve to illustrate for us the equivocal nature of Booth’s religious turn. It
remains difficult to critically converse with this conversion. As Palmer comments,
‘We assume, of course, that as a result of this conversion a new Booth will emerge,
but we never see the actual emergence.’
244 So, even in the most obvious (some would
say artless) of happy endings, there remain loose ends - ends that are, as it were,
misplaced.
Indeed, as I have indicated already, it is in the very nature of the comedic, bound as it
is to the metaphoric, to leave us with such ambiguity. In this respect, Karl Barth was
correct when he said that ‘humour, like art is not a standpoint’.
245 It is in the nature of
the comedic to lead us to areas of uncertainty and even doubt, not, as some would
have it, in order to finally reveal that there is a final consummation, but to simply
revel in the journey itself. Fielding’s approach appears to chime with that of Emily
Dickinson writing more than one hundred years later:
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant –
Success in Circuit lies
Too bright for our infirm Delight
The Truth’s superb surprise
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As Lightning to the Children eased
With explanations kind
The Truth must dazzle gradually
Or every man be blind.
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Dickinson is wrestling here, as she does in many of her works, with the ambiguities
faced by those who would seek after the truth, particularly in the face of tragedy. Her
resolution is to come at truth from an angle, to sneak up on it, as it were, as though it
were a wild beast. The ambiguity thus extends not only to the approach to truth, but,
in the end, to the very definition of truth itself. Truth becomes, then, not a placid, or
passive entity waiting to be discovered, but a wild, restless and ultimately unsettling
safari, which has no guarantee of success. As Wolosky puts it in a separate context,
‘The disjunction of earth from heaven, of language from the Word, constitutes for
Dickinson the problem, not the solution.’
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Fielding, in his comedy, similarly offers us no guarantees. Mark Spilka, in his study
of comic resolution in Joseph Andrews, sees in the character of Adams a kind of
comic blessing on the vicissitudes of human frailty. His jumping from bed to bed
sanctifies the whole messy project of human existence.
248 There is, indeed, truth to be
found, but not necessarily in the most obvious places and the truth when discovered,
like Parson Adams in bed with Fanny, may not be the most easy to digest.
The whole joyous mess is summed up well, I believe, by Oscar Wilde, who more
succinctly and theologically stated it: ‘God and other artists are always a little
obscure.’
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Chapter Three
The Word Made Strange: Fielding, the Novel and the Misplacement of Meaning
The theological significance of literature…lies in its being the explicit
mise-en-scène of human beings’ indefatigable, always fallible but
nevertheless meaningful attempts to come to terms with [the] difference
between words and meaning we hope and believe that they express and
designate beyond their linguistic condition.
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All novelists know their art proceeds by indirection. When tempted by
didacticism, the writer should imagine a spruce sea-captain eyeing the
storm ahead, bustling from instrument to instrument in a catherine wheel
of gold braid, expelling crisp orders down the speaking tube. But there is
nobody below decks; the engine room was never installed, and the rudder
broke off centuries ago. The captain may put on a very good act,
convincing not just himself but even some of the passengers; though
whether their floating world will come through depends not on him but on
the mad winds and sullen tides, the icebergs and the sudden crusts of
reef.
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Fielding’s Knowing Ignorance
It is generally accepted that the epistemological ‘Copernican revolution’ provided by
Kant fatally questioned the empirical system which emphasised the passive nature of
the human subject in the face of objective phenomena. In his Critique of Pure Reason
we read:
We have intended, then, to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the
representation of appearances; that the things which we intuit are not in
themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are
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their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if
we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our
senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space
and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as
appearances, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.
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Thus, according to Kant, we ‘make up’ our world. It becomes our grand creation.
More specifically, in the aesthetic sphere, Kant ‘offered a novel philosophy of art
grounded in the notion that aesthetic works were integral phenomena whose finality
was exhausted in the individual’s experience of the work’.
253 This ‘making up our
world’ extends, then, to the worlds we make up. On the basis of this, it may then come
as less of a surprise to learn that, according to Kuehn, the novels of Fielding were for
Kant ‘the works from which he learned the most’.
254 The ramifications of such a
radical epistemological shift are clear to those who recognise, as Unsworth has, the
ease by which our knowledge can be mis-created, mis-managed or mis-read. On the
strength of this, can it be argued that Fielding’s novels - his ‘new province of writing’
- prefigured Kant’s epistemological revolution in the sense that its self conscious style
testified to the slippage that takes place in our knowledge at every level, and that such
slippage, in Fielding’s hands, is not always entirely innocent?
To offer an introductory example, Fielding makes clear his own ignorance of sorts
when, in the previously cited passage where the novel is revealed as a ‘great creation’
he states:
READER, it is impossible we should know what sort of person thou wilt
be; for, perhaps, thou may'st be as learned in human nature as Shakespeare
himself was, and, perhaps, thou may'st be no wiser than some of his
editors. Now, lest this latter should be the case, we think proper, before we
go any farther together, to give thee a few wholesome admonitions; that
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thou may'st not as grossly misunderstand and misrepresent us, as some of
the said editors have misunderstood and misrepresented their author.
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The intricate texture of this one cheeky paragraph is typical of the narrator’s intrusion
into the text of Tom Jones. Yet it is not enough to describe this as simple irony, or
indeed, as A.R. Humphreys puts it, the kind of irony that ‘represents the social
stability of its age’.
256 In this last comment we are confronted once again with the
temptation to bind Fielding’s technique to an exclusively contemporary context. In the
passage, Fielding betrays the fact that he is more than aware of the epistemological
tensions that result from producing a text. One can argue that this is due to his
theatrical training, and his awareness of an ‘audience’ for his work. But, once more,
this merely confines us to the kind of synchronic criticism which I believe to be
insufficient in any current exploration of Fielding’s works. It is necessary for us to go
to the text itself, rather than soliciting any psycho-sociological explanation of the
means by which Fielding presents his knowledge.
There are several incidences of ignorance being displayed in this passage. Each
incidence of ignorance however, is counterpointed by a corresponding awareness and,
as a result, slippage of any prescribed understanding of ignorance takes place.
Regarding this passage, the first such incidence is Fielding’s immediate and obvious
ignorance of the nature of his reader. This apparently humble admission, in fact,
belies a shrewd understanding of the nature of the reader, as is evinced by his placing
this particular statement of ignorance in the context of a high literary comparison.
Fielding knows that, at the least, his readers have some awareness of the bard. This
awareness leads to the second layer of counterpointed ignorance. Fielding’s placement
of his reader within the context of a literary comparison, where ignorance forms the
key constituent, is prima facie suggestive of an undeveloped sense of, not only the
literary capabilities of the reader, but also of a similar ignorance of the reader’s own
moral self-awareness: ‘perhaps, thou may'st be no wiser’. Fielding, however, knows
only too well the human capacity to seek to be on the side of the angels, and we can
thus be sure that, regardless of any empirical suggestion, he is perfectly able to place
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his readers’ moral capabilities in a particular light. The obvious shorthand for all of
this, of course, is flattery. But, as a textual performance, flattery is too small a term.
For flattery is merely a device to mollify a potential source of social tension. Here,
however, Fielding is able to both flatter and insult.
Fielding is thus exploding the notion of ignorance. His conflation of ignorance with
knowledge by means of subtle literary placement subverts the traditional empirically
based epistemological framework. Knowledge and ignorance serve not simply to
define the individual at any one time but, in fact, constitute the frail and fluid position
which each of us inhabits from moment to moment. The true irony in all of this is that
the traditional synchronic approach to Fielding’s work as evinced by Watt and others
stresses the orderly, systematic nature of Fielding’s work. In reality, we see that the
text itself provides evidence of a subverting epistemological strategy. Fielding’s grand
focus being human nature itself, it is inevitable that this subversion infiltrates
numerous areas of human experience.
We shall, later in this study, specifically examine the means by which revelation is
understood and exercised in Fielding, but at this point we will briefly assess how
Fielding’s misplaced knowledge is extended more generally to the knowledge of God.
A useful example which indicates Fielding’s ambivalent attitude is to be found in
Joseph Andrews. Having been astounded by two lawyers who have sought, by turns,
to disparage and then extol the character of a member of the local gentry, Parson
Adams discovers in conversation with the host of the inn that both have been lying all
along, and that the character of the individual in question is neither completely black
nor snow white. Adams is keen to understand such behaviour and is given a lesson in
lying by the host.
"Why, prithee, Friend," cries the Host, "dost thou pretend never to have
told a lye in thy Life?" - "Never a malicious one, I am certain," answered
Adams, "nor with a Design to injure the Reputation of any Man living." -
"Pugh! malicious; no, no," replied the Host; "not malicious with a Design
to hang a Man, or bring him into Trouble; but surely, out of love to
oneself, one must speak better of a Friend than an Enemy." - "Out of love
to yourself, you should confine yourself to Truth," says Adams, "for by120
doing otherwise you injure the noblest Part of yourself, your immortal
Soul. I can hardly believe any Man such an Idiot to risque the Loss of that
by any trifling Gain, and the greatest Gain in this World is but Dirt in
comparison of what shall be revealed hereafter." Upon which the Host,
taking up the Cup, with a Smile, drank a Health to hereafter; adding, "He
was for something present." - "Why," says Adams very gravely, "do not
you believe another World?" To which the host answered, "Yes; he was
no Atheist." - "And you believe you have an immortal Soul?" cries
Adams. He answered, "God forbid he should not." - "And Heaven and
Hell?" said the Parson. The Host then bid him "not to profane; for those
were Things not to be mentioned nor thought of but in Church." Adams
asked him, "Why he went to Church, if what he learned there had no
Influence on his Conduct in Life?" "I go to Church," answered the Host,
"to say my Prayers and behave godly." - "And dost not thou," cried
Adams, "believe what thou hearest at Church?" - "Most part of it, Master,"
returned the Host. "And dost not thou then tremble," cries Adams, "at the
Thought of eternal Punishment?" - "As for that, Master," said he, "I never
once thought about it; but what signifies talking about matters so far off?
The Mug is out, shall I draw another?"
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The key point to notice in the above exchange is that knowledge of God is bound up
with knowledge of man. Adams is seen as the inferior partner in the debate, even
though he appears to possess the theological or moral high ground. Adams is the
inquisitor but it is the host of the inn who is described as ‘shrewd’ and is able to more
than hold his own in the theological debate. Indeed, one can detect the spirit of the
freethinker in the innkeeper insofar as he is prepared to acknowledge that he does not
accept all that the church teaches. Knowledge of God is thus subverted at both the
epistemological and institutional level. But Fielding goes further in his subtly
ambivalent strategy. He does not provide us with a victor in this particular theological
spat. Rather, we discover that the common ground between the two is not to be found
in the thirst for any rarefied debate regarding the nature of doctrine or the hereafter,
but in a much more visceral thirst – for the innkeeper’s ale. Fielding, then, is not
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suggesting that knowledge of God is unachievable, but that it is more likely to be
found in the active sharing of the common cup – participation in a comic Eucharist.
Knowledge of God, here, becomes less the philosophical conundrum which exercises
characters such as Thwackum and Square in Tom Jones and, to a lesser extent,
Adams, himself in Joseph Andrews, than it is a mystery to be grounded in human
experience.
Fielding’s Subversive Creation
Sheridan Baker has described Joseph Andrews as ‘not only the first English comic
novel, but the Declaration of Independence for all fiction’.
258 It would be fair to say
that this independence goes deeper than Baker appears to suggest. He is, of course,
right to draw our attention to Fielding’s work as a launching point for an art form
which was to supersede (for better or worse) the dramatic and poetic forms which had
hitherto been dominant. However, we can detect that this spirit of liberty goes further
than any straight-forward freeing-up of technique. Fielding’s ‘new province of
writing’ was a creation which questioned itself. The emergence of the novel form, in
Fielding’s hands, leads to an inevitable reflection upon emergence itself.
As a way in to this reflection upon emergence, it may be useful to posit a literary
comparison – one which at first sight may appear more than a little incongruous. The
post-modern work which both glories in and rails against those dissonances and
tragedies which constitute the human experience expressed by Fielding, is Kurt
Vonnegut’s anti-war novel, Slaughterhouse 5. In this novel of sentimental emptiness
we hear again and again the neo-Ecclesiastian lamentation ‘So it goes’ – used at every
reference to death in the work. Almost incidentally to the incanting of this endless,
mournful mantra, we encounter the time-travelling and world/war-weary Billy
Pilgrim, who meets with the mysterious alien race, the Tralfamadorians. During one
such encounter we read:
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Billy couldn’t read Tralfamadorian, of course, but he could at least see
how the books were laid out – in brief clumps of symbols separated by
stars. Billy commented that the clumps might be telegrams.
‘Exactly,’ said the voice.
‘They are telegrams?’
‘There are no telegrams on Tralfamadore. But you’re right: each clump of
symbols is a brief, urgent message – describing a situation, a scene. We
Tralfamadorians read them all at once, not one after another. There isn’t
any particular relationship between all the messages, except that the
author has chosen them carefully, so that, when seen all at once, they
produce an image of life that is beautiful and surprising and deep. There is
no beginning, no middle, no end, no suspense, no moral, no causes, no
effects. What we love in our books are the depths of many marvellous
moments seen all at one time.’
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What the Tralfamadorians speak of as their literature comes across to Billy (and to us)
as a higher technological artefact. At the same time, however, we are here presented
with an image of the deconstructed text. As Fiedler puts it, Tralfamadore, representing
‘absolute Elsewhere, is more easily reached by art of madness than by mere
technology’.
260 This text does not belong to some far flung imagined future. It belongs
here and now. It is a text which defies the constraints of time and which, at this
moment, intimates and animates the beautiful, surprising and deep. Billy’s time-
travelling journey, then, is revealed to be, at the same time, a journey in and through,
behind, beyond and before the text. His (and ours) is revealed to be a timeless,
deferred experience. The emergence of this Tralfamadorian text at a single point in his
experience paradoxically opens Billy up to the exploded experience of creation – a
creation not bound in temporal or spatial terms. Up to this moment it appears that
Billy has been at the mercy of time - his journey has not been a pleasant one. His
encounter with the Tralfamadorians and their ever-open texts, however, reorientates
Billy, who, though suspected by his daughter of being insane, finds for himself a
longed-for peace. Thus, it is the recognition of this creative openness which redeems,
259 Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5 (London: Vintage, 1991), p. 64.
260 Leslie Fiedler, ‘The Divine Stupidity of Kurt Vonnegut: Portrait of the Novelist as Bridge over
Troubled Water’, in Kurt Vonnegut: Images and Representations, ed. by Marc Leeds (Westport Ct.:
Greenwood Press, 2000), p. 13.123
for Vonnegut, the apparently interminable cycle ‘so it goes’ and frees us to experience
that same dangerous, open-ended world in a reinvigorated and hopeful manner. The
Tralfamadorian text becomes both the focus and the means of redemption. To
experience the text is to experience freedom.
It is instructive to place alongside the passage from Vonnegut a portion from another
travel narrative with apparently supra-rational overtones - Henry Fielding’s A Journey
From This World To The Next (1743):
Whether the ensuing pages were really the Dream or Vision of some very
pious and holy Person; or whether they were really written in the other
World and sent back to this, which is the Opinion of many, (tho’ I think,
too much inclining to Superstition;) or lastly, whether, as infinitely the
greatest Part imagine, they were really the Production of some choice
Inhabitant of New Bethlehem is not necessary nor easy to determine. It
will be abundantly sufficient, if I give the Reader an Account by what
means they came into my possession.
261
In this passage we are faced once more with the motif of creation or emergence. More
specifically, what is at issue is the authority which lies behind the emergence of this
particular text. Fielding provides us with no definitive answer to this question. In so
doing he exposes the vulnerability of the text. The text, we are informed, was at first
(like the Tralfamadorian text) virtually illegible, leading many and various authorities
to label it either ‘atheistical’ or a ‘Libel on the Government’. The content of the text,
when deciphered, appears not to impress the Royal Society. That body of august
rationality deem it not ‘wonderful enough for them’.
At every turn, then, the ecclesiastical, civil and scientific communities are seen to
condemn and reject this text. And yet, here it is before us. A point of tension now
exists in that we are invited to witness an artefact which, like that of the
261 Henry Fielding, A Journey from this World to the Next (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.
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Tralfamadorians, must be taken on trust as the record of experience beyond our
own.
262
In Fielding’s hands the text has, at the point of emergence, been exposed as a vehicle
of subversion. Its genesis refuses to be confined by any rational or, more specifically,
religio-political schema. The text lies open before us and the measure of its authority
is governed by an equal measure of trust. Such a measure of trust forms the
counterpoint to the stark issue that at every moment there remains the distinct
possibility that its creation is that of a madman from New Bethlehem. Bedlam is
placed in opposition to New Jerusalem. In other words, hell is juxtaposed with an
image of glory.
Life and death are then at the heart of this text in a way that goes behind the
immediate titular façade. The journey we are asked to undertake begins before we
reach chapter one. Indeed, it begins prior to us picking up the text, for we are already
experiencing our lives as caught between heaven and hell, the eternal and the infernal,
the magnificent and the mundane – in other words, that very dissonance that Tobin
has informed us is craved by the post-modern mind. Fielding, in his presentation of
emergence, merely opens our epistemological boundaries to the multifarious
possibilities that we are afforded at each moment.
It is just such emergence that Derrida describes as ‘untamed genesis’.
263 By this, he
refers to that infinite openness of the text which defies complete prescription. It seems
apparent then, that the postmodern Slaughterhouse 5 and Fielding’s Journey From
This World To The Next share this same openness. Moreover, it can be suggested that
Vonnegut’s Tralfamadore and Fielding’s representation of the afterlife share both a
disturbing and comic sensibility. Their worlds are ludicrously and dangerously fluid.
Billy Pilgrim’s journey to, and experience of, Tralfamadore is suspended between
madness and technology, while the author in Fielding’s Journey finds the path to
glory interrupted by monstrosity, cant and humanity. There are no defined worlds
262 A similar postmodern strategy is to be found in Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose, where we
read of the mysterious, tangled history of Adso’s manuscript, and find the narrator appearing equally
anxious over his presentation: ‘In short, I am full of doubts. I really don’t know why I have decided to
pluck up my courage and present, as if it were authentic, the manuscript of Adso of Melk.’ Umberto
Eco, The Name of the Rose, trans. by William Weaver (London: Vintage, 1998), p. 5.
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here. We are left uneasy as to the nature of ultimate destiny. Tralfamadore and
Elysium are unattainable destinations in that their existence reflects upon the
incompleteness of every journey.
Fielding further plays with this concept of infinite openness when, in his ‘defence’ of
his use of metempsychosis found in A Journey From This World To The Next, he
disingenuously remarks:
It would be paying a very mean Compliment to the human Understanding,
to suppose I am under any Necessity of vindicating myself from
designing, in an Allegory of this Kind, to oppose any present System, or
to erect a new one of my own: but perhaps the Fault may lie rather in the
Heart than in the Head; and I may be misrepresented, without being
misunderstood.
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Goldgar, referring to this ‘defence’, believes that Fielding in The Journey is merely
adopting ‘a satiric device (metempsychosis) which enables him to display the same
ambition and craving for “greatness” operating in a wide range of individual types, in
a wide variety of social circumstances, and over a long period of human history’.
265
Fielding’s ‘design’ is thus, for Goldgar, the extended exposure of vain glory.
266
Though in broad sympathy with this interpretation, I believe there is more in
Fielding’s defence than immediately meets the eye. For me, the key phrase is ‘to
oppose any present System, or to erect a new one of my own’.
Fielding juxtaposes the temporally open ‘present’ with the ideologically fixed
‘System’, and goes on to suggest the possibility of such a fixed system being replaced.
Though this phrase is played out in the context of a vigorous denial, one can suggest
that the author, here, is protesting too much. The comedic aspect of this denial points
to the perennial threat of system renewal or replacement. Emergence, in this respect,
is revealed as an ongoing and deferred process.
264 Henry Fielding, Miscellanies Vol. I, p. 4.
265 Bertrand A. Goldgar, ‘Myth and History in Fielding’s Journey From This World To The Next’,
Modern Language Quarterly, no.3 (1986), pp. 235-252 (p. 240).
266 This, of course, forms the main thrust of Fielding’s satirical Jonathan Wild, which serves as an
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Such open-ended suspension is beautifully illustrated at the level of the text itself in A
Journey from This World to the Next where, on arriving at Elysium, the author
encounters Shakespeare attempting to resolve a textual dispute between two notable
tragedians of the period, Betterton and Booth:
I then observed Shakespeare standing between Betterton and Booth, and
deciding a Difference between those two great Actors concerning the
placing an accent in one of his lines: this was disputed on both sides with
a Warmth which surprised me in Elysium, till I discovered by Intuition
that every Soul retained its principal Characteristic, being, indeed, its very
Essence. The line was that celebrated one in Othello;
Put out the Light, and then put out the Light,
according to Betterton. Mr. Booth contended to have it thus;
Put out the Light, and then put out the Light.
I could not help offering my Conjecture on this Occasion, and suggested it
might perhaps be,
Put out the light, and then put out thy Light.
Another hinted a Reading very sophisticated in my Opinion,
Put out the light, and then put out thee, Light,
making Light to be the vocative Case. Another would have altered the last
Word, and read,
Put out thy Light, and then put out thy Sight.
But Betterton said, if the text was to be disturbed, he saw no reason why a
Word might not be changed as well as a Letter, and, instead of put out thy
Light, you might read put out thy Eyes. At last it was agreed on all sides,
to refer the matter to the Decision of Shakespeare himself, who delivered
his Sentiments as follows: ‘Faith, Gentlemen, it is so long since I wrote
the Line, I have forgot my Meaning. This I know, could I have dreamed so
much Nonsense would have been talked and writ about it, I would have
blotted it out of my Works; for I am sure, if any of these be my Meaning,
it doth me very little Honour.’
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The crucial backcloth to this pedantic textual discussion is the contentious spirit in
which it is carried out. Elysium, it seems, cannot remove or even restrain certain
essential human characteristics. We carry with us our foibles. Instability is therefore
comically introduced into a place of seeming tranquillity. And, it is in this world of
stability and security invaded by instability, that we discover that meaning in our
world is also clearly vulnerable. Shakespeare, it transpires, cannot remember his
meaning, and though he cannot tell his disputants what the true meaning is, he clearly
knows what it is not. The consequences of this comical disputation are clear - if
Shakespeare’s meaning is lost in a place of paradise, then it is not going to be
ultimately determined this side of glory. Indeed, as we have noted, for Fielding,
Elysium itself is no secure destination and this factor alone magnifies the
indeterminate nature of the text.
Both Fielding and Vonnegut thus effectively unravel the worlds they create. Blanchot,
in his criticism of the prevailing desire to use the word ‘world’ to describe the
essential nature of the novel states that:
If every novel has a horizon of being that expresses it, this does not mean
that the novel must always take place in the world we know or in a world
like it, nor that it depends on the circumstances of ‘life’, nor that it must
feature characters whose simulated existence can be identified with that of
the reader.
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Blanchot’s point may, at first glance, appear more than a little obvious. After all, there
works of fiction which place their characters in fantastic, other-worldly places, like
Tralfamadore or Elysium. But Blanchot’s comment runs deeper than this. His
implication is that there are no ‘worlds’ to be discovered, mapped out and delineated
except in the unworldly terrain known as the novel. Tralfamadore and Elysium are, in
this respect, undiscoverable, uncharted and non-linear. The novel, as an anchor-point
of unfixability is a fleeting embodiment of Derrida’s maxim, Il, n’y a pas de hors-
268 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Pure Novel’, in The Blanchot Reader, ed. by Michael Holland (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995), p. 41.128
texte.
269 This is confirmed by the simultaneous recognition that there is everything and
nothing inside the text.
All of this, according to Blanchot, is evidence of the novel as a work of bad faith. By
this, Blanchot means to point to the inherent instability of the creative process. It is
the novelist,
Who believes in his characters and yet sees himself behind them, who is
ignorant of them, who gives them a reality in which they remain unknown
and finds in the words of which he is master a means of having them at his
disposal without ceasing to believe that they escape him.
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To create a world is inevitably to enter the psychological space of the Creator.
Fielding understands this all too clearly and, indeed, takes advantage of it. His is the
most artful of creations. He gives the impression of knowing precisely what he is
doing and he wishes us to be just as aware of his grand design. But this ‘I know that
you know that I know’ attitude regarding the creation of his fiction, paradoxically,
reflects an ambiguity Fielding had over the work of the divine in his creation. His
early detractors, while determining his fiction to be lacking in moral fibre and less
palatable than say, Richardson’s more overtly moral epistolary offerings, were less
aware of a potentially more damning charge – Fielding’s mockery of the creative act.
Fielding entitled one of his plays, The Mock Doctor (1733). He may well have
described himself as the Mock Creator. He sets himself up as the ruler of his own
universe. The lives of all his creatures are at his mercy, or as he was fond of putting it,
‘providence’. His are the providential hands that guide the creation toward its
consummation. And literal consummations lie at the end of his two greatest novels,
Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones – a reflection of God’s primary command to the first
Adam, ‘Go forth and multiply.’
Yet, for all his craftsmanship, all his plotting, his creation is a potential blasphemy,
for, despite his posturing, he does not ultimately know, as the true Creator does, the
269 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1976), p. 158.
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end from the beginning. The creator of a work of art, no matter how calculating, will
always, and at every point, have a scintilla of doubt as to the destiny of his creation. In
the theological climate of the early eighteenth century, the understanding of God’s
involvement with his created order was of increasing importance. The so-called
deistic controversies, coupled with the rising awareness of man’s own ability to have
some greater measure of control over his own universe, led to an inevitable
questioning as to the nature and extent of God’s providential oversight of his creation.
We shall return to the specific issues of blasphemy and providence in later chapters.
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At this point however, let us examine more closely the relationship between
Fielding’s fiction and Scripture.
Fielding, the word and the Word
In her paper, ‘The Secularization of Language in the Seventeenth Century’, Margreta
de Grazia argues that, in the period in question, one can trace a gradual development
of the mistrust of ordinary language. Though fundamental for the emergence and
subsequent application of philosophical programmes, language held within it the
seeds of obfuscation and indeed blatant trickery.
272 The grand empiricist, John Locke
championed the cause of language as a means to communicate ‘determined and
uniform ideas’,
273 but already recognised that such a task was all but impossible. This
revelation did not hinder his complaint:
For he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and
confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, will find
some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has
contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst
mankind.
274
271 See Chapters 4 & 5.
272 For example, Hobbes points to four potential abuses of speech: inconstancy of signification i.e.
mistakes; the use of metaphor to ‘deceive’; lying; and ‘grieving with the tongue’, i.e. verbal abuse
(which, unsurprisingly, is deemed improper ‘unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern’. See
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 25-26.
273 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Roger Woolhouse (London:
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Locke’s pessimism is made all the more significant when one considers the
connection that had hitherto existed between human and divine language. It is this
connection, exemplified in the three-fold order of the Book of the World (or Nature),
the Book of Scripture and the divine imprint on every individual, which is necessarily
put in question by the increasing attraction of mathematical rather than literary
formulae. As Locke himself puts it, ‘the study of mathematics has opened and
disentangled [their minds] from the cheat of words.’
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Consequently, the place of Scripture as the divine Word was consistently examined
and re-examined. Milton in his essay, Christian Doctrine (circa 1660), finds himself
struggling to explain how the text of Scripture and the reader can interact:
We have particularly under the gospel, a double scripture. There is the
external scripture of the written word and the internal scripture of the
Holy Spirit which he, according to God’s promise, has engraved upon the
hearts of believers, and which is certainly not to be neglected.
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Lori Branch, in her recent study, Rituals of Spontaneity, has enhanced our awareness
of this emphasis upon the importance of individual interpretation, to suggest that the
turn inwards toward free spiritual expression was, itself, a crucial example of the
rising anxiety over the place of the word. The paradox of this rejection of liturgical or
outward form, she suggests, is that, in order to preserve the freedom of expression,
other rubrics such as the Puritan Directory for the Publique Worship of God (1644)
had to be incorporated. The fear of impropriety in ordinary language was so great,
then, that free prayer could, in reality never be truly free.
This linguistic paradox is a powerful symptom of that growing anxiety which was to
later infuse what Barth described as ‘the century of mystery’, viz. the eighteenth
century. Barth, himself, has indicated that what he calls ‘the absolute man’ of the
Enlightenment period could not but find himself in an epistemological quandary. For
example, one can trace, at the rise of the empirical sciences, an unsettling resemblance
275 ‘Letter to William Molyneux, 26
th Dec. 1692’, in The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. by E.S.
De Beer (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 609.
276 John Milton, The Complete Prose Works of John Milton Vol. VI, ed. by Maurice Kelley (New
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between the secular search for certainty and the Puritan quest ‘for grounding religious
knowledge in a literalist reading of Scripture focused ever more intensely on manifest,
genuine experience’.
277 Barth broadens this sense of unease to provide a critique of
the entire systematizing thesis:
Where there is a programme, there is also a problem. And where there is a
problem we find ourselves recalled, in one way or another, to a reality
beyond the scope of programmes. A problem means limits and
contradiction, perhaps self-contradiction.
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Such apparent self-contradiction holds within it immediate theological implications. It
suggests that a critical breach has occurred in what had once appeared an impregnable
fortress, namely the working out in language of the intimate connection between God
and man. The image of God is substantially defined by his use of words. Adam’s
naming of the creatures of the world not only demonstrates his, albeit limited, lordship
over the created order, it also, more fundamentally, points to his ontological oneness
with the supreme creator. Language, then, provides the stable bond which glues earth
to heaven. Indeed, the attempt to discover or, rather, rediscover this special,
originating language, has a whole history of its own, and had a serious purpose, as
James Bono points out:
If one could identify the Adamic language, one could begin to recover
Adam’s lost wisdom and harmony with nature by attempting to revive his
understanding between words and things.
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However, as Bono argues, this search though diligently carried out, was ultimately
doomed to failure. This search for Paradise had, by the rise of the novel form in the
early eighteenth century, experienced something of a Fall.
277 Lori Branch, Rituals of Spontaneity (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2006), p. 42.
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Such a crisis had, of course, a particular theological expression in the Reformation.
This specific theological upheaval, if nothing else, initiated an unsettling awareness of
the inevitable circularity of establishing an unchallenged criterion upon which true
knowledge could be established.
280 Despite the scale of the rupture, however, like the
persuasion of the serpent in the garden, the threat to epistemological security was, in
large measure, insidious. In the heat of controversy no-one was prepared to cede any
ground. Nonetheless, by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a growing
unease with man’s place in the cosmos can discerned. A good example is to be found
in the work of the, admittedly, somewhat eccentric cleric, Joseph Glanvill, who finds
himself perplexed by the difficulties of coming to terms with an ever expanding body
of knowledge:
For all things are a great Darkness to us, and we are so to ourselves: The
plainest things are as obscure, as the most confessedly mysterious; and the
Plants we tread on are as much above us, as the Stars and Heavens: The
things that touch us, are as distant from us as the Poles, and we are as
much Strangers to our selves, as to the People of the Indies.
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Attempts to obviate this unease included, of course, the bolstering of the authority of
Scripture itself. If our relationship between ourselves and the divine is dictated by
words then surely the reinforcement of the status of Scripture can reassure us of our
true place once again. The reformers certainly thought that this strategy would
succeed and even believed that Scripture could be used as a scientific tool itself to cast
light on the world:
For just as eyes, when dimmed with age or weakness or by some other
defect, unless aided by spectacles, discern nothing distinctly; so is our
280 See Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1979), esp. ch. 1.
281 Joseph Glanvill, Essay I : 'Against Confidence in Philosophy And Matters of Speculation' in his
Essays on several important subjects in philosophy and religion (London: 1676), p. 32. Similar
sentiments are to be found in John Donne’s Anniversaries, esp. Second Anniversary II. 259-89. John
Donne, The Complete English Poems, ed. by A. J. Smith (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 294.133
feebleness, unless Scripture guides us in seeking God, we are immediately
confused.
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But, by the seventeenth century, such straight-forward confidence appears to have
waned somewhat. The threefold order of Nature, Scripture, and the divine imprint had
altered. By this time, in the words of De Grazia:
The Book of Nature is mathematical; the imprint within is trans-verbal or
intuitive; and while the Bible cannot but be in words, its message must be
supplemented and modified by more authoritative readings. The new form
of the texts comes to determine their relative worth; the more abstracted
from ordinary language, the more reliable the text. (italics mine)
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It is this latter emphasis upon abstraction which leads, for example, to the work of
George Herbert (1593-1633) and the other metaphysical poets in their attempts to
recover some kind of linguistic connection between the human and the divine.
Herbert, particularly, was aware, as John Tobin puts it, of being ‘in the middle of a
paradoxical universe’.
284 It was this awareness which led him to use wordplay ‘in
order to ring the changes on the basic score of the Christian story’.
285 A prime
example is found in his poem, The Son:
Let foreign nations of their language boast,
What fine variety each tongue affords:
I like our language, as our men and coast:
Who cannot dress it well, want wit, not words.
How neatly do we give one only name
To parents’ issue and the sun’s bright star!
A son is light and fruit; a fruitful flame
Chasing the father’s dimness, carried far
From the first man in th’ East, to fresh and new
282 John Calvin, Institutes I.xiv.160-161, ed. by John T. McNeill, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles
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Western discov’ries of posterity.
So in one word our Lord’s humility
We turn upon him in sense most true:
For what Christ once in humbleness began,
We him in glory call, The Son of Man.
Others, like the later Augustans, Dryden and Pope, were more strident in their
attempts to bolster the connection between human and divine artfulness. As we have
noted, both sought to burnish the so-called great chain of being and thereby bind the
work of God and man in a comprehensive and comprehensible unity. Yet, at the same
time, both presented such a unity in a less prosaic way. In order to speak of things
divine, it was necessary to call on a different voice, and the use of metaphor and irony
serve an important artistic and, ultimately, theological function. Take, for example,
Dryden’s A Song for St. Cecilia’s Day (1687), which though, of course, celebrating
the particular metaphor of the musical harmony that finds its roots in God,
nonetheless, exhibits the same ascendant principle at work in the divine creation:
From harmony, from heavenly harmony
This universal frame began:
When Nature underneath a heap
Of jarring atoms lay,
And could not heave her head,
The tuneful voice was heard from high:
“Arise ye more than dead.”
Then cold, and hot, and moist, and dry,
In order to their stations leap,
And Music’s power obey.
From harmony, from heavenly harmony
This universal frame began:
From harmony to harmony
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in man.
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Reinforcing the developing Augustan confidence in the mechanics of God’s creativity
and its assumed vital connection with man’s artistic sensibilities, we are asked in
Pope’s Essay on Man, in his attempt to ‘vindicate the ways of God to man’, the
following rhetorical questions:
Say first, of God above, or Man below,
What can we reason, but from what we know?
Of Man, we see but his station here,
From which to reason, or to which refer?
Thro’ world’s unnumber’d tho’ the God be known,
‘Tis ours to trace him only in our own,
He, who thro’ vast immensity can pierce,
See worlds on worlds compose one universe,
Observe how system into system runs,
What other planets circle other suns,
What vary’d being peoples ev’ry star,
May tell why Heav’n has made us as we are.
But of this frame the bearings, and the ties,
The strong connections, nice dependencies,
Gradations just, has thy pervading soul
Look’d thro’? or can a part contain the whole?
Is the great chain, that draws all to agree,
And drawn supports, upheld by God, or thee?
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Such rhetoric, of course, must be studied through the filter of irony which pervades
Pope’s Essay. He was clearly aware of the tension that existed in the presentation of
man’s place in the universe. As Nuttall succinctly puts it:
Pope’s fluid antithesis of pride and humility has swiftly grown until it
encapsulates one of the primary philosophical tensions of the poem; that
is, the tension between a view of man which confines him to merely
human concerns and the grand metaphysical overview of man in relation
287 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man I.i., pp. 14-17.136
to God and the creation, which at one and the same time provides a
rationale for the first view and violates it.
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The importance of Pope’s ironic stance notwithstanding, it is reasonable to assume
that the poem serves as an example of, if not theological optimism, then of a quiet
confidence in the demonstration of a divinely ordered universe which can be
apprehended both morally and intellectually.
But, as Branch illustrates for us, through her study of the Puritan literature, it also
points us towards the use of language in what we now call the novel. She suggests that
it was this inward turn and the almost pathological requirement for some empirical
spiritual assurance, which laid the foundations for novelists such as Defoe and
Richardson to produce their work in later years. If this assessment is correct, how then
does the fictive nature of the novel in Henry Fielding’s hands display the place and
utilisation of language in the divine-human drama? Can the fictive word lead us back
to the Word?
Samuel Richardson clearly thought as much. Both Pamela (1740-41) and Clarissa
(1747-48) were presented primarily as religious works whose purpose was, in the face
of an increasingly mercantile and godless society, to inculcate, not only a sound
ethical framework, but also an active religious sensibility. The numerous biblical
motifs which pepper both novels, collectively serve as a stabilizing force against the
potential moral chaos which engulfs both Pamela and Clarissa. For example, the
fickle nature of the human heart becomes a recurring theme in Pamela.
289 It serves a
double function in the work. Not only does it entail the straightforward moral
assessment of the human condition based on Jeremiah 17. 9, ‘The heart is deceitful
above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?’, but it reveals Pamela’s
own inconsistent feelings toward Mr B. In her confused passion she exclaims:
‘O credulous, fluttering, throbbing mischief. that art so ready to believe
what thou wishest: and I charge thee to keep better guard than thou lately
288 A. D. Nuttall, Pope’s Essay on Man (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 54.
289 Samuel Richardson, Pamela, ed. by Peter Sabor (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 157, 257, 280, 284.137
hast done, and tempt me not to follow too implicitly thy flattering
impulses.
Thus foolishly dialogued I with my heart; and yet, all the time, this heart
was Pamela.’
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Richardson thereby ‘sanctifies Pamela’s moral ambivalence, placing it within the
broader scheme of scripturally sanctioned human frailty’.
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The character and motivation of Pamela provided Henry Fielding with the
ammunition he required to develop his own subversive strategy. Fielding’s antipathy
to Richardson’s novel is well documented.
292 He quickly produced his response in the
form of Shamela (1741). In this satire, it is instructive at the outset to witness the
clerical correspondents who, in effect, become both the critics of the work and the
criticised within the work. We are immediately confronted with the unsteady nature of
the entire theological edifice that both Parson Tickletext and Parson Oliver wish to
support. What do these two figures represent? Is it the moral stability of the church or,
rather, is it the secret lascivious delight of the chap-book classes who revel in reading
about a woman at the mercy of a sexual predator? Are these two stout moral guardians
or merely a pair of opportunistic voyeurs? The names of both clerics serve as a focus
of this particular ambiguity. The name ‘Tickletext’ (a parson also to be found in
Fielding’s play of 1731, The Grub Street Opera) holds within it both theological and
sexual subtleties, while Oliver (the name of Fielding’s Latin teacher) could
conceivably represent the puritan and bible-fixated Lord Protector, himself.
293 In each
case, the orthodox and the puritan are conflated with the heterodox and the lascivious.
We find, then, in these ‘critical assessments of Pamela’, a deeply subversive strategy
at work.
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Moreover, we are, in the reading of Tickletext and Oliver, returned to ourselves and
are forced to pose the question: What is it that is being valued here in this text? Is it
the virtue of a devout Christian, or is it rather the glorious self-interest of a worldly
wench? The answer, I believe, is both. I shall return in to this specific point in my
examination of Fielding’s novelistic ethics.
294 Suffice it to say that Fielding opens up
for us the space which makes us aware of our own moral and intellectual frailty, but in
such a way as to leave us with hope and not despair.
In all of this we are returned again and again to Fielding’s misplacement of both word
and Word in order that we might be free to explore the vagaries of the human
condition, not from a position of overarching authority, nor from a place of servility,
but in the space opened up by the word which, in its misplacement, provides more
than simple admiration or admonition. The word, for Fielding, counters the
theological determinism of the Word, and yet he is prepared to submit that self-same
word to the misplacement experienced by the Word. There remains for Fielding, a
Word to be listened to, but that Word is listened to in the space where the misplaced
word is also to be found.
Fielding and ‘Pop Scripture’
In his 1972 essay, ‘The Rebirth of God and the Death of Man’, Leslie Fiedler pointed
to what he saw as a new kind of spirituality which was growing out of the counter
culture of the 1960s. Much of that essay is now of purely socio-historical interest in
that it deals with a very specific cultural phenomenon worked out by and large in a
very specific location, viz. North America. However, if one puts those specifics to one
side, one can detect an awareness of a broader cultural phenomenon which has not
been confined to the Sixties Revolution. Despite the obvious and not so obvious
curios which very often obscure a genuine spiritual dimension, the turn to a religion
beyond religion outlined by Fiedler, despite obvious time-determined nuances, is to be
found, not only in our day, but more significantly for our study, in the eighteenth
century itself.
294 See Chapter 5.139
More germane to our present purpose is the fact that Fiedler recognises the
relationship between this turn to religion and literature, and almost prophetically
suggests the rise of the ‘new religious’ novel which seeks to recover all mysteries. He
refers specifically to the quest for the Holy Grail and one can see this phenomenon
worked out very clearly today in novels such as Dan Brown’s, The Da Vinci Code
(2003). Fiedler’s comment in this regard is that, while the literature produced by the
new religion is not of the quality that, say, Matthew Arnold would have sanctioned in
his attempt to save religion from itself, nonetheless it is still read as Scripture. What
Fiedler suggests is that these books, regardless of literary merit, achieve some kind of
sacred status insofar as they appear to provide a focus for some form of spiritual quest
or a new way of living. Literature thus, in this counter culture schema, holds within it
some kind of spiritual power.
Interestingly, Stephen Prickett has provided ample evidence to support the notion that
many of the romantics appropriated Scripture in a similar way to that described by
Fiedler. In an extended discussion of Schlegel’s philosophical and spiritual journey,
quoting from Schlegel’s Philosophical Fragments (1798) he writes:
In the world of language or, what is much the same, the world of art and
culture, religion necessarily assumes the guise of a mythology or a
bible.
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This leads Prickett to conclude:
Schlegel has found the channel through which all his torrent of Romantic
ideas can be brought together. The Bible combines poetry, philosophy, the
novel and mythology in an inextricable profusion. Religion here can be
fused into art. The fragment can hint at unrealisable sublimity and infinite
wholes. The Bible constitutes the ultimate anthology from which we
constantly shape and reshape our self-understanding.
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Can we suggest, however, that the appropriation which Prickett describes was already
taking place prior to the Romantic period? Do Fiedler’s insights offer us, then, a
means to understanding how a text such as a novel by Henry Fielding can be received
as, in Fiedler’s own term, ‘Pop Scripture’? The novelty of the novel in the early part
of the eighteenth century, though clearly, for economic and educational reasons, an art
form for the few, nonetheless (and this becomes particularly true of the later gothic
novel) served, in some sense, as food for the soul. This is clearly the suggestion of
Jonathan Barry, who writes:
While the rising scale of publication, much of it topical, utilitarian or
fictional, may well have led those who could afford it into new ways of
consuming print, they also generated a counter-tendency which canonised
parts of this new culture and the ability to respond to it with sensibility.
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The notion of sensibility to which Barry refers, corresponds chiefly to a reaction to or
development from the specifically didactic novel.
Gradually, the kinds of moral precepts that were to have been gleaned
through the example of Pamela’s or Clarissa’s virtuous conduct in
extreme circumstances would become secondary to the production of the
sentimental affect, of a primarily emotional response in the reader.
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This response was evident in dramatic fashion when Richardson’s Pamela was being
publicly read to a group of villagers. At the climax of the reading, when Pamela
marries Mr. B., the villagers were apparently so affected that they rang the church
bells.
299 The rise of the so-called ‘realistic’ novel (leaving aside the difficulties of
accurately defining that term) gave ‘Augustan novels the impression of being factual
as well as fictitious’.
300 This, as we shall examine further in Chapter 6, proved a vital
component in the contemporary reception of the novel in the eighteenth century. The
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identification of the individual seen as an individual and not merely a stock type, had
a profound effect, of which Fielding was well aware:
And here I solemnly protest, I have no intention to vilify or asperse
anyone; for though everything is copied from the book of nature, and
scarce a character or action produced which I have not taken from my own
observations and experience; yet I have used the utmost care to obscure
the persons by such different circumstances, degrees, and colours, that it
will be impossible for them to guess at them with any degree of certainty;
and if it ever happens otherwise, it is only where the failure characterized
is so minute, that it is a foible only, which the party himself may laugh at
as a well as any other.
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Fielding, of course, is once again teasing his readers, but nonetheless provides us with
an important aspect of his own fiction. It can be regarded as ‘pop scripture’ in the
sense that it comically, but faithfully points to the populace, and the individual within
that populace as real entities. Fielding does of course preface his other fiction with a
kind of spiritual apology for the text, for example in the dedication of Tom Jones we
read:
I hope my Reader will be convinced, at his very Entrance on this Work,
that he will find in the whole Course of it nothing prejudicial to the Cause
of Religion and Virtue; nothing inconsistent with the strictest Rules of
Decency, nor which can offend even the chastest Eye in the Perusal.
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This, too, can be regarded as something of an enticement, but not only in the obvious
lascivious sense (which is, no doubt, present) but in the broader sense of the reader
recognising themselves as a spiritual, but nonetheless, frail individual. We see, then,
in Fielding’s fiction, evidence of a spiritual counter-culture which has some affinity
with that which Fiedler described. Both are seen as a reaction against a perceived tired
301 Joseph Andrews, p. 8.
302 Tom Jones, p. 7.142
orthodoxy and both see literature as one of its chief sources of inspiration, if not
salvation.
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We are reminded here, too, of Heidegger’s appreciation of the poetry of Hölderlin
where the immediate context of the poem becomes virtually irrelevant, and it is the
effect of the poem on the individual which becomes paramount. In Heidegger’s terms,
it is the world that the poem sets up which enables the reader to enter into an
awareness of Being. The work of art as ‘world creating’ is thus what gives it its
potency.
It would appear then, that there is some correspondence, between what we have
described as spiritual power and the ability of the work of art to create a world. There
is, it would seem, a correlation between divine and artistic fiat. This is, of course,
made explicit in Fielding’s own work in that, as we have seen, he makes it quite clear
just who the creator is.
303 Leslie Fiedler, ‘The Rebirth of God and the Death of Man’, in A New Fiedler Reader (New York:
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Chapter Four
The Art of Blasphemy: Fielding’s Comi/C/ritique
And now, ye generation of critics, who raise yourselves up as if it were
brazen serpents, to hiss with your tongues, and to smite with your stings,
bow yourselves down to your native dust, and acknowledge that yours
have been the thoughts of ignorance, and the words of vain foolishness.
Lo! ye are caught in your own snare, and your own pit hath yawned for
you.
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Thro’ Books some travel, as thro’ Nations some,
Proud of their Voyage, yet bring Nothing home.
Criticks thro’ Books, as Beaus thro’ Countries stray,
Certain to bring their Blemishes away.
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Artful Criticism
Leslie Fiedler has written that:
Unless criticism refuses to take itself quite so seriously or at least to
permit its readers not to, it will inevitably continue to reflect the finicky
canons of the genteel tradition and the depressing pieties of the Culture
Religion of Modernism, from which Eliot thought he had escaped – but
which in fact he only succeeded in giving a High Anglican tone: ‘It is our
business as readers of literature, to know what we like. It is our business
as Christians, as well as readers of literature, to know what we ought to
like.’ But not to know that such stuff is funny is to be imprisoned in
Church, cut off from the liberating privilege of comic sacrilege.
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Fiedler, writing in the 1970s, reflected an apparently growing pessimistic strain over
the future of the novel and its accompanying critique. While one may query such
polemical pessimism (after all, despite anxieties over the future of literary criticism, it
seems clear that the book trade itself is not about to implode),
307 what remains of
interest is Fiedler’s connection of any such pessimism with religion. Being stuck on
the modernist treadmill is (to mix metaphors) a bit like being trapped in a lift with a
fundamentalist – there is an awful lot to be listened to, but little that is of any
discernible use. The association of modernist criticism with the church is, however,
not simply a convenient or cheap metaphor. For Fiedler, it places criticism in its
proper interrogative context – the Inquisition. The self-generating critical apparatus
which, at one time found itself as the poor man of the university, striving to find, if
not a place in the higher echelons of the Academy, at least some semblance of
respectability, now, according to Fiedler, believes itself to be the presiding judge of
literature – a veritable cultural Torquemada. (We are reminded, here, of the comments
of Christopher Hitchens regarding the role of literature, in my Introduction). The
reality, however, is very different. According to Fiedler, ‘Established critics may think
that they have been judging recent literature; but, in fact, recent literature has been
judging them.’
308 Moreover, in criticism’s rapprochement with system and
respectability, there has been a wilful avoidance of the fact that criticism is itself a
work of art. For Fiedler ‘criticism is literature or it is nothing’.
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One can trace something of this development of fortunes in the history of critical
studies by glancing at Oscar Wilde’s largely positive or, more accurately, aesthetic
view of the task of the critic in his Socratic dialogue, ‘The Critic As Artist’ (1891).
Wilde has Gilbert exclaim:
But surely, Criticism is itself an art. And just as artistic creation implies
the working of the critical faculty, and, indeed, without it cannot be said to
exist at all, so Criticism is really creative in the highest sense of the word.
307 For a spirited defence of the beleaguered modern-day critic, see Rónán McDonald, The Death of the
Critic (London: Continuum, 2007). Interestingly, while he recognises the part Christian scholars had to
play in the development of literary criticism (p. 49), McDonald, in his desire to see critics engage with
the ‘real’ world of history, sociology and politics, appears to leave no similar contemporary dialogical
space for theology, p. 134.
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The critic occupies the same relation to the work of art that he criticises as
the artist does to the visible world of form and colour or the unseen world
of passion and of thought. […] It works with materials, and puts them into
a form that is at once new and delightful.
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Wilde’s view of the task of the critic is, then, governed by an assumed aesthetic
sensibility. Whether such a sensibility results in any accurate perceptions is, for
Wilde, immaterial. The assumption that criticism, for example, ought to see the object
as it is in itself:
[I]s a very serious error, and takes no cognisance of Criticism’s most
perfect form, which is in its essence purely subjective, and seeks to reveal
its own secret and not the secret of another. […] Who cares whether Mr.
Ruskin’s views on Turner are sound or not? What does it matter? That
mighty and majestic prose of his, so fervid and so fiery-coloured in its
noble eloquence, so rich in its elaborate symphonic music, so sure and
certain, at its best, in subtle choice of word and epithet, is at least as great
a work of art as any of those wonderful sunsets that bleach or rot on their
corrupted canvases in England’s Gallery.
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Such glorious subjectivity has no place in the modern criticism so ridiculed in Italo
Calvino’s, If On A Winter’s Night A Traveller. In an attempt to establish the true
nature of the novel he has purchased, our ‘hero’ finds himself at the publishing house:
The corridors of the publishing house are full of snares: drama
cooperatives from psychiatric hospitals roam through them, groups
devoted to group analysis, feminist commandos. […] You have turned up
here at a time when those hanging around publishing houses are no longer
aspiring poets or novelists, as in the past, would-be poetesses or lady
writers; this is the moment (in the history of Western culture) when self-
realization on paper is sought not so much by isolated individuals as by
310 Oscar Wilde, ‘The Critic As Artist’, in Intentions (London: Methuen & Co., 1913), pp. 137-139.
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collectives: study seminars, working parties, research teams, as if
intellectual labour were too dismaying to be faced alone.
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Criticism has moved from a halcyon period, where art is the focus of both artist and
critic, to the apparent nightmare of the death of the author and the creation of the
modern Prometheus, otherwise known as Modern Criticism. Returning to Fiedler, we
can see that he was, of course, speaking from the perspective of American literary
studies, but one can see that his assessment has wider implications. The type of
synchronic criticism that has already been alluded to in this thesis is not, it appears,
confined to studies of Fielding. The temptation to provide ‘fixed’ or, in D.H.
Lawrence’s terminology, ‘nailed-down’ readings of texts, ignores the very openness
of such texts. In other words, a purely formalist critique cannot, according to Fiedler,
survive the so-called postmodern novel. This inability to preserve the desire to pin
down the text is graphically and amusingly illustrated once more in If On A Winter’s
Night A Traveller, in the developing relationship between the ‘hero’ and Miss Zwida:
In addition there is the fact that this girl’s application in drawing seashells
denotes in her a search for formal perfection which the world can and
therefore must attain; I, on the contrary, have been convinced for some
time that perfection is not produced except marginally and by chance;
therefore it deserves no interest at all, the true nature of things being
revealed only by disintegration. If I were to approach Miss Zwida, I would
have to express some appreciation of her drawings – which are of a highly
refined quality, for that matter, as far as I have been able to see – and
therefore, at least at first, I would have to pretend to agree with an
aesthetic and moral ideal that I reject, or else declare my feelings at the
very start, with the risk of wounding her.
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Calvino comically encapsulates the cultural dilemma of man caught between the
desire for perfection and the fragility of human experience. It is a cultural version of
Luther’s less than cheerful theological understanding of the lot of humanity as being,
312 Italo Calvino, If On A Winter’s Night A Traveller, trans. by William Weaver (London: Vintage,
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in Oberman’s words, ‘caught between God and the Devil’.
314 For Fiedler, the
modernists have sought to be on the winning side, but have, in their struggle for
perfection, lost sight of the fragility of the material they were always working with.
My contention, as has been noted, is that this same critical myopia can be applied
retrospectively to eighteenth-century fiction generally and, of course, for our
purposes, to the novels of Henry Fielding in particular.
Fielding, himself, with characteristic charm, also points out this self-same dilemma
two hundred and thirty years earlier in Tom Jones, where, in reckoning with the
legitimacy of ‘prosai-comi-epic Writing’, he asks:
Who ever demanded the Reasons of that nice Unity of Time or Place
which is now established to be so essential to dramatic Poetry? What
Critic hath ever been asked, Why a Play may not contain two Days as well
as one? Or why the Audience (provided they travel, like Electors, without
any Expence) may not be wafted Fifty Miles as well as Five? Hath any
Commentator well accounted for the Limitation which an antient Critic
hath set to the Drama, which he will have contain neither more nor less
than five acts? Or hath any one living attempted to explain, what the
modern Judges of our Theatre mean by that Word low; by which they
have happily succeeded in banishing all Humour from the Stage, and have
made the Theatre as dull as a Drawing-room? Upon all these Occasions,
the World seems to have embraced a Maxim of our Law, viz. Cuicunque
in Arte sua perito credendum est (Anyone expert in his profession must be
believed). For it seems, perhaps, difficult to conceive that any one should
have enough of Impudence, to lay down dogmatical Rules in any Art or
Science without the least Foundation. In such cases, therefore, we are apt
to conclude, there are sound and good Reasons at the Bottom, though we
are unfortunately not able to see so far.
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The fragility of the human situation is understood all too clearly by Fielding and this
is what he seeks to present in his work. There is no desire for perfection, yet there is
equally no limitation on Fielding’s part to discern what it is in the human condition
that can be considered potentially glorious. It is such ‘potential glory’ that colours so
much of Fielding’s fiction enabling a more open and less ideologically driven reading.
However, in order for us to reach this destination we must confront, like Christian in
the Valley of the Shadow of Death, the ideological beast known as Blasphemy. For, as
I will show, it is through such dark channels that the liberating power of the novel can
be discerned.
The Misplaced Heart of Blasphemy
Our first stop-off on this journey is in fact a return to Fiedler’s essay, where he
amplifies his comparison of criticism with the church, by associating the Old Novel
with what he describes as the Old God. This ‘Old God’, though not explicitly defined,
is clearly aligned with the dead hand of prescription and system – a God who is
neither a liberator nor an innovator. There is an obvious resonance in such a dualistic
account of God between Fiedler and the second century heretic, Marcion. The witness
of Irenaeus is, therefore, useful:
Marcion […] developed his school, advancing the most daring blasphemy
against Him who is proclaimed as God by the law and the prophets,
declaring Him to be the author of evils, a lover of war, inconstant in
judgement, and contrary to Himself.
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Marcion, in The Contradictions, tells us that the father of Jesus Christ was the
Unknown God of Acts 17:23.
317 Like Marcion, Fiedler views the Old God, as the
constraining One, the mighty and vengeful One. The Old God of criticism cannot
therefore fulfil the changed expectations of today’s readers. There is a strong echo
here of the work of Blanchot who, in his essay ‘How is Literature Possible?’ points
out the ‘terror’ tactics of criticism:
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This terror, whose decrees have dominated the world of letters for the past
150 years, expresses a need for purity, a preoccupation with rupture which
goes as far as forgetting the accepted conditions of language. […] Terror,
in brief, as the enemy of the commonplace and rules, is engaged in a fight
against a sickness of language, and in the fear that words, left to
themselves and freed from their meaning, might exert over the minds and
hearts of men a formidable power, this terror attempts to restore to
inspiration and creative force a boundless empire.
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He argues, further, that such terror is, in fact, based upon an illusion that the author is
the sole focus of critical attention. Rather, it is the reader who works with words and
who is always exposed to the unintentionality and openness of texts. Fiedler believes
that such a terrorist regime must be overthrown, and a new God be put in place. This
new God resembles the Unknown God of Marcion in that its very mystery points to
the openness that he sees as vital to the survival and progress of the entire critical
project. Such openness has, at its heart, a less serious, dogmatic approach to literary
studies. In other words, as I have noted, its primary recognition is of its own nature as
literature, and not as something rarefied and beyond that which it critiques. The New
God then, is an immanent God. But, more than this, he is also the comical God. For
the comical God points to the reality of true artistic freedom.
In this regard, Robert Polhemus has argued that ‘when we discover the comic motive
and understanding in great works of art, we go straight to the heart of civilisation’.
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Culture and divinity are therefore conjoined in the comic. But such a synchronicity is
not without a challenge from those who would seek to see comedy as a lesser mode of
artistic expression or human experience. To equate the divine with comedy brings us
in touch with, in Polhemus’s words, ‘the stigma of sacrilege’.
320 There is a dangerous
quality about the comic. Institutions, both religious and cultural, fear its free and
playful nature. So much so that, as Huizinga makes clear:
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Since the 18th century, art, precisely because it is recognised as a cultural
factor, has to all appearances lost rather than gained in playfulness. But is
the net result a gain or a loss? One is tempted to feel, as we felt about
music, that it was a blessing for art to be largely unconscious of its high
purport and the beauty it creates. When art becomes self-conscious, that
is, conscious of its own grace, it is apt to lose something of its eternal
childlike innocence.
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We are reminded here, once more, of Fiedler’s complaint over the serious-mindedness
of modern criticism. Huizinga neatly sums up the conflict that Fiedler was later to
champion when he states, ‘Play cannot be denied. You can deny, if you like, nearly
all abstractions: justice, beauty, truth, goodness, mind, God. You can deny
seriousness, but not play.’
322 As experience teaches us, authorities, both ecclesiastical
and secular, suspect such comedic pretensions. Polhemus outlines the institutional
mentality:
Developing religious and cultural authority sought to suppress or to
control and channel the ridicule in mirth and its celebration of physical
pleasure. Ridicule can threaten elites, can be disruptive, and the pursuit of
pleasure can upset the principle of deferred gratification upon which
developing societies depend in order to grow strong. The material world is
unpredictable, and physical being decays; that, no doubt, is why the
mystery religions -- culminating in Christianity -- succeeded so well in
establishing themselves. They could promise a reality beyond the reality
of unstable matter -- a surety and salvation that supposedly did not rely on
the caprice of nature or the unreliable agencies of men.
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The church, uneasy at the potential for the gospel of liberation to be overtaken by
licence becomes, therefore, yet another substantial controlling and containing
presence. We are brought into the realm of the censor and the witch-finder.
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In all of this, as the earlier quotation from Irenaeus makes abundantly clear, we are
once more confronted with the spectre of blasphemy. In the current political and
religious climate, the term ‘blasphemy’ is in danger of becoming overloaded with
unwelcome potentiality. So much so, that it can lose any sense of meaning under a
veil of political opportunism or religious reaction. Nonetheless, it remains an
important critical concept in this study and, as such, is worthy of exploration both at
the etymological and functional levels.
Our English word ‘blasphemy’ stems, of course, from the Greek, βλασφήμέω, which 
is  itself  a  derivative  of  the  conjunction  between  βλαπτω  (to  hinder)  and  φήμη 
(‘reputation’ or ‘fame’).The resultant field of meaning becomes clearly ‘a spoken
word that is hurtful to the reputation’. Ultimately, it is this field of meaning which is,
in a sense, both simultaneously expanded and limited to apply to the divine. However,
when we learn that φήμη, itself, is derived from φως meaning ‘light’, ‘shine’ or ‘make 
manifest’, then it appears at an etymological level, that blasphemy contains within it
the seeds of both obfuscation and illumination, of hindrance and advancement.
‘Blasphemy’, then, to adopt Derrida’s terminology, becomes an intrinsic ‘binary
opposite’. At its textual roots it remains ambiguous.
This etymological ambiguity, when released into the specific semantic context of the
Bible itself, offers us two great examples of blasphemy in the shape of both Job and
Jesus. In Job we have the saint who, having lost all that was dear to him, sits in silence
and in ashes for seven days. Only then does he open his mouth and, as he does so, he
openly curses the entire cosmos, and by extension, the God behind it:
Perish the day when I was born
and the night which said, ‘A man is conceived’!
May that day turn to darkness; may God above not look for it,
nor the light of dawn shine on it.
May blackness sully it, and murk and gloom,
cloud smother that day, swift darkness eclipse its sun.
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Job, in his cursing, attempts to negate the creation narrative. The imagery that he
adopts is broadly similar to that found in Genesis, but in his curse he overturns it. So
instead of light we have darkness; instead of lights to separate, we have perpetual
night. As Perdue puts it, ‘Job’s use of sacred language in curse and lament is designed
to awaken chaos to destroy’.
325 Later, in his closing assault (chs. 29-31), Job begins
by recounting his own blissful existence and concludes, in opposition to the
contentions of Eliphaz in chapter 22, that he has lived an entirely blameless life. As a
consequence, one must assume that ‘if Job is indeed innocent, God by implication
must either be guilty or forced to respond to the indictment of misgoverning
creation’.
326 When God does deign to make an appearance, what is most striking is
that Job, in contrast to his comforters, is praised for the way he has spoken about God.
This leads Perdue to conclude:
In finding for Job over against his friends, what God does is vindicate
Job’s stringent questioning of divine justice and deconstruction of the
friends’ false theology of retribution and unquestionable sovereignty.
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In other words, here Job is paradoxically praised for his blasphemy insofar as it leads
to a more authentic view of faith.
This paradox is even more acute in the person of Jesus, who is consistently accused of
being a blasphemer by his opponents and is ultimately executed as such.
328 From the
Christian perspective, of course, this is a felix culpa, a blessed blasphemy, in that the
crime which led Jesus to death and utter alienation from God (the proper punishment
for a blasphemer) actually releases the true blasphemers, ourselves.
Further, when Jesus, himself, speaks about blasphemy, he immediately indicates that
it can be forgiven. However, there is one exception - when it is placed in the context
of the identifying of that which is holy as evil – the so-called sin against the Holy
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Spirit.
329 What appears to be the blasphemy here is not a particular act as such, but
rather, a direct ontological association between two opposites. Jesus is here rebuking
the tendency to assume an unattainable perspective. In other words, the true
blasphemy lies, not in individual doctrine, but in the determinism into which any such
doctrine can descend. There is, then in Jesus’s mind, a need to be always open to the
other. The irony here, of course, is that it is just such a deterministic outlook which
proscribed Jesus as a blasphemer and sent him to his death. To his opponents the
freedom that Jesus preached was regarded as blasphemous; for Jesus, it was just the
opposite.
Moving from the pages of Scripture and to the period under discussion, we find that,
in the eighteenth century, there is exhibited a similar level of practical dubiety. The
ambiguous nature of the blasphemous is echoed in the difficulty to be found in the
eighteenth century in determining the precise nature of heterodox belief. Bishop
Francis Hare of Chichester (1671-1740) indicated the slipperiness of ‘blasphemy’
when he described it as ‘a Term, which there is a strange Magick in, though it has no
determinate Meaning in the Mouth of the People, nor any ill Meaning in it self’.
330 A
climate of mistrust therefore could be discerned both within and beyond the prevailing
Anglican hegemony. As Leslie Stephen stated long ago, ‘the zeal for true religion did
not in those days burn with the purest of flames.’
331 Granted that such suspicion did
not result in the hysterical reaction that earlier witch hunts had produced, nonetheless
it appears that a zeal for orthodoxy led to many, foolish or brazen enough to question
the party line, being vilified. Hare testifies to the practical impossibility of defending
oneself against the imputation of heresy/blasphemy:
If you are guilty of no open Vices, secret ones will be imputed to you;
Your Enquiries will be called Vain, Curious and Forbidden Studies. Pride
and Ambition will be said to be the secret Springs of them. A Search after
Truth, will be called a Love of Novelty. The doubting of a single Text, will
be Scepticism; the denial of an Argument, a renouncing of the Faith. To
329 Matthew 12. 31.
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say what the Scriptures have said, and in the very same Words too, if not
explained in the common Way, will be Blasphemy; and the most sincere
Concern for the Honours of Almighty God, you cannot be sure will not be
interpreted down-right Atheism.
332
Thus, there is both a semantic and cultural ambiguity at play regarding blasphemy in
general, and more specifically in the period in which the novel comes to birth. The
Anglican Church found its authority under threat from within and without, and its
vigorous response (outlined by Hare above), some have argued, served precisely to
both exacerbate the apparent threat of deism or freethinking, and, at the same time, to
shore up its own increasingly tenuous political if not theological legitimacy. In his
study, The Enlightenment and Religion, S.J. Barnett has forcefully suggested that this
is precisely what happened. He summarises his position thus:
The central question is: should we accept the proclaimed fears of
eighteenth-century thinkers as a true reflection of reality? If they were
real fears, did they necessarily reflect the actual existence of deists or even
a movement of them? In short, the answer is negative: on this subject,
what we read in the historical record is for the most part the furies and
prejudices of writers, rather than actual observations.
333
Barnett’s conclusion is that the so-called deist controversy was anything but. Lund
agrees, when he states:
Despite the insistence of orthodox polemicists that modern infidels –
variously described as hordes, tides, shoals, herds, etc. – threatened to
overwhelm the nation, one is struck by their numerical insignificance in
comparison with a perceived threat assuming near mythical
proportions.
334
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There appears, then, to be a gap or hesitation between the experience of reality and
unreality in this period of cultural and scientific ferment. A space appears to exist that
indicates an anxiety over the apparent blurring of the boundaries which hitherto had
protected our secure understanding of our God, our world and ourselves. There is a
nervous pause for breath prior to the plunge. Clearly, such a dichotomy has, as Barnett
would quickly suggest, an overtly political foundation, one that has cast long shadows
into our own day. One need only think of such recent catch-all blandishments as ‘the
war on terror’ to recognise this as a phenomenon based upon a certain cosy insecurity
– a secure insecurity. In this respect, it is curious to notice the similarities between the
ferment of the eighteenth and the twenty-first centuries. It is equally intriguing to note
that the same ‘nervous pause’ that is created out of a sense of epistemological frailty
becomes the moment where artistic creativity can flourish. Indeed, as David Lawton
has indicated, ‘Blasphemy almost always involves representation, through texts,
languages and performances.’
335
We are here reminded, too, of Blanchot’s description of literature’s inaccessible and
inescapable space (L’Espace littéraire). As Blanchot, himself, describes the dilemma,
‘the impossibility of reading is the discovery that now, in the space opened by
creation, there is no more room for creation.’
336 The creation of the work of literature
both confines and liberates. In its very existence it points to the instability and
fragility of the created order. The work of literature is itself nothing; but, at the same
time, it simply is. It ‘reduces itself to being’ and its very ambiguity thereby threatens
the nature of truth. It is this ‘reduction’, echoing the ‘nervous pause’ outlined above,
which is energised by blasphemy, the assault upon the bastions of the traditional
demarcations of reality and unreality, of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, of fact and
fiction.
Recognising this ‘nervous pause’ and though unwilling to dissent from Barnett’s
historical assessment, I would, however, prefer to concentrate, less on the political
machinations of the interested parties, than upon the influence of such a cultural bi-
polarity over the texts that were being produced at the time. I would argue that such
335 David Lawton, Blasphemy (Philadelphia: The University of Philadelphia Press, 1993), p. 17.
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blasphemous reality/unreality holds within it the possibilities for a more open
understanding of the works of Henry Fielding. All in all, we can clearly discern that
this was an era of mounting epistemological tension poised, as I have already noted,
on the defining cusp of the Enlightenment. The novel, emerging at this specific time,
reveals such tension and Henry Fielding, in particular, recognises both the serious and
ludicrous nature of the cultural and theological dilemma. Alain Cabantous has vividly
pointed to the irony that ‘blasphemy founded Christianity’.
337 Richard Holloway has
argued in a similar vein:
The very existence of the idea of blasphemy suggests that acute anxiety
about its claims has been embedded in religion since the beginning. Like a
social climber in denial about its lowly origins, religion refuses to admit
its dodgy start in life.
338
Can we suggest, however, that blasphemy also founded that other artistic social
climber, the novel, in that the work of fiction, as expressed in the previous chapter,
reflects the mocking of the creative act as a perennial means of recreating and thereby
re-discovering the blasphemous truth of human experience? Can we argue that the
novel recognises and exploits the ‘nervous space’ by providing an artistic reflection of
this selfsame tension?
True Lies: Blasphemy and the Novel
To begin to answer these questions it is salutary to recognise an immediate conflict of
interest which, in itself, is illustrative of the ‘nervous space’ outlined above. One
significant but inevitable by-product of the modernist critics’ desire to gain
respectability in the Academy has been the re-emergence of a love-hate relationship,
first witnessed to in Plato, between literary studies and philosophy.
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It is arguable that the period in literary history which more than any other illustrated
this ‘permanent tension’ is the so-called long eighteenth century, encapsulating, as it
does, the Enlightenment project and the development of the novel itself. The
immediate focus of such tension at this time, as far as the novel is concerned, lay in
the presentation of nature.
339 While having considered regard for the Platonic notion
of the ‘ideal’, eighteenth-century artists increasingly wished to display such reverence
for classical tradition within a domestic setting. This desire, of course, coincided with
the scientific revelation/revolution of the domesticated status of our own planet. The
Earth was no longer the centre of the universe and the corresponding notions of a
heaven above and a hell beneath, as a result, lost some of their enchanting vigour. The
biblical epics, which sustained such a theologically driven cosmological view, could
no longer be literally supported themselves, and the way was opened at this early
stage for art to somehow fill the threatening epistemological chasm. As the old truths
found themselves in retreat, so the presentation of truth in art became of crucial
importance. These ‘necessary falsehoods’, as Augustine described works of fiction
which pointed to truth,
340 were to increasingly dominate the cultural landscape. They
were also to engender an associated new critical background literature which sought
to determine the legitimacy or otherwise of this novel form. Yet, the desire to present
the truth was immediately and thereafter consistently brought into question by the
very fictive means adopted to achieve this laudable aim.
How truth is managed in the novel becomes, then, an intriguing question for the early
exponents of the new form. Strategies ranged from, for example, the somewhat artless
presentation of truth (particularly moral truth) in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe
(1719) (whose ‘biographical’ techniques were, in truth, thought suspect),
341 through
the ‘true’ analysis of feeling and emotion in Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1746), to
Laurence Sterne and his scatalogically subversive Tristram Shandy (1751). The novel,
in its desire to present reality, became an epistemological laboratory. Within this
laboratory, Henry Fielding is well aware of both the prevailing desire to present the
truth, and its accompanying dangers. In Tom Jones, he criticises those historians who,
339 See, for example, Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
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for the sake of voluminousness, refuse to omit even the most mundane detail, and
goes on to describe his understanding and presentation of time and narrative in his
own ‘history’:
Now it is our Purpose in the ensuing Pages to pursue a contrary Method.
When any extraordinary Scene presents itself (as we trust will often be the
Case) we shall spare no Pains nor Paper to open it at large to our Reader;
but if whole Years should pass without producing any Thing worthy his
Notice, we shall not be afraid of a Chasm in our History; but shall hasten
on to Matters of Consequence, and leave such Periods of Time totally
unobserved.
[…] My Reader then is not to be surprised if, in the Course of this Work,
he shall find some Chapters very short, and others altogether as long;
some that contain only the Time of a single Day, and others that comprise
Years; in a Word, if my History seems to stand still, and sometimes to fly.
For all which I shall not look upon myself as accountable to any Court of
Critical Jurisdiction whatever: For I am, in reality, the Founder of a new
Province of Writing, so I am at liberty to make what Laws I please
therein. And these Laws, my Readers, whom I consider as my Subjects,
are bound to believe in and to obey; with which that they may readily and
cheerfully comply, I do hereby assure them, that I shall principally regard
their Ease and Advantage in all such Institutions: For I do not, like a jure
divino Tyrant, imagine that they are my Slaves, or my Commodity. I am,
indeed, set over them for their own Good only, and was created for their
Use, and not they for mine. Nor do I doubt, while I make their Interest the
great Rule of my Writings, they will unanimously concur in supporting
my Dignity, and in rendering me all the Honour I shall deserve or
desire.
342
Fielding here, in this typically mischievous passage, recognises an important truth -
that truth itself can, in the hands of the artist, be manipulated. In the same way that
Galileo and Newton have mastered the nature of the physical universe, and Locke, the
342 Tom Jones, II.i.53.159
nature of human experience and perception, so Fielding claims for himself an
overriding control over his own ‘Laws’. Such manipulation, he cheekily argues,
however, is not done to mislead, but to make the reader’s task that much smoother.
His is the role of the helpful tourist guide around the Great Creation. The guide knows
all the key attractions and chooses to ignore that which, in any case, would be of no
interest to the tourist. Fielding says as much again in his Preface to the posthumous
The Journal of A Voyage to Lisbon (1755) where he writes:
To make a traveller an agreeable companion to a man of sense, it is
necessary, not only that he should have seen much, but that he should
have overlooked much of what hath been seen. Nature is not, any more
than a great genius, always admirable in her productions.
343
Yet, despite his good-natured subtlety, Fielding is presenting us with a dilemma. In all
his talk of Laws, it is clear that he is aware of the potential for his ‘history’ to mislead,
for his ‘truth’ to ‘lie’ - for his Great Creation to be a blasphemy in that it becomes the
uncontrollable domain of unfixity. Contemporary critics, like Samuel Johnson,
focussed this uncontrollability at the moral level:
MANY Writers for the sake of following Nature, so mingle good and bad
Qualities in their principal Personages, that they are both equally
conspicuous; and as we accompany them through their Adventures with
Delight, and are led by Degrees to interest ourselves in their Favour, we
lose the Abhorrence of their Faults, because they do not hinder our
Pleasure, or perhaps, regard them with some Kindness for being united
with so much Merit.
344
Johnson appears to be as aware as Fielding is of the artful presentation of time in a
narrative, but he chooses here to confine his criticism to the surface layer of moral
behaviour. Yet, even at this superficial level, he seems unable to grasp that literature,
as Phillips argues, ‘can open our eyes to possibilities of moral seriousness which are
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wider than those we happen to agree with and wider than those prevalent in a society
at any given time.’
345 White puts it more starkly intimating that, for Johnson:
The standard by which truth and the adequacy of language are measured is
a simple one: correspondence with the substantive view of the world he
holds, in which plain religious truth is paramount; and, at the level of the
individual mind, an integration of the self that renders thought and
experience coherent.
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Moral considerations override the more fundamental question of how the truth, any
truth, can ultimately be pointed to in a work of fiction. Fielding, by contrast, in his
aside above, appears more critically cognisant of this particular and profound danger,
and interestingly invokes the monstrous divinely appointed despot as a foil for his
own benign purposes. God’s tyrant may act with profligacy and wrath but, he, the
mere creator of his ‘Province of Writing’, his own small Garden of Eden, remains
committed to the well-being of those who venture into his little corner of Paradise.
Fielding is the spirit of the good God, hovering over the waters of unbridled chaos.
347
He is the faithful mother God who, when all other mothers have forgotten their
creation, will remain true.
348 Fielding’s faithfulness to his creation becomes the
blasphemous riposte to orthodox (jure divino) faithlessness. His story is true history in
that he faithfully and honestly misplaces both reality and unreality. One can
confidently state that truth lies in Fielding.
A helpful postmodern symmetry to Fielding’s subtle marshalling of truth and
blasphemy is to be discovered in Milan Kundera’s novel, The Joke (1967). Kundera’s
hero (or anti-hero), Ludvik, is expelled from the Communist Party. As a result of a
joke concerning Trotsky that he tells to a serious-minded and party-faithful girlfriend,
Ludvik is forced to ‘volunteer’ for work in a mine. The thrust of the novel is, clearly,
to emphasise the absurdity of a political system (mirroring the potential activity of
Fielding’s monstrous divinely sanctioned tyrant) which can so quickly and violently
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condemn an individual for the sake of a few clever, misplaced words. The words are
misplaced only insofar as they do not fit in a society where individual expression is
thwarted. They are clever (and therefore funny) precisely because they are placed in
that selfsame context. These clever, misplaced words are thus revealed to be
blasphemous.
However, the system which condemns Ludvik for blasphemy is itself more subtly
condemned for having no sense of humour and, therefore, no sense of creativity and
common humanity. Surrounded by the heavy memory of a slowly vanishing cultural
heritage, Kundera has his characters struggling with the discovery of a cultural void at
the heart of a system they once revered. The violence of communist state suppression
is contrasted with the simple cultural expressions of a tired folk festival. And the final
joke is that the tired folk festival, for all its trashiness, holds within it greater creative
potential.
Blasphemy in The Joke has its own obvious political semantic context, but there is, I
believe, a deeper subversion at work in that the blasphemy which condemns Ludvik
serves also to liberate him from his hitherto subservient attitude to the Party.
Blasphemy, then, serves both a deconstructive and a reconstructive function. Indeed,
that blasphemy should function in this way is an inevitable consequence of its
ultimate association with a joke, i.e. with comedy. The blasphemous joke here
becomes, in the terminology of Paul Ricoeur, a ‘word-event’. As Ricoeur makes clear,
‘Something is said of which I am not the origin, nor the owner.’
349 It points beyond
mundane, political realities to the revelatory nature of the absurd. It illustrates David
Jasper’s principle that:
What is most "true" in literature, then, is not necessarily derived from
what is actually seen and observed, but from what is cast in the furnace of
the perceptive and prophetic imagination. Nor should language which is
primarily metaphorical and imaginative be regarded as less serious or
349 Paul Ricoeur, 'Religion, Atheism, and Faith', in The Religious Significance of Atheism, ed. by
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grounded in matters of basic concern than that which claims to have the
authority of scientific or historical verification.
350
What Jasper claims for the text of Scripture, I would suggest, applies equally across
the literary spectrum. I shall, in due course, apply this principle in my discussion of
revelation.
351 Indeed, the bipolarity we have discerned in the word ‘blasphemy’ can be
regarded as a means to experiential truth (as opposed to strictly scientifically
empirical), and a way through the epistemological conundrum inherited at the
Enlightenment. This experiential, subverting truth which attempts to square the
epistemological circle of achieving ultimate veracity can be regarded as coterminous
with the notion of mystery, mentioned earlier in this study. Paul Fiddes explains the
options well:
In thinking about the mystery to which the imagination reaches out, some
then will follow a Kantian line in understanding it to be an elusive
dimension in our own feelings, pointing to some depth of human values.
Others will want to give the mystery a greater objectivity of its own, over
against human experience. That is, they will want to retain a
"metaphysics", and will argue in support that there are other modes of
knowing than observation and deduction relying on the evidence of the
senses alone. In our century, Heidegger has spoken of a "primordial
thinking" which links as to Being itself, adept in existence which
transcends our own merely finite beings.
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Helpful though Fiddes analysis is, there is a danger that he attempts to restrict the very
notion of mystery he wishes to advance. Fiddes rejects natural theology in favour of a
concept of general revelation in which God is present in his world by means of natural
human experience. The idea is not that God leaves messages or propositions about
himself embedded in the natural world which can then be ‘picked up’ by the receiving
apparatus of the human mind. Rather, he unveils his own being through the vehicle of
human and natural events. ‘Nature,’ Fiddes argues, ‘is a place of an encounter with
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the living God, not a dead-letter drop.’
353 This places mystery too much on the side of
the angels. It seems to me that experience indicates that nature can also be equally
regarded as the place of abandonment. Is that not to confirm the ultimate blasphemy,
that our ever-present awareness is that of absence?
If, at this point we return to Kundera’s novel, we discover that it offers us a useful
postmodern analogy to the relationship between the competing systems of rationalism
and faith as found in the work of Henry Fielding. Kundera’s image of a static and
unforgiving state juxtaposed with the simplicity, mystery and hopefulness of a Czech
folk festival can be seen as an echo of the developing tension between the clinical
determination of the Enlightenment enthusiasts (exemplified in Fielding’s Tom Jones
by the philosopher, Square), and the increasingly beleaguered and, in some ways,
bewildered religious faithful (witnessed most clearly in Joseph Andrews by Parson
Adams).
At the outset, however, one must be careful to recognise, as Fielding does, that this
tension does not imply a straight forward state of affairs whereby one force for good
is under threat from an opposing force for evil. As always, such simple analogies fail;
there can be, of course, no direct correlation between the Communist Party of
Kundera’s novel and the Enlightenment enthusiasts in Fielding’s work; but in this
case, such analogous failure is important. For Fielding, both the rationalists and the
religious can be equally totalitarian. We are left as a result, in Fielding’s work, with
an important awareness of the ambiguity of blasphemy and the irony that all systems,
be they rational or religious, have the capacity both to free and to imprison, to bless
and to curse.
Such ambiguity is wonderfully demonstrated in Fielding’s, Joseph Andrews, where
we discover the following exchange between Parson Adams and his long-suffering
wife:
Adams bid his Wife prepare some Food for their Dinner; she said, truly
she could not, she had something else to do. Adams rebuked her for
353 Ibid., p. 31.164
disputing his Commands, and quoted many Texts of Scripture to prove
that the Husband is the Head of the Wife, and she is to submit and obey.
The Wife answered, ‘it was Blasphemy to talk Scripture out of Church;
that such things were very proper to be said in the Pulpit, but that it was
profane to talk them in common Discourse.’ Joseph told Mr Adams he
was not come with any Design to give him or Mrs Adams any trouble; but
to desire the favour of all their company to the George (an Alehouse in the
Parish), where he had bespoke a Piece of Bacon and Greens for their
Dinner. Mrs Adams, who was a very good sort of Woman, only rather too
strict in Economics, readily accepted this Invitation, as did the Parson
himself by her Example; and away they all walked together…
354
We are presented here with multiple expressions of comic ambiguity. All of these lead
us to the place where we are left floundering, not only as to who is actually the head
of this particular household, but also as to the nature of blasphemy, and the identity of
the blasphemer. Parson Adams apparently holds the secure authority, not only of his
office, but his classical education and, above all, his knowledge of the Scriptures. This
impressive legitimating arsenal is, however, powerless before a force which displays
none of the merits of status, intellectual endeavour or theological orthodoxy. Adams’
wife is displayed in this passage as everything her husband is not. Her combative
nature may be the closest attribute that they as husband and wife share, yet the basis
of such quarrelsome harmony differs in each case. Adams anchors his fights upon
sound, established principle and, as in the passage above, the Scriptures. His wife, on
the other hand, simply creates her own principles to establish her position. There can
be, in theory, no reconciling these two. And yet, the passage finishes on a point of
familial harmony.
Within this ambiguous understanding of domestic authority we encounter the specific
use of the word ‘blasphemy’. The word is thereby undermined in two ways. Firstly, it
finds itself misplaced to the extent that its traditional ecclesiastical and inquisitorial
environment is spectacularly reduced to that of a domestic tiff. Such misplacement is
highlighted by the fact that there is an immediate theological context within which the
354 Joseph Andrews, IV.12.253.165
term’s meaning is explored and exploded. According to Adams’ wife, it is blasphemy
to use the Scriptures out of the pulpit. On the face of it, one may accuse her of gross
ignorance, or, worse, a malevolent bent toward having her own way. Neither of these
suggestions does justice to the innocence of both parties and ignores Fielding’s
deliberate intention which is to subvert the term itself. This is strengthened by the
possibility that Fielding was, in fact, cheekily placing the wafer of a Roman Catholic,
i.e., heterodox position, into the mouth of the Anglican curate’s wife. Such a delicious
possibility cannot be claimed with any sense of finality but, nonetheless, it goes to
emphasise the level of instability which surrounds theological terms like blasphemy in
this text.
Secondly, the fact that the word comes, not from the lips of Adams (out of whose
rhetorical armoury, one would expect to enlist such a weapon – he never, in fact uses
the term), but from his wife, further emphasises its loss of potency. This does not
imply any misogynist intent on Fielding’s part. One need only look to his portrayal of
Sophia in Tom Jones or, to a degree, the eponymous Amelia; or indeed Mrs Heartfree
in Jonathan Wild, to recognise Fielding’s awareness of the positive outworking of the
Christian ethic in the ‘gentle Sex’. In the current passage, the practical and non-
theological Mrs Adams is placed alongside her otherworldly husband – a long-
suffering Martha alongside a hearty Church of England Mary. Such placement also
gives the lie to the very hysteria, outlined earlier, regarding the nature of the deist or
freethinker threat. The cleric is silent while the lay woman pontificates. The result is
not an extension of religious mania and a desire for divine retribution. Indeed, if
judgement is being pronounced at all in this passage, it is upon Adams, himself. Once
again, through a semantic subversion, the blasphemer (Mrs Adams) who criticizes the
‘blasphemer’ (Parson Adams) becomes ultimately a source of reconciliation. To
blaspheme is to subversively point to truth and, as a result, to bring peace.
We are reminded, here, of the therapeutically profane nature of the comedic. In this
sense, the comedic expresses a radicalization of theology. It reflects a theology which
refuses to compromise with systems which exist in and for themselves. Comic faith is
dismissive of human hubris or what Fielding calls ‘affectation’. Comic faith becomes
the desacralizing force in the temple. Comic faith is the blaspheming hider in the
house. As Aichele has it, ‘iconoclastic faith is very similar to blasphemy; it justifies the166
faithlessness and doubt which defeat man’s inclinations to self-deification.’
355 As a result,
the place of the orthodox and the heterodox are constantly put into question, with the
ultimate purpose of allowing each to become aware of the fragility of their own position.
Fielding and Criticism
As a further means of highlighting the critical harmony between postmodern critics
like Fiedler and Calvino, and an early novelist like Henry Fielding, I will now
examine the latter’s attitude toward the practice and purpose of criticism itself, as well
as his assessment of the critics of the day. It would be uncontroversial to state that
Fielding was no true friend of the critic. In his work they are described variously as
‘little reptiles’, ‘unmerciful judges’, ‘slanderers’, ‘slaves to vice’, ‘vermin’ and
‘illiterate’ (to name but a few).
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However, prior to examining Fielding’s specific critique of the critics it is worth
mentioning an important point of convergence between blasphemy and criticism, that
is the citing of the critic in the context of his ‘great Creation’:
This Work may, indeed, be considered as a great Creation of our own; and
for a little Reptile of a Critic to presume to find Fault with any of its Parts,
without knowing the Manner in which the Whole is connected, and before
he comes to the final Catastrophe, is a most presumptuous Absurdity.
357
Fielding’s sliding in of the reptile, not only enhances the image of his blasphemous
creation, but also provides us, in the shape of the critic, with the ultimate enemy –
Satan himself. In other words, Fielding is subtly defending himself on several fronts,
with the broader buttress being the argument that, if his creation is regarded as absurd
or blasphemous, (intriguingly, the word ‘absurd’ shares some of the same root
meaning as ‘blasphemy’ in that there is a mutual connection with ‘murmuring’) then
the critic is the very snake that inhabits the garden of Eden.
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Moving to Fielding’s specific critique, we discover that his ire is directed toward
those who, through ignorance or malice, or through second-hand acquaintance only,
misunderstand the nature of a work and subsequently publicly malign it. Fielding was
well aware of the existence of ‘qualified’ critics who have ‘certainly been authorised
to execute at least a judicial Authority in Foro Literario (the literary forum)’.
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However, his theatrical experience had no doubt educated him early as to the
scurrilous nature of the critical profession who could make or break a work of art with
a stroke of the pen: ‘For Slander is a more cruel Weapon than the Sword, as the
Wounds which the former gives are always incurable.’
359 Such skulduggery was to
bedevil Fielding to the end. His last work of fiction, Amelia, was badly received, and
Fielding took great pleasure in ridiculing the ridiculers who, he believed, lacked the
necessary acumen and experience to pass any considered judgement. In a biting
riposte to those who belonged to the ‘High Office of Critic’, Fielding outlines a
number of fundamental qualifications he believes may or may not be of benefit in the
execution of their literary endeavour:
To require what is generally called Learning in a Critic, is altogether as
absurd as to require Genius. Why should a Man in this Case, any more
than in all others, be bound by any Opinions but his own? Or why should
he read by Rule any more than eat by it? If I delight in a Slice of Bullock’s
Liver or of Oldmixon, why shall I be confined to Turtle or Swift?
The only Learning, therefore, that I insist upon, is, That my Critic BE
ABLE TO READ; and this is surely very reasonable: For I do not see how
he can be otherwise called a Reader; and if I include every Reader in the
Name of Critic, it is surely very just to confine every Critic within the
Number of Readers.
360
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While we may justifiably find ourselves smiling at a typical thrust of Fielding’s
penetrating wit, it is important that we do not miss the fundamental point here.
Fielding is, in this passage, fulfilling the demand made by Fiedler two centuries later,
in that his criticism is itself a conscious work of art. It is precisely one of Fielding’s
own complaints that such criticism as he encounters shows little in the way of
imagination. In the same article cited above, he suggests that it shall not be:
Sufficient for such Critic to drivel out, I don’t know not I, but all that I
know is, I don’t like it. Provided, nevertheless, that any Reason how
foolish or frivolous soever, shall be allowed a good and full Justification;
except only the Words POOR STUFF, WRETCHED STUFF, BAD
STUFF, SAD STUFF, LOW STUFF, PAULTRY STUFF. All of which
STUFFS I do forever banish from the Mouths of all Critics.
361
Fielding is making the same plea here for the use of the critical imagination that goes
beyond the mundane or the crudely analytical. A typical example of the latter would
be a ludicrous (and malicious) review of Tom Jones which criticized Fielding for his
poor sense of topography.
362 Criticism, for Fielding, is not merely standing over and
above that which is criticized. It involves an entering into the work of art as art. Only
then can the critic truly engage with the objective of his critical apparatus.
Fielding provides us with his own critical apparatus in a wonderfully vivid passage
designed to point out the arbitrariness of some criticism that relies on a purely
‘mechanical’ rather than imaginative approach. Fielding ‘inherits’ what he describes
as The Weather-Glass of Wit (a by-product of an alchemist’s search for the
Philosopher’s Stone), a piece of machinery that can only be described as a kind of
critical thermometer. Such devices were frequently adopted by satirists of the period.
William Hogarth (1697-1764), for example, in his print Credulity, Superstition and
Fanaticism: A Medley (1762), (Fig. 3 below) provides a mental thermometer that rises
out of a "Methodist's Brain." The mercury, here, measures states of enthusiasm and
insanity, ranging from cold, melancholic conditions such as "Low Spirits," "Settled
361 ‘The Covent Garden Journal’, No. 3 in The Criticism of Henry Fielding, p. 68.
362 Paulson & Lockwood, eds., Henry Fielding: The Critical Heritage, pp. 166-168.169
Grief," and even "Suicide" to hot states of sexual excitement, first "Love Heat,"
"Lust," and "Extacy," and then "Convulsion Fits" and "Raving". Similar devices
measuring the human passions were also popular.
Fig. 3
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By his own device, however, Fielding is able to detect the relative merits of a literary
work. He proceeds to tell us how it operates:
That Morning I happened to take up a Virgil. I had no sooner began to
read, but I saw the Spirits mount up suddenly in the Thermometer, from
whence I concluded, but there must have been a very sudden Alteration of
the Air; but upon laying the Book aside, to observe the Instrument more
exactly, the Spirits immediately subsided to their former Pitch. This
Accident surprised me pretty much; but I had the greater Reason for
Admiration when I observ’d, that the Moment I began to read on, the170
Spirits began to ascend again, and that they sunk as soon as ever I left off.
I imagined, at first, that my Breath was the Cause of this sudden Change;
but I soon laid aside that Thought, as I observ’d, that there was the same
Appearance, whether I read aloud or to myself; and whether I was near to,
or at a Distance from the Glass. Whilst I was in this Perplexity, I took up
the first Book which came to hand, which happen’d to be a Volume of
Sermons, which had been given to me by an Eminent Divine, when I first
went abroad. I had scarcely dipp’d into it, when I saw, to my great
Astonishment, that the Liquor, instead of rising, sunk down to the very
Bottom of the Tube, and ascended as suddenly, upon my laying the Book
aside.
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Superficially, one may regard this as a clever means to ridiculing certain low forms of
fiction. However, that would be to fall into the temptation that besets all
unimaginative critics, namely the desire to condemn rather than comprehend. What
Fielding is, in fact, introducing us to is the interactive nature of the text. Fielding, in
his Thermometer, imaginatively illustrates for us the dynamism of any given text.
That he chooses, in the above passage, a volume of sermons to illustrate the
‘effectiveness’ of his device, becomes then, less of a comment on the nature of
sermons than a means of illustrating the dynamic reality of all literary engagement.
We are here, transported once again to the land of the Tralfamadorians with their
empathetic texts. In the same way that the technology of the Tralfamadorians can
generate an overall ‘feeling’ for the text, so Fielding’s own technology provides us
with an awareness of the importance of an artistic engagement with the text. An
apparently accurate piece of machinery is used to ‘measure’ the immeasurable. The
improbability of the task being achieved is indicative of the open-ended nature of all
texts, novels and criticism alike.
Such open-ended artistic engagement for Fielding, then, is the substance of criticism,
and it is this artistic engagement which deflects from Fielding the accusation of
blasphemy in Tom Jones:
363 Williams, The Criticism of Henry Fielding, p. 126.171
That this motely [sic] History of Bastardism, Fornication and Adultery, is
highly prejudicial to the Cause of Religion, in several Parts of it, is
apparent in the gross Ridicule and Abuse which are wantonly thrown on
religious Characters. Who reviles the Clergy may be well said to be upon
the very Threshold of Immorality and Irreligion […] It is amazing, Sir
[…] that you should venture on commending a Book so truly profligate, of
such evil Tendency, and offensive to every chaste Reader, so discouraging
to Virtue and detrimental to Religion.
364
The anonymous Critic, here, shares none of the artistic engagement which Fielding
desperately craves. His superficial accusation bears no understanding of the true
blasphemy that is taking place in Tom Jones, i.e., the very ambiguity that a text can
engender. Tom Jones is thus far more than the pathetic sum total of vices portrayed in
the passage quoted above. That kind of reductionist criticism cannot, by definition,
engage with a text like Tom Jones. Such criticism has set itself apart. It has not
sought, like Fielding, to dine at ‘the Provision of HUMAN NATURE’.
365 As a result,
it is no criticism of Tom Jones at all, but merely an empty diatribe.
Such salacious comment resonates with that of blasphemy. It is a blasphemy insofar
as this slander is upon the creation of an artist. Blasphemy is returning to blasphemy.
We are entering here upon the early stages of the metamorphosis that was to be
completed in the following century, whereby the status of Scripture and Literature
were effectively reversed. In the words of Joss Marsh, literature ‘incrementally
graduated from an oppositional to an accessory relationship to Scripture’.
366 The
novel thus evolves from its blasphemous primordial soup to become, following the
title of Northrop Frye’s famous work, the Secular Scripture.
364 ‘Letter from ‘Aretine’ to George Lyttelton’, in Paulson & Lockwood, eds., Henry Fielding: The
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The ‘Problem’ of Amelia
On the journey to that new state, the novel, in Fielding’s hands, had to undergo
something of a trial. His last novel, Amelia, published in 1751 in the glow of the
success of Tom Jones, was received with less than overwhelming enthusiasm. There
were, to be sure, some initial favourable responses, for example, John Cleland’s
review in the Monthly Review of December, 1751 regarded it as ‘the boldest stroke
that has yet been attempted in this species of writing’.
367 Even Samuel Johnson, we
are told, ‘read Fielding’s Amelia through without stopping.’
368 However, it is fair to
say that, overall, the book was seen as a backward step. Samuel Richardson,
predictably, thought ‘the characters and situations so wretchedly low and dirty’,
369 and
even Fielding’s own second cousin and literary benefactor, the redoubtable Lady
Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762), in a letter following Fielding’s death wrote, ‘All
these sort of books have the same fault, which I cannot easily pardon, being very
mischievous.’
370 Various reasons are cited for this overwhelmingly negative
contemporary reaction. A significant complaint appears to be the description of
Amelia, herself, as someone who, though beautiful and honourable in every way,
nonetheless has a facial disfigurement. Some less than charitable critics suggested that
syphilis was the cause of the condition. The setting of the novel - ‘that good-for-
nothing London!’
371 - led some to regard it as unfitting for more refined tastes. On the
whole, the critical response consists of a disappointment in the drama of the piece,
dealing as it does, with the domesticity of marriage, rather than, as in traditional
comedy, ending with one.
Subsequent readings of Amelia have remained lukewarm, if not downright dismissive.
Though not comprehensively supported, the infamous comments of F. R. Leavis
which acerbically claimed that by the time Fielding had written Amelia, he had ‘gone
soft’, have overshadowed much modern criticism.
372 There are, to be sure, other more
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moderate but nonetheless similarly dissatisfied critical voices. For example, in his
study, Mask and Feast, Andrew Wright comments:
All in all, Amelia is not a bad work – I do not wish to suggest, let alone
press the view that it is bad – but it is deeply flawed because Fielding […]
abandons the tools of his trade.
373
By ‘tools of his trade’ Wright chiefly means Fielding’s ability to playfully engage
with his reader, specifically by means of the series of prefaces which he ‘perfected in
Tom Jones’. The contrasts with both Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones are obvious.
Aside from the overt narratorial omniscience which infuses these earlier novels and
gives them their jocular dynamic, these are works of the road. Joseph Andrews and
Tom Jones are panoramic, while Amelia is, if anything, claustrophobic, dealing as it
does with the domestic crisis surrounding the marriage of Amelia and Will Booth,
geographically set in the constraining environs of either the sponging house or
Newgate Prison, and the immediate London area in which Booth, as a convicted
debtor, is only permitted to travel freely on a Sunday.
Wright goes further in his criticism:
In short, Amelia is the work of a Christian fatalist who was losing his faith
in art; it is the flawed achievement of a great novelist who turned his back
on his own fictional inventions.
374
What is certainly cogent about this assessment is that Fielding, indeed, produced no
other novel, signing off in the only way he could by writing a mock trial of Amelia in
The Covent Garden Journal in January 1752. Having attempted to defend his
‘favourite Child’, Fielding solemnly declares before the assemblage of ‘Beaus, Rakes,
fine Ladies, and several formal Persons with bushy Wigs, and Canes at their noses,
pushed forward’ (possibly an image of the criticism of Amelia’s damaged nose,
itself), ‘that I will trouble the World no more with any Children of mine by the same
Muse.’
375
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However, there are others, for example, Robert Alter, who would not dismiss Amelia
out of hand and, indeed, despite his awareness of some obvious difficulties in the
novel is quite prepared to describe it as ‘a work of a writer of genius’.
376 Being more
specific in his praise, Alter states:
It is not enough to say there are good things in Amelia; there are things in
this book which one simply does not find in the English novel until it
reaches a stage of greater technical sophistication, in the nineteenth
century.
377
We are left, then, with the ‘problem’ of Amelia’s ambiguous reception. How is it that
it can provide such contemporary and modern-day critical variances? The simplistic
answer, of course, is to say that different readers like different things, and that times
and tastes change. However, if one examines the criticism of Amelia more broadly,
we discover that Fielding is condemned (often in the same period), both for the low
nature of the subject matter and for his overt didactic presence. He is accused of both
flat characterisation, and yet, that his characters are all too real, i.e., that they are
unsavoury. He is berated for both providing us with an earthy novel and proffering us
a sentimental one. How can these apparently disparate comments cohere?
The answer, I believe, is that they cannot, because in Amelia, as all the variations in
reception appear to indicate, we find a critically blasphemous novel. It is a work
which has, at its core, a degree of instability which is unsettling, leaving ‘its larger
mysteries impenetrable’.
378 It is a work which both illuminates and obfuscates, in that
it contains elements of the ‘comic Epic-Poem in prose that Fielding championed in
Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones, but has expanded these in a paradoxically restricted
mode. Indeed, Amelia becomes rather like the character of Tom Jones himself, an
outsider on the road to somewhere, but, as I have already mentioned, that somewhere
is actually less determined than we initially suspect. Rawson suspects something of
the kind when, in his more generous attempt to come to terms with Amelia, writes:
376 Robert Alter, Fielding and the Nature of the Novel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
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It is no mere question of an elderly flagging talent, for there are things of
fierce vitality in all the later writings. It seems instead to be that Fielding’s
world has ceased to make total sense, so that his reactions have become
fragmentary. The phenomenon of Blear-eyed Moll and that of Amelia
simply cannot connect: both are noted, and strongly reacted to, but a
world in which both exist can only be acknowledged, not ‘explained’.
379
Rawson recognises the feeling of unease that Amelia generates but cannot resist
attributing some of that unease to Fielding himself. I would argue, however, that it is
not necessary or fruitful to second-guess Fielding’s frame of mind as he produced the
world of Amelia, but simply, despite the challenges, to encounter it. In so doing, we
remove ourselves form any deterministic approach to the text and allow it to confront
us.
Permitting the novel to speak for itself, we discover that the sense of disturbance
experienced by the reader is generated chiefly by the conflict between interiority and
exteriority. The novel begins its life in the claustrophobic and dangerous world of the
debtor’s prison, and this intimidating atmosphere overshadows the various twists and
turns that Fielding provides throughout the text. To this extent, one can detect an early
trace of what was to become a favourite motif of the gothic novel. However, it is
reasonable to state that, in terms of narrative structure and character development,
Amelia provides us with a greater degree of sophistication than is to be found in the
vast majority of such novels, (with the possible exception of William Godwin’s Caleb
Williams (1794) and Fleetwood (1805)).
380
As has been noted, the novel focuses upon an existing marriage, rather than leading to
one, and here we find that the same dichotomy of interiority/exteriority is in evidence.
Marriage is regarded as the place of apparent paradisal security which contrasts with
the bleak security of the debtor’s prison and its surrounding environs. In addition, the
naïve and impulsive Booth is consistently torn between the domestic bliss offered by
379 Claude Rawson, Henry Fielding and the Augustan Ideal Under Stress, pp. 96-97.
380 I have argued elsewhere, that both Caleb Williams and Fleetwood are expressive of Godwin’s own
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Godwin (unpublished master’s thesis, The Open University, 2002), p. 34. It is also fair to point out that
the Richardsonian novels Pamela and particularly Clarissa may also be regarded as proto-gothic in that
they, too, deal with what are, effectively, prison worlds.176
his faithful Amelia, and a succession of ‘opportunities’ both legal and illicit which he
encounters beyond the family home. To this extent, as Blewett has indicated, ‘the
union of William and Amelia Booth is menaced both from without and within’.
381 By
placing marriage and prison in such close proximity, we are left with uncomfortable
awareness of the possibilities of each influencing the other. Marriage, then, becomes a
prison for Booth; and the debtor’s prison, an unexpected opportunity for
advancement.
As a result, and as I noted in Chapter 2, we become increasingly aware of the
ambiguity of character in Amelia. The motif of the mask displays for us that same
insecurity, whereby a stable understanding of individual character remains elusive.
Even at the novel’s most transparent moment, i.e., the conversion of Booth, we are
still in doubt as to what change has actually taken place. It is instructive to contrast
this conversion with Fielding’s remarks in his satirical Jonathan Wild (1743):
Without considering Newgate as no other than human nature with its mask
off, which some very shameless writers have done, a thought which no
price should purchase me to entertain, I think we may be excused for
suspecting, that the splendid palaces of the great are often no other than
Newgate with the mask on.
382
Granted that, in Jonathan Wild, we are presented with a satirical piece which has its
focus upon the nature of ‘greatness’ (Walpole, of course, being the target of the
satire), Fielding, nonetheless, with his customary coyness, opens to us the
uncomfortable connection between transparency and corruption. The boundary
between light and darkness, he is suggesting, is an elusive one. Fielding recognises
that the mask of either prison or palace can render opaque those characteristics of
human nature so easily assumed to shine in either context. Heaven can be found in
hell and vice versa.
Applying this ambiguity to the conversion scene in Amelia, we are left wondering, not
only about the psychological dimensions of Booth, but the very nature and efficacy of
redemption itself. Ultimately, then, if the supreme security of salvation is in doubt,
381 Amelia, p. ix.
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then we are left with no safe place. Amelia, instead of the providential saccharine that
both contemporary and modern-day critics have accused Fielding of serving his
readers, becomes instead a much more bitter dish, whose ingredients are difficult to
swallow. Consequently, it shares all the hallmarks of misplacement – it is the novel of
blasphemy.
Returning to the broader issue of the novel’s reception, we find that this notion of
Amelia, as the novel of blasphemy, serves as a means to coming to terms with the less
than coherent critical response that the novel has received. The apparently flawed
nature of the novel in this misplaced sense, paradoxically exhibits for us its greatest
strength, namely its own fragile existence, standing as it does on the edge of existence
and non-existence, of reality and unreality. I have founded my argument on the basis
of human frailty. That frailty extends to the novel itself. In this respect, Wright’s
comment that Fielding ‘was losing his faith in art’ becomes an unwittingly apposite
critique, in the sense that one can read such an expression in two ways. The first way,
I would suggest, is to regard it as representative of a temptation towards a
metaphysics of presence. In other words, Wright is seeking for a way out of the sense
of unease with which Amelia leaves us. Fielding, he argues, has, in Amelia, simply
given up.
However, there is another way of reading Wright’s comments, and that is to see
Fielding as ‘losing his faith in art’, that is, his faith is actively and positively lost in
the art form he is producing. Notice that this is not, as with the Romantic tradition, a
losing of faith to art. Instead, this is to be regarded as a forging of a work of art
alongside the risk of faith. This is another way of expressing one of the key themes in
my thesis — a parting with the ineffable. In this particular case, Fielding is seen, not
to give up as Wright sees it, but rather to struggle with an art form which, at all times,
points us to a parting with the ineffable. The critical paradox of Amelia is that, despite
its claustrophobic atmosphere, it actually breaks free from the determinism within
which critics seek to imprison it. The blasphemy of Amelia is that it refuses to
provide any easy solution for us as to both the nature of the novel form but also,
ultimately, the nature of the human condition.178
In Jorge Luis Borges’ story, The Theologians, Aurelian, having caused his fellow-
theologian, John of Pannonia to be burned as a heretic, is himself struck by lightning
and killed. He finds himself in heaven:
The end of the story can only be related in metaphors since it takes place
in the kingdom of heaven, where there is no time. Perhaps it would be
correct to say that Aurelian spoke with God and that He was so little
interested in religious differences that He took him for John of Pannonia.
This, however, would imply a confusion in the divine mind. It is more
correct to say that in Paradise, Aurelian learned that, for the unfathomable
divinity, he and John of Pannonia (the orthodox believer and the heretic,
the abhorrer and the abhorred, the accuser and the accused) formed one
single person.
383
It is clear, then, that Fielding exposes, both in his comedic critical awareness and in
his own fiction, a sensitivity towards that determinism which literary, theological and
historical tradition strives to exert upon the artist. Rather like the merging of the
accuser and the accused in Borges’ tale, Fielding himself, as we have seen, no
stranger to the wrath of the critic, carries out an exercise in illumination and
obfuscation. In Amelia particularly, he offers us a work which renders opaque, those
hitherto clear assessments of what constituted the novel form and yet, paradoxically,
in so doing, he sheds light on the misplaced nature of both the work of art and the
human condition.
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Chapter Five
Prudence, Providence and Jurisprudence: Fielding’s Moral Misplacement
There are a Set of Religious, or rather, Moral Writers, who teach that
Virtue is the certain Road to Happiness, and Vice to Misery, in this
World. A very wholesome and comfortable Doctrine, and to which we
have but one Objection, namely, That it is not true.
384
Walking Away With The Nail
In his 1925 essay, ‘Morality and the Novel’, D. H. Lawrence evangelically states:
Philosophy, religion, science, they are all of them busy nailing things
down, to get a stable equilibrium. Religion, with all its nailed down One
God who says Thou shalt, Thou shan’t, and hammers home every time;
philosophy, with its fixed ideas; science with its ‘laws’: they, all of them,
all the time, want to nail us on to some tree or other. But the novel, no.
The novel is the highest example of subtle inter-relatedness that man has
discovered. Everything is true in its own time, place, circumstance, and
untrue out of its own place, time, circumstance. If you try to nail anything
down in the novel, either it kills the novel, or the novel gets up and walks
away with the nail. Morality in the novel is the trembling instability of the
balance. When the novelist puts his thumb in the scale, to pull down the
balance to his own predilection, that is immorality.
385
What Lawrence is clearly advocating here is a space for literature, and particularly the
novel, to do what only it can do. The legitimisation of the novel form, for Lawrence,
does not lie in its moral acceptability, but in its ability to express life. As a result,
deterministic stances, be they founded on religion, science or philosophy, have no
place in the creation of what he described in another essay as ‘tremulations on the
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ether’.
386 The novel, then, is the whole of life, the mystery and its reflection. It defies
conventions and breaks down any artificially created divisions.
I have, earlier, sought to recognise, in a way similar to Lawrence, that a space is
indeed required for literature including especially the novel. However, as I have
consistently noted, whereas Lawrence (and as we saw earlier, the Romantics) would
seek to leave the space as a void for art to fill, my claim is that this space can only
fulfil the task set for it when it is regarded as a hope-filled space; i.e., already filled
with the potentiality that misplacement can bring from both an artistic and a
theological perspective.
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate that I should quote Lawrence of Lady Chatterley’s
Lover fame, since Henry Fielding, who found himself courting, albeit less vociferous,
controversy with his great work, Tom Jones could also fairly be described as a
novelist who delights in walking away with the nail. Fielding’s artistic self-
consciousness allied to his endless store of ironic charm provides us, in Tom Jones,
with a work which sits well with Lawrence’s description of the novel form. In this
chapter, then, I shall examine Fielding’s subversive ethical vision.
Lawrence stated elsewhere that Fielding was one of the few novelists to attempt to
rescue the Old Man (meaning, of course, the scriptural ‘Old Adam’) from the clutches
of those religious autocrats who would seek to remove any reference to the flesh and
thus real life.
387 This is most obviously the case when we look at Tom Jones. The
subject matter – a bastard son is alienated both from his guardian, Squire Allworthy,
and Sophia, his one true love and, as a consequence, goes on a series of adventures
including several sexual dalliances – proved too much for the likes of Samuel
Richardson, who described it as ‘a dissolute book’.
388 Tom Jones is undoubtedly
‘earthy’, but it is this very earthiness which, paradoxically in Fielding’s hands,
exhibits its sublimity. This paradox is most apparent in Fielding’s discussions of
morality and religion. For the purposes of this chapter, I wish to concentrate on three
specific ethical motifs which occur in Fielding’s fiction, namely Prudence, Providence
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and the Law. Given Fielding’s own background as a magistrate, one can appreciate
the significance of an examination of his understanding of the law. Indeed, a number
of such studies have already been offered.
389 However, as, I hope is clear by now, the
present study does not wish to provide a purely historical analysis but, rather, a means
of discerning the deconstructive nature of Fielding’s artistic activity. With this
background in mind, it is important that we begin with a more fundamental
examination of Fielding’s ironic use of the terms Prudence and Providence in order to
illustrate his approach to morality or what he describes in his last novel, Amelia, as the
‘Art of Life’.
390
Prudence
Martin Battestin recognised long ago the ambivalent nature of the word “prudence” in
the hands of Fielding.
391 Even earlier, Hutchens made the point that, in Tom Jones,
‘the words “prudence”, “prudent”, and “prudential” are used unfavourably three times
to every one time they are used favourably.’
392 The original meaning of this, one of
the four cardinal virtues had, by Fielding’s day, acquired less wholesome nuances. It
had come to mean more than simply the ability to judge between virtuous and vicious
actions and had garnered connotations of a sly, political awareness which is self-
serving rather than selfless. So we find the chief villain of Tom Jones, Blifil,
exhibiting those particularly detestable aspects of modern prudence in the way he
ingratiates himself into the affections of the more traditionally prudent, yet clearly
unworldly, Allworthy.
And yet Fielding is well aware of the danger of simplifying moral behaviour. That is
one of the reasons, I believe, that he so ridiculed Richardson’s Pamela with his own
Shamela. For Fielding, Pamela does not learn prudence; she is in his mind therefore,
someone who remains shallow. He would rather she exhibited the kind of sleekit
nature or, as he describes it, ‘Vartue’, to be found in his parody of the Richardson
389 See, for example, Lance Bertelsen, Henry Fielding at Work: magistrate, businessman, writer
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000).
390 Amelia, 1.2.14.
391 Martin C. Battestin, The Providence of Wit (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 166-192.
392 Eleanor, N. Hutchens, Irony in Tom Jones (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1965), p. 101.182
heroine. This would, at least, introduce us to a human being – which of course is the
specific goal he sets himself in Tom Jones.
Indeed, it is this learning the value of prudence which serves as the goal that Fielding
sets Tom in his journey. Fielding knows that prudence, itself as well as Tom, is
subject to misuse and confusion and, in the novel, this ambivalence is stretched to its
limits. This can lead to the potential for what I describe as a moral misreading of the
text. A good example of this is found in the critical passage in which, Battestin
believes, Tom finally recognises the error of his ways – the apparent discovery that he
has committed incest. I would suggest, on the contrary, that even here at the nadir of
Tom’s exile, Fielding is playing with perceptions of morality:
‘Sure,’ cries Jones, ‘Fortune will never have done with me, ’till she hath
driven me to Distraction. But why do I blame Fortune? I am myself the
Cause of all my Misery. All the dreadful Mischiefs which have befallen
me, are the Consequences of my own Folly and Vice. What thou hast told
me, Partridge, hath almost deprived me of my Senses. And was Mrs
Waters then — But why do I ask? for thou must certainly know her. — If
thou hast any Affection for me; nay if thou hast any Pity, let me beseech
you to fetch this miserable Woman back again to me. O good Heavens!
Incest — with a Mother!’
393
Here, Battestin suggests, is the place where Tom finally grows up and assumes
responsibility. It is not Fortune that is to blame but himself. As Battestin puts it, ‘Here
is at once the climax and the resolution of the theme of prudentia in the novel.’
394
Though I understand why Battestin would wish to come to this conclusion, he seems
to have fallen into the trap that Lawrence believes awaits all ideological critics – the
desire to pin down the text. As a result, rather ironically, Battestin appears to have
missed the joke at the end of the last passage. Tom loudly wails, ‘Incest — with a
Mother!’ Here, Fielding is not, as Battestin seems to think, simply spelling out what
Tom thinks he has done, thereby pointing to the full horror of his situation. Nor is
Boucé correct when, in his analysis, he states:
393 Tom Jones, XVIII.ii.597.
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The harrowing experience of narrowly avoided incest is Fielding’s method
of forcing Tom to shed the grossest lusts of the flesh, and grasp in true
Platonic fashion the idea of love beyond its worldly image.
395
Rather, the reality Fielding wishes us to be aware of is that incest is incest is incest.
Whether it is with a mother is not the issue. Tom’s cry of dereliction, as Alter has
noted,
396 becomes the joke that bursts the melodramatic nature of the whole scene,
which Fielding, himself, describes in the chapter heading with his tongue firmly in his
cheek as ‘a very tragical Incident’. This heading, like so many others in Tom Jones, is
clearly another joke as it most likely refers back to Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the tragedy
that, earlier in the story, Tom and his eccentric companion, Partridge, had attended at
the Drury Lane Theatre. This comic connection is further enhanced by an awareness
of the parallel moral catastrophe of ‘incest’ committed between Hamlet’s uncle,
Claudius, and Gertrude, Hamlet’s mother.
Battestin has, in my view, misread the passage, and has seen what appears to be a
moral judgement against Tom. As a result, he has weakened the comedic effect, and
thereby the power of the narrative in illustrating the ridiculous nature of the human
condition. Fielding is by no means belittling the seriousness of incest, but he is, as the
overseer of his world, tipping the wink to us that even though Providence may have
failed, he has not. Thus, at this most critical point in the novel, the point of moral
realisation is never a final destination, but a means to further exploration. Fielding,
who saw the sole purpose of Tom Jones as a means to exhibiting HUMAN NATURE,
knows that, in the end, human nature defies final analysis. It is through comedy that
he is not only able to amuse us but to subvert those theological and moral constraints
under whose artificial yoke humanity cannot flourish. His desire in his earlier work,
Joseph Andrews, was to witness to the sublime by means of the ludicrous.
397 He is, as
a result, never prepared to close off any potential comedic avenue, regardless of the
sacredness of the subject matter.
395 Paul-Gabriel Boucé, ‘Sex, amours and love in Tom Jones’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 228, (1984), 25-38 (p. 37).
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We are left, then, with the question: Is there a moral purpose to Fielding’s fiction at
all? There are those who would answer in the affirmative. Take, for example, Arnold
Kettle who argues that Fielding is confident that the problems which confront society
can be ameliorated by ‘humane feeling and right reason’.
398 Can this truly be so? Can
we even agree with Michael Irwin when he suggests, ‘By the time Fielding came to
write, an ethical intention was essential to any serious writer and open exhortation
was commonplace.’?
399 Irwin is suggesting that Fielding merely falls into line with
the expected ethical dimension to fiction that Richardson and Defoe before him had
developed. But clearly, Fielding does not follow this line. If he did, would he have
received such vitriol from Richardson or Johnson?
In a desire to rehabilitate Fielding, Henry Knight Miller attempts to come to terms
with Fielding’s portrayal of Tom by arguing, ‘Impractical, immature, adolescent, even
absurd, such moral innocence has forever been felt as the rejuvenating impulse
without which society would stagnate and die.’
400 Such grand analysis, though well-
intentioned and, to a degree, cogent, is precisely the kind of deterministic thinking
that Fielding, the novelist, would eschew. Miller does recognise, though, that
Fielding’s innocence has an edge to it. It confronts corruption and can be overtaken by
it. In Miller’s words, ‘Innocence implies its opposite.’
401
Despite, or perhaps because of, Fielding’s full sceptical recognition that
fallen man – take him all in all – is an ambiguous being, not very strongly
deserving of the love of his equally dubious fellows…the persistent
emphasis of Tom Jones is upon love, the need for love, the necessity of
love, both as a freely offered gift and as a jewel worth striving for.
402
Damrosch Jr. succinctly offers his own view of the subtle range of Fielding’s ethical
approach:
398 Arnold Kettle, ‘Tom Jones’, in Fielding: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Ronald Paulson, p.
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In Richardson’s world you are either defiled or pure. In Fielding’s world
there are a few great sinners, not many saints, and a wide range of mortals
in between.
403
The point is that Fielding’s comic fiction is, indeed, ethically subversive. Such
subversion is actively found in the nature of the novel itself. To this end, as Hauerwas
has made clear, the new narrative medium of which Fielding was, of course, a
pioneer, becomes a crucible of lived human experience, which questions any
particular moral code while, at the same time as we experience the text, engenders a
morality of its own:
Thus the very act of reading of the novel is a moral training. By forcing
our eyes from one word to the next, one sentence to the next, one
paragraph to the next, we are stretched through a narrative world that
gives us the skills to make something of our own lives. To make
something of our own lives requires us being able to locate our own story
in an unfolding narrative so that we can go on […] Novels are the means,
though not the only means, to be sure, that we have to attain the skills of
locating and telling our individual stories, not as instances of some grand
schemes, but as uniquely ours.
404
What Hauerwas appears to be promoting in the above is that the narrative world
becomes a catalyst for our own lived experience. In this respect, the morality (or
immorality for that matter) found in a work of fiction is real to the extent that it can
become a training ground for our own individual moral development. And this moral
reality is not located in some metanarrative but in the very narrative that is placed
before us. The ethical component is grounded in the text itself and must be enfleshed
by the reader. To this extent, as I have already indicated earlier in this study, the novel
has a deeply sacramental nature. It is in the earthiness of the text that we encounter for
ourselves a moral aesthetic.
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The consequence of this is that morality itself, as we find it in the novel, is misplaced.
It is both fictive and, as Hauerwas has pointed out, deeply real. It lies in the text, but it
moves beyond the text into the lived experience of the reader.
All of the above finds contemporary resonance when Fielding himself argues in his
‘An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men’:
Good nature is that benevolent and amiable temper of mind, which
disposes us to feel the misfortunes, and enjoy the happiness of others; and,
consequently, pushes us on to promote the latter, and prevent the former;
and that without any abstract contemplation on the beauty of virtue, and
without the allurements or terrors of religion.
405
Once again, Fielding seeks to distance the experience of virtue from any fixed
metaphysical point and root it in the experience of the individual. This has led
Woodman to suggest that ‘the whole thrust of Fielding’s work is obviously towards
ignoring the niceties of doctrine and faith and concentrating on the broad dimension
of actively expressed love for one’s neighbour’.
406 Following this, and more
specifically, Ribble has argued that, for Fielding, ‘prudence is not cleverness that
happens to be applied to a good end, but a feeling for the end, a feeling for the
whole’.
407 Richard Holloway’s wry comment that ‘prudence wins, as it often does in
the religious calculus’,
408 is one with which Fielding would have some sympathy.
Indeed, given his last comment, above, regarding virtue and religion, one cannot help
harbouring the suspicion that, in his fiction, Fielding takes every opportunity to, in my
terminology, misplace those ethical or theological terms which, in his day, were
405 Henry Fielding, ‘An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men’, in Miscellanies Vol. I, ed.
by Henry Knight Miller, p. 158. There is some debate as to the extent to which Fielding owes his
understanding of ‘Good Nature’ to Lord Shaftesbury (1671-1713). Martin Battestin seeks to distance
Fielding from Shaftesbury’s deistic tendencies, but K. G. Simpson argues that Shaftesbury should be
placed more centre-stage in establishing Fielding’s moral compass. Martin Battestin, A Henry Fielding
Companion (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 132-133; K. G. Simpson, Henry Fielding:
Justice Observed (London: Vision and Barnes & Noble, 1985) pp. 56-74.
406 Thomas Woodman, ‘Tom Jones and Christian Comedy’, in Biblical Religion and the Novel, 1700-
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viewed as so secure that clerics and philosophers, like Thwackum and Square, could
never discuss without coming to blows.
Providence
“A man,” the Rabbi had said, “a poor man, found a fine horse upon the
road. ‘How fortunate you are,’ his friend said. ‘Well,’ the man said,
‘well, you never know.’ His son took the horse out to ride, and was
thrown, and was maimed. ‘How misfortunate you are,’ the friend said,
and the man said ‘Well, you never know.’ But the next day the recruiting
officers came round, to press the Jewish boys. Where they would go to
the Czar’s army to serve twenty-five years. But the man’s son was
maimed, and so he was spared. ‘How fortunate you are,’ his friend said,
and the man…”
409
A matter of equal importance to many of the early writers of fiction was that of
Providence. As I have already noted, in an age where human creativity in both the arts
and sciences was expanding along with the geographical boundaries of the known
world, the sense of a controlling benevolence was either looked to as a blessed
succour for those bewildered in this fast-changing world, or seriously questioned by
those who saw humanity’s future steering its own course.
In writing Robinson Crusoe, to offer an introductory example, Daniel Defoe desired
to ‘justify and honour the Wisdom of Providence’.
410 Such bold religious goals are
tempered by Defoe’s clear understanding of where he believes the root of true
suffering lies. G.A. Starr summarizes the position well when he states: ‘For Defoe, the
heart of darkness is man’s handiwork, not nature’s; the worst disasters have humans
not only as victims but also as perpetrators.’
411
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Defoe had already written about disaster, some years before Robinson Crusoe was
published. His work, The Storm (1704) describes the events surrounding a natural
disaster that struck Britain on 26/27 November 1703 in which around 8,000 people
lost their lives. In this work, Defoe challenges those who would refuse to accept the
providence of God in the whole sorry episode. Defoe may have had the storm in mind
when he writes of that which occurred off the Yarmouth coast in Robinson Crusoe.
412
Crusoe’s response to disaster in all its forms becomes a significant theme in the book
and, as a consequence, ought to impact upon our attempts to interpret the work.
It is, of course, a truism to state that ‘the problem of pain’, as C.S. Lewis encapsulated
it, is by no means a new human dilemma. Defoe’s contemporaries knew only too well
the transitory nature of the human condition. The question of providence in the face of
suffering was not a frivolous one.
413 There was a powerful connection between the
apparent arbitrary nature of the material world and a divine benevolence lying
somewhere in the background. Rogers has written: ‘In 1719 no living Englishman (or
woman) could have escaped the power of the religious word; it was the stuff of his
culture.’
414 Defoe was no different and I suggest that in Robinson Crusoe we find a
conscious, though obviously imperfect attempt to express such enduring questions of
existence. Crusoe’s ‘dismal island’ forms an isolated Eden where, ultimately, he not
only dominates the land but also learns to discipline his soul, which, as Halewood
puts it, ‘becomes his antagonist’.
415
Overall, Crusoe links his experience of suffering with his spiritual waywardness. His
conversion, though in some senses overly stylised, can also be regarded as a
significant staging post on his journey to reconcile that conundrum of providence in
the face of evil. Robinson sums up his experience thus:
412 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, ed. by Michael Shinagel (New York & London: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1994), pp.10-11.
413 Roy Porter informs us that, in the early eighteenth century, ‘maybe a fifth of all babies died in their
first year; perhaps one in three died – of gastro-enteric disorders and fevers – before the age of five’.
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In a word, as my Life was a Life of Sorrow, one way, so it was a Life of
Mercy, another; and I wanted nothing to make it a Life of Comfort, but to
be able to make my Sense of God’s Goodness to me, and care over me in
this Condition.
416
A helpful contrast with Defoe’s work, and one that can lead us to Fielding’s own
presentation of Providence, can be found in J.M. Coetzee’s Foe. Here, Coetzee
dispenses with the tract-like narrative which seeks to justify every act as somehow or
other part of God’s design. Susan Barton, the voice of the novel is a woman stranded
on the same island as Cruso and Friday. She discovers that Friday has, at some time,
had his tongue removed and wonders at the circumstances of such a horrible fate:
“It’s a terrible story,” I said. A silence fell. Friday took up out utensils and
retired into the darkness. Where is the justice in it? First a slave and now a
castaway too. Robbed of his childhood and consigned to a life of silence.
Was Providence sleeping?”
“If Providence were to watch over all of us,” said Cruso, “who would be
left to pick the cotton and cut the sugar-cane? For the business of the
world to prosper, Providence must sometimes wake and sometimes sleep,
as lower creatures do.” He saw I shook my head, so went on. “You think I
mock Providence. But perhaps it is the doing of Providence that Friday
finds himself on an island under a lenient master, rather than in Brazil,
under the planter’s lash, or in Africa, where the forests teem with
cannibals. Perhaps it is for the best, though we do not see it so, that he
should be here, and that I should be here, and now that you should be
here.”
417
Defoe’s repentant and God-fearing Crusoe is here replaced with Coetzee’s more
ambivalent (and interesting) Cruso who, instead of seeing his situation as an ordeal to
be overcome has been, instead, overtaken by the island he now cannot be separated
from and live. This Cruso is more prepared than his illustrious fictional predecessor to
accept the possibility that life is infused with frailty and ambiguity; in the one breath
416 Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, p. 132.
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he can state that Providence is asleep, in the next Providence is wide awake and
intervening in the lives of all three protagonists. It is here, I suggest, that Coetzee
offers us an example of Providence being misplaced. The word is being used in such a
way as to leave open the possibility of a broader field of meaning. We are led to the
space where literature and theology can fruitfully engage without prejudice. This
misplacement, I believe, is the strategy Fielding skilfully directs at the word
Providence in his own work.
An example from Tom Jones may aid us here. In the third chapter of Book 18,
Allworthy discovers that Tom is innocent of profligacy and has instead been robbed
of the £500 he had received on his expulsion from Allworthy. Fielding introduces the
discovery thus:
Here an Accident happened of a very extraordinary kind; one indeed of
those strange chances, whence very good and grave Men have concluded
that Providence interposes in the Discovery of the most secret Villainy, in
order to caution Men from quitting the Paths of Honesty, however warily
they tread in those of Vice.
418
Here the two ideas of Prudence and Providence are virtually conflated and both are
equally misplaced. At the outset, Fielding baldly uses the word ‘Accident’ to deflate
the pretensions of those who would wish to impose supernatural means upon the
natural activity of men. He uses the words ‘extraordinary’, ‘strange’ and ‘chance’ to
drive home the ordinariness of what has occurred. The equation of ‘good’ with
‘grave’ is illustrative of Fielding’s distaste for that theology which is too deterministic
and thus, for him, dead. He ‘walks away with the nail’ further in his assessment of the
apparent achievement of Providence. It is to ‘caution Men from quitting the Paths of
Honesty, however warily they tread in those of Vice’. In other words Providence and
Prudence (the act of ‘warily treading’) as mere theological or ethical notions have
little power to alter the hearts of those minded toward evil. What counts is the actual
behaviour of the individual under specific circumstances. How the individual travels
in life is, for Fielding, more significance than the principles he holds.
418 Tom Jones, XVIII.iii.600.191
It is this travelling that Tom is engaged in. He leaves Allworthy’s ‘Eden’ under
difficult circumstances and his journey becomes a movement from innocence to
experience – a departure from Paradise to encounter the world. It is in this journey, in
other words, where Tom himself becomes the embodiment of misplacement. Tom is,
at the hands of Fielding, providentially misplaced both geographically and socially.
However, the most significant providential misplacement is found at the level of his
own character.
Contrary to many critics of Tom Jones, I believe Fielding’s intention is to present us
with Tom (and thereby Human Nature) in all his complexity.
419 This complexity is not
developed in the same manner as, for example, Richardson, who, even if he did not
realise it, was, in Pamela and, more particularly, Clarissa, presenting to us vital
psychological portraits. Fielding, on the other hand, uses his skill as a comic director
to guide us to the conclusion that Tom is more than Johnson or Richardson assumed
him to be.
The development of character, for Fielding, thus becomes a misplaced providential
activity. This understanding of providence has little or nothing to do with the doctrine
that the individual has little or no control over his or her own destiny. Rather, it entails
the broader sense that all lived experience is, to a degree, ‘guided’ by lights that are
both benign and malevolent. In other words, the human experience of frailty becomes
the template upon which individual character is shaped. For Fielding, the recognition
of this fact is the means by which affectation and hypocrisy are avoided.
Such a misplaced providence chimes very well with Vattimo’s notion of a ‘weakening
of being’, discussed in Chapter 1. For the development of character in the novel is, to
a large degree a development of ontology. The ‘being’ of character and the ‘character’
of being are the essence of the providential act in a work of fiction. It is this
providential act that Fielding is most acutely aware of, and it is such awareness that
leads him to subvert the very notion of providence itself.
419 For example, Watt argues that, effectively, Fielding’s characters are sacrificed on the altar of plot.
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Having offered this broad assessment, we must recognise that Fielding does, however,
on occasion, become more explicit regarding his mode of characterisation:
Our modern Authors of Comedy have fallen almost universally into the
Error here hinted at: Their Heroes generally are notorious Rogues, and
their Heroines abandoned Jades, during the first four Acts; but in the fifth,
the former become very worthy Gentlemen, and the latter, Women of
Virtue and Discretion.
420
For a character to ‘work’ in fiction, he or she must not defy the potential for his or her
future to be undermined. Fielding’s subversive approach to prudence and providence
in the character of Tom, implies a sincere desire to reckon with him as a fragile
individual. Ironically, this sincere desire is best put into execution by the use of
comedy. So we find Fielding laughing at both providence and prudence as he displays
the threat that lies over his hero:
WHEN a comic writer hath made his principal characters as happy as he
can, or when a tragic writer hath brought them to the highest pitch of
human misery, they both conclude their business to be done, and that their
work is come to a period.
[…] But to bring our favourites out of their present anguish and distress,
and to land them at last on the shore of happiness, seems a much harder
task; a task indeed so hard that we do not undertake to execute it. In
regard to Sophia, it is more than probable that we shall somewhere or
other provide a good husband for her in the end—either Blifil, or my lord,
or somebody else; but as to poor Jones, such are the calamities in which
he is at present involved, owing to his imprudence, by which if a man doth
not become felon to the world, he is at least a felo de se; so destitute is he
now of friends, and so persecuted by enemies, that we almost despair of
bringing him to any good; and if our reader delights in seeing executions,
I think he ought not to lose any time in taking a first row at Tyburn.
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This I faithfully promise, that, notwithstanding any affection which we
may be supposed to have for this rogue, whom we have unfortunately
made our heroe, we will lend him none of that supernatural assistance
with which we are entrusted, upon condition that we use it only on very
important occasions. If he doth not therefore find some natural means of
fairly extricating himself from all his distresses, we will do no violence to
the truth and dignity of history for his sake; for we had rather relate that he
was hanged at Tyburn (which may very probably be the case) than forfeit
our integrity, or shock the faith of our reader.
421
Such irony is borne out of Fielding’s serious understanding of the operational frailties
surrounding notions such as Providence. As Rosengarten puts it:
Fielding believed that he lived in the theatre, if not of God’s glory, then of
God’s broadly encompassing activity. He was less certain, however, about
the degree to which confidence in God’s broad embrace of the world
could rest firmly on the events of daily life.
422
Rawson is surely correct when he states: ‘If Richardson makes his novel look like life,
Fielding is making life look like one of his novels.’
423 This comment, designed as it is
to point simply to Fielding’s overall authorial control of his creation, actually gets to
the heart of the matter in a way that Rawson may not have envisaged. The novelist
does create a real world in his fiction. What that world achieves is as real as any
achievement in the so-called ‘real’ world. Another way of describing this achievement
is misplacement.
Fielding is clear that, in the novel, anything approaching realism has to avoid the
fantastic but, at the same time, cannot ignore the equally pressing reality of the artistic
pulse to drive forward the creation. In other words, he is more than aware of the
creative tension that the novel form, by its very existence, cannot help but produce. It
is this creative tension allied to Fielding’s ironic mastery that inevitably stretches the
421 Tom Jones, XVII.i.569.
422 Richard A. Rosengarten, Henry Fielding and the Narration of Providence (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
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boundaries of language at all levels, and particularly, as we have seen, at those
‘sacred’ and ‘fixed’ levels of theology and morality.
Jurisprudence
“I would be loathe to speak ill of any man behind his back, but I believe
the gentleman is an attorney.”
Samuel Johnson
424
Compared with actions words have the disadvantage of carrying within
themselves the seeds of judgements.
425
Having been at pains to recognise in this study that I wish to avoid a purely socio-
historical approach to Fielding and his work, at this stage one cannot avoid asking
how the legal profession was generally regarded in the eighteenth century, not least
because of Fielding’s own professional engagement as a magistrate.
The place of the law in the eighteenth century was an ever-expanding though,
paradoxically, increasingly ambivalent one. As Porter makes clear, the general
perception of English Law as a means to promote individual liberty remained
unbowed.
426 But Leemings has suggested that it was precisely because of this
perceived ideal that many were led to criticize the current legal status quo.
427 Law-
making in general, by the middle of the period, had become a feverish activity. This,
allied to the plethora of local legislation demanded by the pressure of interest groups
or even individuals, inevitably led to a more opaque and less readily accessible
judicial system.
428 It is within this morass that the attorney was seen to do his work. It
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comes as no surprise, then, to discover that the lawyer was not universally adored.
This antipathy toward the lawyer was not, however, simply because of the legal mire
from which he plied his trade. Many people sincerely believed that those who
operated from the morass could not fail to be contaminated by it. Though the system
was ostensibly designed to provide security for all, it was clear that the propertied
stood more of a chance in litigation. Through the expansion of legal proceedings,
which inevitably involved property rights of all kinds, the lawyer came to be seen as,
not only a champion of the wealthy, but also to be criticized by those he aimed to
serve. Harding makes the point that an Act of 1732 disqualified from the office of
justice attorneys, solicitors and anyone not possessing an estate worth £100 a year.
429
Clearly this emphasised the vertical, paternalistic relationship played out particularly
in Fielding’s novels, between the magistrate and his ‘clientele’. As I shall show,
however, the cosy relationship envisaged in the rural communities did not reflect the
greater difficulties faced by those called to serve justice in the less clearly defined
metropolitan situations.
Having briefly outlined the historical milieu can we, at this point, apply a
deconstructive approach to Fielding’s assessment of the law? Is it possible to see, in
the way he presents the law in his fiction, a means to subvert the very stability the law
is meant to provide? As we shall see, there is, in Fielding, a complete recognition of
the potential weaknesses of individuals charged with a duty of care under the rule of
law. Can this ambivalence be extended to, not only the practice of law, but to the law
in and of itself? Can we discern in his fiction the tension that exists in presenting any
rule of law purely on the basis of a moral code?
In his essay, ‘The Law Wishes To Have A Formal Existence’, Stanley Fish offers two
points that are pertinent to our study here. The first of these is the importance of a
morally neutral legal code; the second, the equally significant recognition that the
exercise of law is itself a narrative activity. Amplifying the first of these points, Fish
argues that experience shows us, not only that there are competing moralities, but that
those very different moralities change over time. The result is obvious: ‘In short,
429 Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law (London: Penguin, 1966), pp. 267-8. Julian Hoppit
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many moralities would make many laws, and the law would lack its most saliently
desirable properties, generality and stability.’
430 Morality, in this regard, is not a boon
but a burden.
Fielding, a magistrate himself, is acutely aware of the risk of moral interest in the
exercise of the law and does not shrink from the negative light within which his
profession found itself. Indeed, as with most of his characters, he appears to delight in
displaying in his attorneys, magistrates and justices those very weaknesses which had
become the bane of so many people’s lives. We become particularly aware of the
moral bias that infects so much of the decision-making process. This is seen very
clearly in Joseph Andrews where the law has an important place throughout. In
relating her “History of Leonora”, Parson Adams’ companion in the coach speaks of
the Quarter Sessions, (courts which lasted two or three days, held to try small
offences):
‘It seems, it is usual for the young Gentlemen of the Bar to repair to
these Sessions, not so much for the sake of Profit, as to shew their Parts
and learn the Law of the Justices of the Peace: for which purpose one of
the wisest and gravest of all the Justices is appointed Speaker or
Chairman, as they modestly call it, and he reads them a Lecture, and
instructs them in the true Knowledge of the Law.’
‘You are here guilty of a little Mistake,’ says Adams, ‘which if you
please I will correct; I have attended at one of these Quarter Sessions,
where I have observed the Counsel taught the Justices, instead of
learning any thing of them.’
431
The ignorance of the justices is only comparable to their weakness for corruption, as
is evidenced in the character of the aptly named Justice Frolick, whose extreme
treatment of the poor is only tempered by the intervention of the local gentry.
432 In
Tom Jones, it is Squire Western acting as a country justice, who finds himself on the
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receiving end of Fielding’s wit. Tempted, on the instruction of his aggrieved sister, to
have Mrs Honour despatched to Bridewell, he is cautioned by his Clerk thus:
But luckily the Clerk had a Qualification, which no Clerk to a Justice of
Peace ought ever to be without, namely, some Understanding in the Law
of this Realm. He therefore whispered in the Ear of the Justice, that he
would exceed his Authority by committing the Girl to Bridewell, as there
had been no Attempt to break the Peace; ‘for I am afraid, Sir,’ says he,
‘you cannot legally commit any one to Bridewell only for Ill-
breeding.’
433
Even the saintly Allworthy ‘whose natural Love of Justice, joined to the Coolness of
Temper, made him always a most Patient Magistrate’,
434 is given a subtle censure
throughout the work, simply because of his blindness to the ways of the world and to
the variances of human nature. His most blatant mistake, of course, is that over Tom,
himself, and this continuing lack of judgement forms a major theme in the
presentation of what does and does not constitute a truly criminal act in the mind of
Fielding.
It is, however, the attorney who feels the full force of Fielding’s wrath. He points to
the exorbitant and apparently random nature of legal costs in a footnote:
This is a Fact which I knew happen to a poor Clergyman in Dorsetshire,
by the Villainy of an Attorney, who not content with the exorbitant
Costs to which the poor Man was put by a single Action, brought
afterwards another Action on the Judgement as it was called. A Method
frequently used to oppress the Poor, and bring Money into the pockets of
Attorneys, to the great Scandal of the Law, the Nation, of Christianity,
and even of Human Nature itself.
435
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The most obvious example of this scheming type is Lawyer Dowling in Tom Jones.
His complicity with the schemes of Blifil, who, as I have noted, is the clearest
personification of evil in the novel, speaks volumes as to Fielding’s thoughts
regarding the self-serving approach of members of the legal profession. Possibly the
ultimate accusation is offered by Fielding at the point where we last hear of the evil
Blifil. Here we find him conspiring with none other than an attorney to buy a seat in
Parliament.
436
What we witness in these passages is, not so much the censure of moral degradation
itself, but the misplacement of the law by the very presence of an amoral code. The
law gains its status as law by the absence of morality. Fish makes the point that ‘if one
can infer directly from one’s moral obligation in a situation to one’s legal obligation,
there is no work for the legal system to do’.
437 Fielding appears to recognise this in his
fiction and it forms the basis of the comic misplacement of the stability the law is
meant to provide.
Fish’s second point holds even more force for this study insofar as it recognises the
interpretative or, more accurately, narrative nature of the juridical process. He
describes the law as ‘a discourse continually telling two stories, one of which is
denying that the other is being told at all’.
438 That we find Fielding placing the activity
of the law within the context of a story, serves to enhance Fish’s point. The law as
narrative within narrative reveals an inherent instability which serves, not only as a
focus for comedy, but as a serious question mark upon the security of the decision-
making process. The comic misplacement that Fielding exercises in his fiction points
to the impossibility of complete justice, and the fact that any judicial activity has, at
all times, to confront fragile individuals who reveal their equally fragile idiosyncratic
narratives.
Such comic misplacement, if it does not have any moral root, clearly has a theological
one. In his important study, ‘Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’,
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Derrida hints at the transcendent nature of this thing called law. Calling on
Kierkegaard, Derrida states:
The instant of decision is a madness… This is particularly true of the
instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a
madness. Even if time and prudence, the patience of knowledge and the
mastery of conditions were hypothetically unlimited, the decision would
be structurally finite, however late it came, decision of urgency and
precipitation, acting in the night of non-knowledge and non-rule. Not of
the absence of rules and knowledge but of a reinstitution of rules which by
definition is not preceded by any knowledge or by any guarantee as
such.
439
Derrida’s dramatic point is that, in the moment of decision, there is both a conserving
and a destroying of the law. Each decision is made uniquely and, as such, cannot rest
on previous judgements, and, as a result, we come to the conclusion that the very act
of deciding is never truly made in a free and responsible manner in the present. We
are faced here with the dilemma of undecidability. As Derrida puts it:
A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not
be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or
unfolding of a calculable process.
440
Expanding upon this undecidability, Derrida points to the ambivalent position of the
individual before such a law. If the judicial process is beset by undecidability, in what
sense can an individual truly find themselves before the law? Derrida’s answer is to
present us with the paradox of the transcendent immanence of the law. The law is, in
his terms, always ‘to come’ (avenir), it is never completely established and, to this
degree, the individual can never be truly in contact with it. There must be a constant
presenting before the law which, in its turn, is constantly interpreted. The law and the
individual thus find themselves misplaced in order that justice may be carried out.
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Derrida, in his attempt to establish the transcendent nature of the law, quotes
Montaigne’s words: ‘Even our law, it is said, has legitimate fictions on which it
founds the truth of justice.’
441 This, of course, has resonance with the remarks that
Fish has made above regarding the narrative nature of the law.
How then, given the above, are we to assess how Fielding presents the individual
before the law? We recognise at once, of course, that criminality of one sort or
another lies at the heart of his major works of fiction. Jonathan Wild, as well as an
ironic treatise on ‘true greatness’, also serves as an extended, comical study of the
criminal/political mind. Joseph Andrews, along with Fanny and Parson Adams, is
brought before the justice in his particular adventure, while Tom Jones is taken for a
thief, and is generally considered a wayward soul. In Amelia, the threat of the court
and the debtor’s prison looms large.
Fielding’s novels thus entail an inquisitorial element. His purpose to present human
nature can, in this respect, be restated as an investigation-in-narrative into the
motivation and judgement of the characters in question. For, indeed, the characters are
in question. In their very creation they are being placed before the judgement seat. It
is important to recognise that the place of the individual before the law is not merely a
means to either reflect the historical situation (for example the notorious debtor’s
prison in Amelia), or to merely increase the tension in typically comic fashion towards
an ultimate release and resolution. Both of these more obvious factors do, of course,
inhere in the works of Fielding, however, it would be missing a further key element if
we were to avoid the misplacement of the individual before the law, that is, the
putting into question of the very character Fielding has created for us. The judgement
is not only part of the narrative; it reflects the deeper reality that judgement is the
narrative by which we find ourselves misplaced before the law.
The putting into question of character, paradoxically, removes from us the temptation
or obligation to judge. If character finds itself misplaced and under judgement, then
there can be no place for a judgemental attitude. Through narrative, then, not only is
the potential injustice of the law exposed, its very ontological nature is thus exploded.
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Returning to the dangerous story in John’s Gospel of the woman caught in adultery
mentioned in my first chapter, we can see that, in the narrative, both the accused and
those bringing judgement find themselves misplaced before the law. There is a
judgement here, but not the judgement those who bring the woman were expecting, or
possibly even hoping for. Those bringing the charge find themselves under judgement
and the accused is pardoned. Moreover, from this story, the law itself is misplaced
insofar as one assumes that the woman, for all the contrivances of her accusers, had a
case to answer (indicated by Jesus’s words ‘Go and sin no more’). The law here is
misplaced in that it is rendered impotent in the face of divine justice. It is just such
juridical misplacement that I believe Fielding offers us in his fiction. And, it is this
juridical misplacement which serves as a response to the tension that exists between
Fielding the magistrate and Fielding the novelist.
442 Let us now see how this is
worked out practically in Fielding’s fiction.
Martin Battestin has argued that the thematic motif of Joseph Andrews is the doctrine
of charity.
443 It is this notion of charity, he suggests, which governs Fielding’s overall
approach to the criminal and his prosecution. Such good-natured benevolence does
not imply any overtly liberal approach toward the treatment of the wrongdoer. One
need only examine Fielding’s own experience to see that one could not in any sense
call him ‘soft on crime’. He was known on occasion to keep his court open all night to
deal with exceptional numbers of miscreants.
444 His An Enquiry into the Causes of the
Late Increase of Robbers (1751) left the reader in no doubt as to both the reasons for
criminal activity and Fielding’s own Whig sensibilities. The increasing wealth
brought into London, he believed, removed the sense of responsibility from all layers
of society, inviting those of lower station to dare to assume to a higher one: ‘Each
rank in society is now emulating in expensive pleasures the next rank above.’
445 This
reckless aspiration, he argued, led to idleness and inevitably vice, be that gambling or
gin-drinking. Recognising the paternalistic nature of his approach, it seems, however,
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that the key expression in Fielding’s legal armoury was the recognition of
responsibility.
446
This key term allied to charity is played out dramatically, as I have shown, in Joseph
Andrews with a reworking of the Parable of the Good Samaritan.
447 It is worth noting
at the outset that the original story was, itself, prompted by a question from a lawyer:
‘Who is my neighbour?’
448 Following his own road to Jericho experience with the
bandits, the naked Joseph is grudgingly rescued by passengers on a passing coach.
The notion of responsibility is ironically sounded, once again, by a travelling lawyer
who argues that to pick up the helpless Joseph would, if Joseph later died, leave him
and his fellow passengers culpable of murder. The parallel notion of charity is,
however voiced by none of the well-to-do passengers but by the soon to be
transported postillion, who offers his great coat. That the whole company is
subsequently robbed by the same bandits emphasises the value of recognising the
needs of others as one’s own and that, to act accordingly, constitutes the good-natured
individual. Mercy and justice are bound together as are charity and responsibility. For
Fielding, here, it is not the crime which is the issue but how one responds to it.
Similarly, in Tom Jones, crime is presented in a rather stilted form in order to preserve
the intricacy of the plot. So Irwin argues, ‘What he [Fielding] regarded as vices could
be adequately represented by the ‘two-dimensional’ figures of the tradition of the
humours, but the ‘good’ he preached was an everyday charity and sympathy which
was not so glibly personified.’
449 In other words, Fielding is more interested in the
way so called ‘good’ characters behave in situations of difficulty. Tom Jones, though
not exactly a didactic novel, does have the explicitly confessed goal of sharing
Fielding’s view of human nature.
450 This is at its most explicit, of course, in the
relationship between Tom and Blifil. As I have noted, Blifil is the most thoroughly
evil character in the work but, even here, Fielding is less interested in showing the
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darkness of Blifil than in displaying the shades of grey which colour Tom’s life.
Fielding wishes us to be surprised with Allworthy at Tom’s benevolence toward
Blifil: “‘Child,’ cries Allworthy, ‘you carry this forgiving Temper too far.’”
451
Forgiveness is once more to the fore in an important passage from Joseph Andrews
where we see it subverted by Fielding as he places the foolish cleric, Barnabas, in the
difficult position of defining the very act he wishes to inculcate in the thought-to-be-
dying Joseph:
Mr Barnabas was again sent for, and with much difficulty prevailed on to
make another visit. As soon as he entered the room he told Joseph "He
was come to pray by him, and to prepare him for another world: in the
first place, therefore, he hoped he had repented of all his sins." Joseph
answered, "He hoped he had; but there was one thing which he knew not
whether he should call a sin; if it was, he feared he should die in the
commission of it; and that was, the regret of parting with a young woman
whom he loved as tenderly as he did his heart-strings." Barnabas bad him
be assured "that any repining at the Divine will was one of the greatest
sins he could commit; that he ought to forget all carnal affections, and
think of better things." Joseph said, "That neither in this world nor the
next he could forget his Fanny; and that the thought, however grievous, of
parting from her for ever, was not half so tormenting as the fear of what
she would suffer when she knew his misfortune." Barnabas said, "That
such fears argued a diffidence and despondence very criminal; that he
must divest himself of all human passions, and fix his heart above."
Joseph answered, "That was what he desired to do, and should be obliged
to him if he would enable him to accomplish it." Barnabas replied, "That
must be done by grace." Joseph besought him to discover how he might
attain it. Barnabas answered, "By prayer and faith." He then questioned
him concerning his forgiveness of the thieves. Joseph answered, "He
feared that was more than he could do; for nothing would give him more
pleasure than to hear they were taken." - "That," cries Barnabas, "is for the
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sake of justice." - "Yes," said Joseph, "but if I was to meet them again, I
am afraid I should attack them, and kill them too, if I could." -
"Doubtless," answered Barnabas, "it is lawful to kill a thief; but can you
say you forgive them as a Christian ought?" Joseph desired to know what
that forgiveness was. "That is," answered Barnabas, "to forgive them as—
as - it is to forgive them as - in short, it is to forgive them as a Christian." -
Joseph replied, "He forgave them as much as he could." - "Well, well,"
said Barnabas, "that will do." He then demanded of him, "If he
remembered any more sins unrepented of; and if he did, he desired him to
make haste and repent of them as fast as he could, that they might repeat
over a few prayers together." Joseph answered, "He could not recollect
any great crimes he had been guilty of, and that those he had committed
he was sincerely sorry for." Barnabas said that was enough, and then
proceeded to prayer with all the expedition he was master of, some
company then waiting for him below in the parlour, where the ingredients
for punch were all in readiness; but no one would squeeze the oranges till
he came.
452
The perfunctory nature of Barnabas’s dealings with Joseph not only reflects the lax
attitude of some clerics which Fielding, himself had condemned, but, more
significantly, and as we saw in Booth’s ‘conversion’, puts the whole notion of a
secure understanding of forgiveness and restitution into question. Once again, as in
the conversation cited earlier between Parson Adams and an innkeeper, it is alcohol
which calls a halt to any resolution. The spirit of true forgiveness is subverted by an
altogether more natural spirit. And yet, we are aware that, even here, some semblance
of what constitutes forgiveness is, in the case of Joseph himself, groped for.
453
Returning to Tom Jones, we recognise that our chief role is to observe and that such
observation involves discovery of ever deeper reservoirs of good nature in those who,
at first sight, seem worthy of nothing more than condemnation. Indeed, at the point of
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meeting between the redeemed Tom and the disgraced Blifil, Fielding seems less
interested in Blifil’s crime than in his response to the offer of forgiveness. He seems
to have little time for over-effusive expressions of regret:
Jones could not so far check his Disdain, but that it a little discovered
itself in his Countenance at this extreme Servility. He raised his Brother
the Moment he could from the Ground, and advised him to bear his
Afflictions more like a Man; repeating, at the same Time, his Promises,
that he would do all in his Power to lessen them.
454
The capacity for mercy in the face of the guilty is tempered, then, by an equal desire
for the penitent to act in a responsible fashion in the face of discovery – to grow up
and, in modern parlance, ‘face the music’.
Such a facing up to reality is reflected very much in Fielding’s last novel, Amelia.
Yet, even here the tension between the serious activity of the law and the novelist’s
ability to take liberties with it is in evidence. In the early paragraphs of Amelia we
find:
On the first of April, in the Year ───, the Watchmen of a certain Parish
(I know not particularly which) within the Liberty of Westminster, brought
several Persons they had apprehended the preceding Night, before
Jonathan Thrasher, Esq; one of the Justices of the Peace for that
Liberty.
455
In this paragraph, we are introduced, not to the omniscient narrator of Tom Jones, but
to a witness to events. Fielding places himself in the witness box and attempts to tell
the whole truth (for the law is a serious business) and nothing but the truth. That he
cannot precisely give the year or the exact location but reveals to us that the events
took place on April Fool’s Day, indicates Fielding’s ambivalent approach to even this,
the darkest of his novels.
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This said, Fielding does not stay in the witness box for long and, as we have earlier
noted, moves to interrogate his characters. In Amelia, it is Booth whom Fielding, as
barrister, seeks to defend:
We desire, therefore, the good-natured and candid reader will be pleased
to weigh attentively the several unlucky circumstances which concurred
so critically, that Fortune seemed to have used her utmost endeavours to
ensnare poor Booth's constancy. Let the reader set before his eyes a fine
young woman, in a manner, a first love, conferring obligations and using
every art to soften, to allure, to win, and to enflame; let him consider the
time and place; let him remember that Mr. Booth was a young fellow in
the highest vigour of life; and, lastly, let him add one single circumstance,
that the parties were alone together; and then, if he will not acquit the
defendant, he must be convicted, for I have nothing more to say in his
defence.
456
Fielding, in this passage, appears well aware of the risks he is running with the
material that he is presenting to his readership. Like any decent defence counsel, he
seeks to present mitigating circumstances for his client’s behaviour. That the self-
same barrister is responsible for the chain of events in the narrative process, serves to
leave the reader in a position of a misplaced judgement. Who is in the dock, Booth,
Fielding, or indeed the reader? The narrative leaves us unclear as to where ultimate
responsibility lies and, indeed, whether there is a charge to be defended in the first
place. Fielding, in other words, opens up the whole juridical process by gently
intruding as both novelist and defence counsel, and misplaces the legal edifice of
which we as jurors/readers play our part.
Fielding’s desire to see individuals grow up and assume responsibility goes beyond
the immediate socio-historical milieu in which he was writing. We, too, are implicated
in this misplaced legal process. From a purely historical perspective, it may be
legitimate to claim that Fielding’s interpretation of this coming to maturity is not
dependent upon destroying the system, but in recognising that it is there; and that
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individuals share a common responsibility before a legal system which, though
flawed, has the interests of the individual at its heart. Equally, we can suggest that, for
Fielding, liberty is best understood, in Miller’s words, as ‘a grant to the educated and
responsible members of society, and it carried with it the obligations of intelligent use,
restraint, and the recognition of an inherent scale of subordination’.
457 In other words,
‘growing up’ for Fielding means seeing things as they are and not as we would wish
them to be.
All of this has its place, but the far more significant ‘seeing things as they are’ is an
awareness that is based upon our ability to see things as they aren’t. In other words, as
we have previously indicated, the legal process is itself a narrative process. Fielding,
then, in his fiction provides us with, not only an awareness of the shades of grey
which make up the palette of the human condition, not least before the law, but
exposes the law itself to the misplacement of all processes borne out of frailty.
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Chapter Six
Measuring Mimesis and Misplacement: Realism, Rule and Revelation in Fielding
‘There’s no remaking reality’
Philip Roth
The Mimetic Heritage
Earlier in this study, we encountered in the work of Tobin the suggestion that
eighteenth-century readers greatly valued the expression and experience of reality that
was to be found particularly within the pages of the novel. The novelist, Clara Reeve
(1729-1807), spoke for many a lover of this new form when she offered the following
contrast:
The Romance is an heroic fable, which treats of fabulous persons and
things. The novel is a picture of real life and manners, and of the times in
which it is written. The Romance in lofty and elevated language, describes
what never happened nor is likely to happen. The novel gives a familiar
relation to such things, as pass every day before our eyes, such as may
happen to our friend, or to ourselves; and the perfection of it, is to present
every scene, in so easy and natural a manner, and to make them appear so
probable, as to deceive us into a persuasion (at least while we are reading)
that all is real, until we are affected by the joys and distresses of the
persons in the story, as if they were our own.
458
Reeve could easily have been paraphrasing William Congreve, who, in his Incognita
(1692), offered the same contrast noting that, unlike Romance, novels ‘come near us,
and represent to us intrigues in practice’.
459 More specifically, Reeve goes on to credit
Fielding’s achievements in this endeavour, noting that he ‘certainly painted Human
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Nature as it is rather than as it ought to be’.
460 Similarly, Elizabeth Carter, in a letter
to Catherine Talbot, sought to defend Tom Jones against those who compared it
unfavourably with Richardson’s Clarissa:
I am sorry to find you so outrageous about poor Tom Jones; he is no doubt
an imperfect, but not a detestable character, with all that honesty, good-
nature and generosity of temper. Though nobody can admire Clarissa
more than I do, yet with all our partiality, I am afraid, it must be
confessed, that Fielding’s book is the most natural representation of what
passes in the world, and of the bizarreries which arise from the mixture of
the good and bad, which makes up the composition of most folks.
461
For all that Fielding’s work was admired for its affecting realism, yet there were those
who saw in that same literary exercise, and in Tom Jones especially, an insidious
threat. Johnson’s view was clear enough; the presentation of reality was welcome
insofar as it held within it an educative and morally beneficial purpose. He appeared
committed to those ‘veridical elements in the constitution of the universe which are of
higher worth than gross and unselected reality itself’.
462 The subject matter of a work
like Tom Jones certainly, for Johnson, did not fit into that filtered category.
It is justly considered as the greatest Excellency of art, to imitate nature;
but it is necessary to distinguish those parts of nature, which are most
proper for imitation: greater care is still required in representing life,
which is so often discoloured by passion, or deformed by wickedness. If
the world be promiscuously described, I cannot see of what use it can be
to read the account.
463
Johnson’s view, here, appears to be part of a wider interpretative strategy of suspicion
whereby imagination can, if left unchecked, have dangerous consequences:
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There is no man whose imagination does not sometimes predominate over
his reason, who can regulate his attention wholly by his will, and whose
ideas will come and go at his command. No man will be found in whose
mind airy notions do not sometimes tyrannize, and force him to hope or
fear beyond the ability of sober probability. All power of fancy over
reason is a degree of insanity; but while this power is such as we can
control and repress, it is not visible to others, nor considered as any
depravation of the mental faculties: it is not pronounced madness but
when it becomes ungovernable, and apparently influences speech and
action.
464
Doubtless, Johnson here, as Greene comments, is not deprecating the imaginative
faculty out of hand.
465 After all, Johnson’s own Rasselas (1759) is itself a work of
imagination. There was room in the neo-classicist’s critical arsenal for what Pope, in
his Essay on Criticism (1709), described as ‘a grace beyond the reach of art’; in other
words, the stroke of genius. What had to be kept in mind was that, for the neo-
classicists at least, such genius was comparatively rare (and probably absent from
contemporary art). The maxim of Horace: ‘Art that hides art’ was the watchword, and
therefore art was regarded never solely for its own sake, but for the sake of humanity.
Any attempt to move beyond these classical confines was to be resisted.
From the passage in Rasselas quoted above, however, one cannot but harbour the
nagging sense that Johnson has more in mind than the intellect being exposed to the
risk of mere madness. The first sentence itself leaves us with the distinct impression
that reason and imagination are almost to be regarded as separate aspects of the
human intellectual framework – a little like the perennial tension between Apollo and
Dionysius. Imagination has to be held in check, for otherwise what has hitherto been
hidden or secured, may be let loose. The imagination is not safe. It therefore must be
somehow domesticated in order that it be of service to the sensibilities of right-
thinking people. Imagination thus ought never to run riot. In so saying, Johnson is
typical of critics of the period who sought to define empirically that which was
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worthy of reflection or representation in art. The mirror must be selectively held up to
the world in order that only those pleasant and beautiful components may legitimately
be reflected therein.
In this chapter, I wish to argue for a less prescriptive approach to the apprehension
and execution of mimesis as witnessed in the novels of Fielding, and I also seek to
indicate the key role of imagination in the creation, not only of the novel form, but
also, by extension, the literary canon itself. At first glance, this latter desire may seem
somewhat unambitious in that the role imagination plays in any artistic creation is
regarded as fundamental. As I hope to show, however, Fielding is deeply aware of the
potential subversion that takes place in the act of representation, and it is this
subversion driven by the imagination which actually leads us beyond the mere
imitative to the heart of the novel’s function as a new creation. Ultimately, this new
creation holds within it the means to both define and destroy what we understand as
canonicity, and it is at this point where we discern the novel’s sacramental nature. For
the novel, like a sacrament pointing both to the human and divine nature of reality,
holds the elemental and transcendental in a mutual tension within which each has the
potential to subsume the other. In all of this, we are also inevitably faced with the
question as to the nature and scope of revelation. Can we, indeed, recognise some
active revelation in a fictional narrative and, as a result, reach toward some
understanding of the nature of Fielding’s God? Let us, first of all, trace some
examples within Fielding’s fiction which indicate for us his awareness of the danger
of the mimetic act.
Fielding’s Mischievous Mimesis
Fielding, the dramatist, was no doubt conscious of Hamlet’s definition of playing
‘whose end, both at the first, and now, was, and is, to hold, as ‘t were, the mirror up to
nature’ (Hamlet III. 2), and was more than aware of the pedigree of the mimetic
analogy and its discriminatory usage. However, this awareness does not prohibit
Fielding from suspecting it as merely a laudable but ultimately flawed attempt to
present reality to us. For example, in the dénouement to Tom Jones, we find Sophia212
and Tom at last together and Tom attempts to alleviate any anxiety she may have
regarding his fidelity:
‘After what is past, Sir, can you expect I should take you upon your
Word?’
He replied, ‘Don't believe me upon my Word; I have a better security, a
Pledge for my Constancy, which it is impossible to see and to doubt.’
‘What is that?’ said Sophia, a little surprised. ‘I will show you, my
charming Angel,’ cried Jones, seizing her Hand and carrying her to the
Glass. ‘There, behold it there in that lovely Figure, in that Face, that
Shape, those Eyes, that Mind which shines through those Eyes: can the
Man who shall be in Possession of these be inconstant? Impossible! my
Sophia; they would fix a Dorimant, a Lord Rochester. You could not
doubt it, if you could see yourself with any Eyes but your own.’ Sophia
blushed and half smiled; but, forcing again her Brow into a frown, ‘If I am
to judge,’ said she, ‘of the future by the past, my Image will no more
remain in your Heart when I am out of your Sight, than it will in this Glass
when I am out of the Room.’ ‘By Heaven, by all that is sacred,’ said
Jones, ‘it never was out of my heart. The Delicacy of your Sex cannot
conceive the Grossness of ours, nor how little one Sort of Amour has to do
with the Heart.’ ‘I will never marry a man,’ replied Sophia, very gravely,
‘who shall not learn refinement enough to be as incapable as I am myself
of making such a distinction.’ ‘I will learn it,' said Jones. ‘I have learnt it
already.’
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Fielding, in this passage, is toying with the empirical notion of the mimetic so popular
in the eighteenth century. What at first glance appears to be a tender scene of
reconciliation framed by the metaphor of the glass is, on closer inspection, a more
complex and subversive encounter. Those critics, such as Johnson, who wished to
hold up to the artistic mirror those worthy elements of reality – beauty and truth –
would, of course, be delighted by the surface imagery adopted by Fielding here. The
beautiful and wise Sophia (the very personification of wisdom), is placed before the
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mirror. She, rather than the mere promise of Tom, is to be the real guarantee of
faithfulness and true love. Tom’s fragile word is sublimated by the substance of
Sophia, herself. It is her image that sets in relief and subsequently destroys the
‘grossness’ which has hitherto clouded Tom’s journey. Framed in the mirror, she
becomes an icon of Tom’s sanctification.
But she also blushes and half smiles! No icon ever exhibited such behaviour. Sophia,
the indomitable Sophia, has a little streak of vanity. And that is all it takes to crack a
plaster saint. For, of course, that is in many respects what Sophia is. Once again
Fielding explodes the very image he elaborately sets up. But this should not surprise
us, particularly with regard to Sophia. Take, for example, Fielding’s introduction to
Tom’s belovèd:
HUSHED be every ruder Breath. May the Heathen Ruler of the Winds
confine in iron Chains the boisterous Limbs of noisy Boreas, and the
sharp-pointed Nose of bitter-biting Eurus. Do thou, sweet Zephyrus, rising
from thy fragrant Bed, mount the western Sky, and lead on those delicious
Gales, the Charms of which call forth the lovely Flora from her Chamber,
perfumed with pearly Dews, when on the first of June, her Birth-day, the
blooming maid, in loose Attire, gently trips it over the verdant Mead,
where every Flower rises to do her Homage, till the whole Field becomes
enamelled, and Colours contend with Sweets which shall ravish her most.
So charming may she now appear; and you the feather’d Choristers of
Nature, whose sweetest Notes not even Handel can excel, tune your
melodious Throats to celebrate her Appearance. From Love proceeds your
Music, and to Love it returns. Awaken therefore that gentle Passion in
every Swain; for lo! adorned with all the Charms in which Nature can
array her; bedecked with Beauty, Youth, Sprightliness, Innocence,
Modesty, and Tenderness, breathing Sweetness from her rosy Lips, and
darting Brightness from her sparkling Eyes, the, lovely Sophia comes.
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One can easily recognise the irony in this apparently sublime overture. But just in case
it is lost on his reader, Fielding follows up his overblown panegyric with this:
Sophia then, the only Daughter of Mr Western, was a middle sized
Woman; but rather inclining to tall.
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Given this particular turn from the prosaically sublime to the sublimely prosaic, it is
hard to believe that Fielding has perennially found himself accused of flat
characterisation. Either, it is argued, his characters are considered too easily drawn
from real life:
Parson Young sat for Fielding’s Parson Adams, a man he knew, and only
made a little more absurd that he is known to be. In his Tom Jones, his
hero is made a natural child, because his own first wife was such. Tom
Jones is Fielding himself, hardened in some places, softened in others. His
Lady Bellaston is an infamous woman of his former acquaintance. His
Sophia is his first wife. Booth, in his last piece, again himself; Amelia,
even to her noselessness, is again his first wife.
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or they are accused of merely being coarse representations, so Mrs Thrale could
remark that ‘Richardson had picked the kernel of life…while Fielding was contented
with the husk’.
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Such a critique fails to contend, not only with the consistent artful irony at play in
Fielding’s work, but also with the crucial recognition by Fielding of the plasticity of
character itself. Indeed, it is surely not an overstatement to suggest, as Korshin has
done, that Fielding thought more about the nature of character than any other
eighteenth-century writer.
471 He was clearly aware of the tension between
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representation of character and the production of stock types. So, with his tongue set
firmly in his cheek, we hear him argue in the Preface to Joseph Andrews:
And here I solemnly protest, I have no Intention to vilify or asperse any
one: for tho’ every thing is copied from the Book of Nature, and scarce a
Character or Action produced which I have not taken from my own
Observation and Experience, yet I have used the utmost Care to obscure
the Persons by such different Circumstances, Degrees, and Colours, that it
will be impossible to guess at them with any degree of Certainty.
472
The example of Sophia, above, surely serves as testimony to Fielding’s ability to
mock his own creation while, at the same moment, exhibiting an acute awareness of
the slippage that takes place between the presentation of character and the elusive
reality it is intended to emulate. One cannot escape the implication that, in the
passages in Tom Jones cited above, an assault is being carried out, not only upon
novelistic hagiography (Samuel Richardson’s Pamela being the obvious target), but
also upon the very notion of mimesis itself. Fielding is asking us the question
whether, regardless of the source of artistic expression, be it in the empirical or the
transcendental sphere, can we in all honesty represent anything? The analogy of the
mirror holds within it fundamental epistemological and artistic concerns. Do we, in
the end, inevitably behave in the way Sophia accuses Tom of behaving, that is, of just
as easily forgetting the image when out of the room or away from the glass? In other
words, is the temptation with this particular approach to a work of art that individual
artistic expression (i.e., imagination), is sacrificed upon the altar of verisimilitude?
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Sophia’s question: ‘Can you expect I should take you upon your Word?’ takes upon
itself a significance far beyond the immediate domestic context.
It appears then, in this respect, that Fielding finds himself ahead of his time and,
though for differing reasons, is in broad agreement with Oscar Wilde, whose own
high view of Art as Art led him to deprecate the entire naturalist assumption:
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Art is our spirited protest, our gallant attempt to teach Nature her proper
place…Art itself is really a form of exaggeration; and selection, which is
the very spirit of art, is nothing more than an intensified mode of over-
emphasis…Art, breaking from the prison-house of realism, will run to
greet [the liar], and will kiss his false, beautiful lips, knowing that he
alone is in possession of the great secret of all her manifestations, the
secret that Truth is entirely and absolutely a matter of style…She is a veil,
rather than a mirror.
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Wilde, of course, is following on in the romantic tradition of seeking to disengage
with the empiricist approach to language which says what it means and means what it
says. David Shaw makes this point in his study, The Lucid Veil:
I prefer the metaphor of the lucid veil to that of the mirror of nature
because by suggesting a norm of transparent knowing that is in practice
rare, the mirror blunts the force of Wittgenstein’s insight that ‘we
predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it’. […]
Indeed, transparency is a limit, and when the mind reaches that limit the
metaphor breaks down.
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In this chapter, therefore, I do not wish to remain on the transparent ground that
Johnson uses to fight his argument. Johnson, through a combination of his own
empiricist analysis of the artistic act, coupled with a robust moral sense, places too
much emphasis upon the outward and ethical issues apparently thrown up in the likes
of Tom Jones. He seems more interested in the risks that may befall those youths who
read for pleasure rather than actively engaging with the text as it is. Reflecting upon
Wilde’s comments above, we can clearly discern that Johnson is either unaware of, or
chooses to ignore the ‘unnatural’ aspects of his own natural selection.
However, in so describing the imitation of nature as the mark of excellence in art,
Johnson does offer us an instructive way in to what I consider to be a more
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fundamental question, namely the relationship between mimesis and misplacement;
that is, as we have indicated, the slippage that occurs in any attempt to present the
truth. Doubtless, questions of morality are implicated in such an approach, not least
because morality, in and of itself, is a ‘real’ phenomenon insofar as its execution at
the personal or, more particularly, institutional level can have immediate and tangible
effects upon an individual. Such moral judgement inevitably becomes subject to the
very ambiguity I am bearing witness to in my thesis (as we saw in Chapter 5).
My broader aim in the current chapter is to discover how Fielding, in his fiction,
presents reality to us. It is, of course, vitally important that we recognise that the term
‘realism’ did not have the currency in Fielding’s day that it was to have in the
nineteenth century. Fielding’s desire to present HUMAN NATURE in Tom Jones is,
for example, very different from that of George Eliot who, in Adam Bede, makes clear
her realist manifesto:
‘This Rector of Broxton is little better than a pagan!’ I hear one of my
lady readers exclaim. ‘How much more edifying it would have been if you
had made him give Arthur some truly spiritual advice. You might have put
into his mouth the most beautiful things – quite as good reading as a
sermon.’
Certainly I could, my fair critic, if I were a clever novelist, not obliged to
creep servilely after nature and fact, but able to represent things as they
never have been and never will be. Then, of course, my characters would
be entirely of my own choosing, and I could select the most
unexceptionable type of clergyman, and put my own admirable opinions
into his mouth on all occasions. But you must have perceived long ago
that I have no such lofty vocation, and that I aspire to give no more than a
faithful account of men and things as they have mirrored themselves in
my mind. The mirror is doubtless defective; the outlines will sometimes
be disturbed, the reflection faint or confused; but I feel as much bound to
tell you, as precisely as I can, what that reflection is, as if I were in the
witness-box narrating my experience on oath.
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Eliot adopts a juridical allegory to emphasize her dependence upon what she regards
as the faithful and true witness to events in the real world. The oath she pronounces
refers, one assumes, to the swearing of a witness upon a Bible – an arresting analogy
given Eliot’s own theological background. Fielding, however, makes no such
dramatic plea. There is less urgency in Fielding’s presentation of mimesis. The Bill of
Fare metaphor that Fielding adopts in the opening of Tom Jones is testimony enough
to his less intense approach to the execution of his new species of writing. If it can be
put this way, there is less evangelical fervour about Fielding’s representation of
reality. Johnson and Eliot, in their varying ways, share the same missionary zeal for
their respective understandings of realism. Johnson values the importance of
traditional religious (Anglican) moral virtue above tawdriness, while Eliot prizes ‘the
supersession of God by Humanity, of Faith by Love and Sympathy, the elimination of
the supernatural, the elevation of the natural, the subordination of intellect to heart,
thought to feeling’.
477 Both Johnson and Eliot harbour a crusading spirit in the
promotion of their respective positions. Fielding does not share the same passion in
his presentation of reality. This is because he is presciently aware of the artistic deceit
which, over two hundred years later, William H. Gass describes so vividly:
In every art two contradictory impulses are in a state of Manichean war:
the impulse to communicate and so treat the medium of communication as
a means and the impulse to make an artefact out of the materials and so to
treat the medium as an end.
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The novel, for Fielding, has a pedigree in the epic form, but it also shares with
romance a less refined heritage. The presentation of reality in the form he describes as
the comic-epic poem in prose, cannot but take less seriously its own ability to offer a
sense of reality that is not exposed by its own artificiality. And yet, there is, in this
very recognition, a sense of the importance of this artistic impossibility. Returning to
the Bill of Fare metaphor we find this intriguing and amusing statement:
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In reality, true Nature is as difficult to be met with in Authors as the
Bayonne Ham or Bologna Sausage is to be found in the Shops.
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Here, Fielding is, of course, directly attacking the writers of vulgar Romance. He does
not want his work to be mistaken for cheaper forms of entertainment. The question
remains, though, as to whether Fielding regarding himself as their superior actually
succeeds where they had patently failed. I would argue that the placement of this
question in the centre of a metaphoric trope indicates less than complete confidence in
the mimetic project.
My suggestion, then, is that the reality we are presented with in Fielding is not the
reality that Johnson or Eliot would wish it to be. Yet, ultimately, it is not the reality
Fielding wishes it to be either. My contention is that, in Fielding’s fiction, his
celebrated realism exposes, not only the glorious fragility of the human condition, but
the entire mimetic façade itself. Mimesis fails to point to reality. It becomes merely a
self-reflecting rhetorical device. Mimesis, as an activity, is, rephrasing the Buddhist
expression, like pointing at God and merely focussing on one’s finger. The reality is
far greater than that which seeks to illustrate it. And yet, paradoxically, as Ortega has
written, ‘the real things do not move us but their representation – that is to say, the
representation of their reality – does.’
480 Representations of reality are,
simultaneously, all and nothing. They are the artistic sacraments formed of the stuff of
the earth but which point to the unearthly.
How then do we illustrate this contention from the work of Fielding himself? I believe
we must begin with Fielding’s naming of his own creation. In this nominative strategy
we find both a connection with mimetic tradition and a desire to move beyond it. We
begin, then, with his fundamental artistic self-assessment in the preface to Joseph
Andrews where he describes the work as a ‘comic-epic poem in prose’. Such an
epithet bears witness, not only to Fielding’s awareness of his indebtedness to the
mimetic heritage, but also to his implicit desire to reframe his creation according to
his own lights. The result is a work of art which is both self-conscious and, at the
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same time, hermeneutically unconstrained. Within this initial self-assessment we find
a fundamental strategy at work, that of literary misplacement.
Literary Misplacement
Fielding frequently punctuates his comic novels with references to writers of antiquity
or others in the contemporary canon, in order to confirm his own position or to
expound upon the situation of a particular character. Thus, we find him (in mockery
of those who believe the age of genius is passed) calling on the muse of Genius to aid
him in his labours:
Whose Assistance shall I invoke to direct my Pen?
First, Genius; thou Gift of Heaven; without whose Aid in vain we struggle
against the Stream of Nature. Thou who dost sow the generous Seeds
which Art nourishes, and brings to Perfection. Do thou kindly take me by
the Hand, and lead me through all the Mazes, the winding Labyrinths of
Nature. Initiate me into all those Mysteries which profane Eyes never
beheld. Teach me, which to thee is no difficult Task, to know Mankind
better than they know themselves. Remove that Mist which dims the
Intellects of Mortals, and causes them to adore Men for their Art, or to
detest them for their Cunning in deceiving others, when they are, in
Reality, the objects only of ridicule, for deceiving themselves. Strip off
the thin Disguise of Wisdom from Self-Conceit, of Plenty from Avarice,
and of Glory from Ambition. Come, thou that hast inspired thy
Aristophanes, thy Lucian, thy Cervantes, thy Rabelais, thy Molière, thy
Shakespeare, thy Swift, thy Marivaux, fill my Pages with Humour, till
Mankind learn the Good-Nature to laugh only at the Follies of others, and
the Humility to grieve at their own.
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Ostensibly, Fielding’s plea fits well with traditional Augustan humility before the
arduous task of the artist, whose responsibility is to reflect the glory of Nature,
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herself. Yet, the awareness of his connectivity with these literary giants past and
present (Marivaux was still living at the publication of Tom Jones), sets himself apart
and above these to a position of even greater glory. This calling upon the muse is the
joke of the comic who reckons rightly the greatness of the task and that the true
source of genius lies, not in the lap of the gods, but in his own hands.
So, for example, we hear Mrs Fitzpatrick, in conversation with Sophia, lamenting her
solitude and finding solace in literature:
‘At length, my Friend was removed from me, and I was again left to my
Solitude, to the tormenting Conversation with my own Reflections, and to
apply to Books for my only Comfort. I now read almost all day long. –
How many Books do you think I read in three Months?’ ‘I can’t guess,
indeed, Cousin,’ answered Sophia. – ‘Perhaps half a Score!’ ‘Half a
Score! half a Thousand, Child,’ answered the other. ‘I read a good deal in
Daniel’s English History of France; a great deal in Plutarch’s Lives; the
Atlantis, Pope’s Homer, Dryden’s Plays, Chillingworth, the Countess
D’Anois, and Lock’s Human Understanding.’
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The adoption of this particular tactic does, of course, reinforce the sense of ‘reality’
in the work as a whole - the reference to ‘real’ works of literature within the story
serving to concretize the action by immediate and relevant reference to an ‘existing’
tradition (in this case a literary canon of sorts). But in Fielding’s hands, this ‘fiction
within a fiction’ strategy carries a greater significance. The above example hides
within it an awareness of the limitations of literature. Such wide reading has not
served Harriet Fitzpatrick well. Though she considers herself one who has
‘Understanding equal to the wisest and greatest of the other Sex’, Harriet finds all
such knowledge superfluous in the perilous choice of a lover. In Fielding, as Alter has
pointed out, we find ourselves moved ‘toward an awareness of the different
possibilities of representing reality than toward a simple assent to the authority of an
art more verisimilar than the conventional sort’.
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Fielding provides us with a similar theological example in the earlier Shamela (1741),
where we hear Parson Tickletext proclaim of Pamela:
Happy would it be for Mankind, if all other Books were burnt, that we
might do nothing but read thee all Day, and dream of thee all Night. Thou
alone art sufficient to teach us much Morality as we want. Dost thou not
teach us to pray, to sing Psalms, and to honour the Clergy? Are not these
the whole Duty of Man? Forgive me, O Author of Pamela, mentioning the
Name of a Book so unequal to thine.
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The name dropped here, of course, is most likely the divine, Richard Allestree (1619-
81), whose Whole Duty of Man (1658) was a hugely influential spiritual guide of the
period and for many years to come. That Fielding chose to place this almost sacred
work alongside his racy Shamela, enhances both the sense of shock but also,
paradoxically, the awareness of the text as found in exactly the context that
Richardson himself surely sought for the ‘official’ Pamela.
All of this points to Fielding’s comic novels as works of metafiction - that self-
conscious and self-deprecating literature which displays its wares and is prepared to
have them exposed as fraudulent or shoddy. As Patricia Waugh states:
Metafictional novels tend to be constructed on the principle of a
fundamental and sustained opposition: the construction of a fictional
illusion (as in traditional realism) and the laying bare of that illusion. In
other words, the lowest common denominator of metafiction is
simultaneously to create a fiction and to make a statement about the
creation of that fiction.
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Waugh, here, has in her sights modernist and postmodernist fiction. She argues that
the post–war climate cleared away many of the assumptions and certainties taken for
granted by previous literary generations. The resultant anxiety was to produce art
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which testified to the epistemological frailty now endemic within society. In so
arguing, she does acknowledge, however, that all fiction can be seen as metafictive
for ‘the language of fiction is always, if covertly, self-conscious’.
486 I would argue
that Henry Fielding was as aware as any artist could be of the tension that Waugh
describes. The ‘textuality’ of Fielding’s comic fiction provides us with evidence of
Fielding’s awareness of the deceit he is prepared to carry out in the presentation of a
reality within reality. The comic text becomes in Fielding the proving ground for
fiction. This ‘proving’ has within it, of course, the sense of ‘testing’ but it also
harbours the more significant possibility of ‘rebuttal’.
This double sense of proving is found in a further and most distinctive example of
literary misplacement concerning the inimitable Parson Adams and his (only?)
constant ‘companion’ – his copy of Aeschylus. In the following passage we discover
Adams (and Aeschylus) before the magistrate:
The Clerk now acquainted the Justice, that among other suspicious things,
as a Penknife, &c., found in Adams's Pocket, they had discovered a Book
written, as he apprehended, in Ciphers: for no one could read a Word in it.
‘Ay,’ says the Justice, ‘this Fellow may be more than a common Robber,
he may be in a Plot against the Government. - Produce the Book.’ Upon
which the poor Manuscript of Æschylus, which Adams had transcribed
with his own Hand, was brought forth; and the Justice looking at it, shook
his Head, and turning to the Prisoner, asked the Meaning of those Ciphers.
‘Ciphers!’ answered Adams, ‘it is a Manuscript of Æschylus.’ ‘Who?
who?’ said the Justice. Adams repeated, ‘Æschylus.’ ‘That is an outlandish
Name,’ cried the Clerk. ‘A fictitious Name rather, I believe,’ said the
Justice. One of the Company declared it looked very much like Greek.
‘Greek!’ said the Justice; ‘why 'tis all Writing.’ ‘Nay,’ says the other, ‘I
don't positively say it is so: for it is a very long time since I have seen any
Greek. There's one,’ says he, turning to the Parson of the Parish, who was
present, ‘will tell us immediately.’ The Parson, taking up the Book, and
putting on his Spectacles and Gravity together, muttered some words to
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himself, and then pronounced aloud – ‘Ay indeed it is a Greek
Manuscript, a very fine piece of Antiquity. I make no doubt but it was
stolen from the same Clergyman from whom the Rogue took the
Cassock.’ ‘What did the Rascal mean by his Æschylus?’ says the Justice.
‘Pooh!’ answered the Doctor with a contemptuous Grin, ‘do you think that
Fellow knows anything of this Book? Æschylus! ho! ho! ho! I see now
what it is - A Manuscript of one of the Fathers. I know a Nobleman who
would give a great deal of Money for such a Piece of Antiquity. - Ay, ay,
Question and Answer. The Beginning is the Catechism in Greek. - Ay, -
ay, Pollaki toi - What's your Name?’ – ‘Ay, what's your name?’ says the
Justice to Adams, who answered, ‘It is Æschylus, and I will maintain it.’ –
‘O! it is,’ says the Justice; ‘make Mr. Æschylus his Mittimus. I will teach
you to banter me with a false Name.’
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While it is ostensibly Adams in the dock, the text, too, finds itself accused.
Paradoxically, however, the text of Aeschylus, even as it is being judged or defined,
in actuality becomes itself, a ‘defining’ character. From being progressively described
as a threat against the crown to a valuable but stolen artefact to being mistaken for
Adams himself, the text is continuously misunderstood and misplaced. However, at
the same moment, the text is able to clearly and succinctly define those who seek to
accuse it. Thus, the judge becomes no more than an ignorant boor; the clerk, a
sycophantic pedant; the parson, a hypocritical ignoramus; the doctor, a pompous
materialist. All four find themselves judged by the very text they seek to judge.
This textual judgement, of course, applies as much to Adams himself, throughout
Joseph Andrews where we find that Aeschylus determines him as the well-meaning,
lovable but quixotic cleric that he is. Following Joseph and Fanny’s reunion, during
the course of which, in order to minister aid to Fanny, Adams, absently throws his
Aeschylus into the fire, we are presented with the option of observing either the
lovers’ ardour or Adams’ own idiosyncratic capers:
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If Prudes are offended at the Lusciousness of this Picture, they may take
their Eyes off from it, and survey Parson Adams dancing about the Room
in a Rapture of Joy. Some Philosophers may perhaps doubt whether he
was not the happiest of the three; for the Goodness of his Heart enjoyed
the Blessings which were exulting in the Breasts of both the other two,
together with his own. But we shall leave such Disquisitions, as too deep
for us, to those who are building some favourite Hypothesis, which they
will refuse no Metaphysical Rubbish to erect and support: for our part, we
give it clearly on the side of Joseph, whose Happiness was not only
greater than the Parson's, but of longer Duration; for as soon as the first
Tumults of Adams's rapture were over he cast his Eyes towards the Fire,
where Æschylus lay expiring; and immediately rescued the poor Remains,
to wit, the Sheepskin Covering, of his dear Friend, which was the Work of
his own Hands, and had been his inseparable Companion for upwards of
thirty Years.
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What is remarkable (and amusing) about this passage is the tactic Fielding adopts to
use high literature as the vehicle by which pretentious or other-worldly attitudes
(which would ordinarily be associated with such texts) can be punctured. Even in the
act of its own destruction, the text can serve to throw light on the character of the
individual. The comedy is only matched by the genuine poignancy of the fact that
Adams has, indeed, lost his dearest friend, who, even as the last few hand-written
pages are immolated, strives to teach a final lesson in the understanding of reality.
It is, of course, inevitable when we begin to talk of literary misplacement, that there
can be both theological and philosophical implications. In a general sense, the grand
narratives can be seen to be as susceptible to misplacement as any individual text thus
far mentioned. Thwackum and Square respectively embody just such grand narratives
and, at Fielding’s hands, are equally censured. The stability of the realities which
Thwackum and Square separately inhabit is undermined most evidently in a passage
from Tom Jones where Tom is on his sickbed. Having injured himself saving Sophia
from a frisky horse, Tom is subjected to the ministrations of the tyrannical Thwackum
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and the clinical Square. Following Thwackum’s suggestion that Tom’s broken arm is
evidence of God’s judgement:
Square talked in a very different Strain: he said, 'Such Accidents as a
broken Bone were below the Consideration of a wise Man. That it was
abundantly sufficient, to reconcile the Mind to any of these mischances, to
reflect that they are liable, to befall the wisest of Mankind, and are
undoubtedly for the Good of the Whole.' He said 'it was a mere Abuse of
Words to call those Things Evils in which there was no moral Unfitness:
That Pain, which was the worst consequence of such accidents, was the
most contemptible Thing in the World;' with more of the like Sentences,
extracted out of the Second Book of Tully’s Tusculan Questions, and from
the great Lord Shaftesbury. In pronouncing these he was one Day so
eager, that he unfortunately bit his Tongue, and in such a manner that it
not only put an End to his Discourse, but created much Emotion in him,
and caused him to mutter an Oath or two; but what was worst of all, this
Accident gave Thwackum, who was present, and who held all such
Doctrine to be heathenish and atheistical, an Opportunity to clap a
judgment on his Back. Now this was done with so malicious a Sneer that
it totally unhinged (if I may so say) the temper of the Philosopher, which
the bite of his Tongue had somewhat ruffled; and as he was disabled from
venting his Wrath at his Lips, he had possibly found a more violent
Method of revenging himself, had not the Surgeon, who was then luckily
in the Room, contrary to his own Interest, interposed, and preserved the
Peace.
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In this example, we find Fielding exposing the attempts that the religious and non-
religious make to use or misuse texts to their own advantage. What Fielding appears
to be saying here is that any grand narrative can always be broken down by the
inconsistency of those who supposedly adhere to them. Paradoxically, then, it appears
that System cannot stand in the face of human frailty.
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Such a general critique is made all the more specific when Fielding applies his literary
misplacement to the Bible itself. A key passage, here, is once again in Tom Jones,
where a conversation takes place between Sophia and her maid, Mrs Honour:
And, to be sure, I could tell your Ladyship something, but that I am afraid
it would offend you.'-'What could you tell me, Honour?' says Sophia.
'Nay, Ma'am, to be sure he meant nothing by it, therefore I would not have
your Ladyship be offended.'-'Prithee tell me,' says Sophia; 'I will know it
this Instant.’ Why, Ma'am,' answered Mrs Honour, 'he came into the
Room one Day last Week when I was at Work, and there lay your
Ladyship's Muff on a Chair, and to be sure he put his Hands into it; that
very Muff your Ladyship gave me but yesterday; "La," says I, "Mr Jones,
you will stretch my Lady's Muff and spoil it;" but he still kept his Hands
in it: and then he kissed it--to be sure I, hardly ever saw such a Kiss in my
Life as he gave it.' - 'I suppose he did not know it was mine,' replied
Sophia. 'Your Ladyship shall hear, Ma'am. He kissed it again and again,
and said it was the prettiest Muff in the World. "La! sir," says I, "you have
seen it a hundred times." - "Yes, Mrs Honour," cried he; "but who can see
anything beautiful in the presence of your Lady but herself?" Nay, that's
not all neither; but I hope your Ladyship won't be offended, for to be sure
he meant nothing. One day, as your Ladyship was playin on the
harpsichord to my Master, Mr Jones was sitting in the next Room, and
methought he looked melancholy. "La!" says I, "Mr Jones, what's the
Matter! A penny for your thoughts," says I; "Why, Hussy," says he,
starting up from a Dream, "what can I be thinking of, when that Angel
your Mistress is playing?" And then squeezing me by the Hand - "Oh!
Mrs Honour," says he, "how happy will that Man be!"- and then he
sighed; upon my Troth, his Breath is as sweet as a Nosegay - but to be
sure he meant no harm by it. So I hope your Ladyship will not mention a
Word: for he gave me a Crown never to mention it, and made me swear
upon a Book, but I believe, indeed, it was not the Bible.
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Fielding, in this instance, once again plays with the notion of literary authority, but on
this occasion takes such liberties to their ultimate conclusion with his deliberate
misplacement of the Bible. The context in which this misplacement takes place is a
morally dubious one. Four artefacts find themselves in focus - Sophia’s muff and
harpsichord, the crown and the book. All four hold within them elements of dubiety.
Both the muff and harpsichord share obvious sexual overtones whereas the
juxtaposition of the crown with a book which may or may not be the Bible, clearly
serves to undermine the authority of the latter. As a result, then, of Mrs Honour’s
sexually suggestive speech, the Scriptures become either indefinable or of less
authoritative value than a common bribe – or both. It is little wonder then, that, at the
end of her remarks, Sophia finds herself of a red ‘more beautiful…than Vermillion’.
There is more than mere sexual double entendre here. The reality of these objects
becomes questionable. All are placed in a subtler context in order to point to the
greater reality, namely the love of Tom for Sophia. Even the Bible, it seems, can be
sacrificed for the sake of true love.
There is evidence, here, as previously suggested, of a tension, a ‘nervous pause’ as to
the presentation of reality. This nervousness lies, not only at the moral level, as
Johnson would have it, but also at the epistemological. The tension indeed exists at
the heart of both the Enlightenment project and in the postmodern debate as to the
pursuit of meaning. Intellectual apprehension in both environments becomes a key
area of theological and philosophical debate. This inevitably leads to questions
regarding the nature and legitimacy of authority. During the eighteenth century, for
example, we witness the anxiety produced by the early and unprecedented
interrogation of the Scriptures – the basic rule of religion. The misplacement of the
Bible in Fielding’s comedy, despite the recurrent assessment of his work as a literary
bastion of Anglicanism, in fact reflects that deeper sense of insecurity, albeit with a
light-hearted veneer.
In the batting back and forth of the pamphleteers, we very quickly come to discern, in
all the competing theological and ideological bluster, a certain shared and largely
unspoken anxiety. The orthodox are as aware as the deists of the stakes. Even to think
of the stakes, for some of the orthodox, proved too much. To question the ‘givens’ of229
the faith was tantamount to giving up the ghost (and in the case of the doctrine of the
Trinity, that held a rather more literal ring). What both sides recognised was that the
reality of religious experience was based upon two factors: the authority handed down
in the traditions of the church and chiefly in the dissemination and interpretation of
the Scriptures, and secondly and crucially, the reason by which individuals can access
and interpret and live out that particular authoritative revelation. The debate was,
therefore, how these two factors could be harnessed to the service of the faith.
I would suggest that Fielding exhibits this very tension in his fiction. Beneath the
apparently robust Anglican façade which provides the substantial theological
superstratum for these works, there lies an acute concern for the stability of the
orthodox position. This is not to say that Fielding saw himself as anything less than
orthodox (although scholars like Paulson have hinted as much). There is, however, a
strong awareness of the potential for mutability, at least at the level of theological
praxis. Such awareness has its artistic roots in the presentation of reality, and, as I
have noted, Fielding is more than aware of the slippage that occurs in such a
presentation.
Moving into our own era, mimesis, basically understood as art imitating life has,
through the critical lens of deconstruction, become a less secure descriptor of the
processes by which we apprehend a work of art. Duyfhuizen points to the opposition
that is assumed under the epithet, art imitating life – reality/representation – and
concludes that, although this opposition ‘appears logically natural…it can be
deconstructed to reveal representation as always already coexistent with reality’.
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As a result, one can conclude that life can legitimately be seen to imitate art. The
traditional bounded relationship between author and reader, which established the
foundation of mimesis, i.e. the intention of the author coupled with Coleridge’s
‘willing suspension of disbelief’ on the part of the reader, is, it would appear, set at
nought in the light of deconstruction. How can we get to reality in the light of this?
The answer, of course, is that we cannot. Or at least we cannot in the sense of a final,
closed off and unsurpassable reading of reality. In his more recent discussion of the
491 Bernard Duyfhuizen, ‘Mimesis, Authority, and Belief in Narrative Poetics: Towards a Transmission
Theory for a Poetics of Fiction’, Novel: A Forum on Fiction, Vol.18, No.3. (Spring, 1985), 217-22 (p.
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novel, James Wood believes that realism cannot be regarded as mere verisimilitude,
but ought to encapsulate what he calls lifeness on the page. However, he is more than
aware that to present this is unceasingly difficult:
The true writer, that free servant of life, is one who must always be acting
as if life were a category beyond anything the novel had yet grasped; as if
life itself were always on the verge of becoming conventional.
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I would suggest that Henry Fielding understood Wood’s analysis completely.
Curiously, though, even Johnson, that ‘embodiment of sturdy prejudice’
493 appeared
to recognise this lack of finality in the experience of the real. In his The History of
Rasselas, during the debate regarding the nature of the soul, he has the poet declare:
‘It is no limitation of omnipotence… to suppose that one thing is not consistent with
another, that the same proposition cannot be at once true and false.’
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Rule
A fundamental expression of this apparent conundrum is the experience of canon. It
appears that we can commit ourselves to the canon, be it the scriptural or literary
variety, in one of two ways. Either we can allow the weight of the tradition, which
established or ‘fixed’ the canon, to be the sole arbiter of the constitution and
interpretation of the canon; or we can adopt a less prescriptive and more dynamic
understanding. The former mode would seek to establish a common ground of
canonically acceptable readings of texts. These texts themselves would thus be read
‘against’ others in the canon. Each would inform upon the other according to the
already established canonical principle. Hudson, for example, has argued that Johnson
had ‘a tendency to place far greater trust in the confidence of a tradition than in the
brilliance of an individual’.
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We can detect here an understanding of the canon as a form of security against the
threat of the innovator or the heretic. This, of course, as I have noted, fits with
Johnson’s wariness of the attempt to present reality, particularly in the moral sphere.
Mimesis, according to Johnson, presents us with all kinds of hazards and threats. As a
result, one must be prescriptive about what one considers literary or at least worthy of
a wider readership. Only the safest text can find its way into the canon:
Nothing can please many, and please long, but just representations of
general nature. Particular manners can be known to few, and therefore few
only can judge how nearly they are copied. The irregular combinations of
fanciful inventions may delight for a while, by that novelty of which the
common satiety of life sends us all in quest; but the pleasures of sudden
wonder are soon exhausted, and the mind can only repose in the stability
of truth.
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Ezra Pound, however, reverses this when he argues that ‘good literature worries
“lovers of order”: they regard it as dangerous, chaotic subversive, because its
exactitudes show no mercy to society’s self-inflating tendencies.’
497 Bloom agrees
when he writes that, ‘the West’s greatest writers are subversive of all values, both
ours and their own’.
498 Presumably, at least some of the ‘good literature’ that Pound
has in mind, finds itself in the canon. Reading Johnson and Pound, then, we find
ourselves then in a curiously ambiguous position. Canonicity, it appears, plays some
kind of dual role, insofar as it both preserves and subverts the very tradition it
encapsulates.
Negatively, the canon may be regarded as a reactionary force determined upon its
own rarefied course. As Leitch argues in a broader, but nonetheless apposite context:
Tradition, while transmitting more and more knowledge, conceals truth;
repository of self-evident, disembodied “truths”, tradition, in the role of
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authority and master, blocks access to the genuine sources and primordial
experiences in which truth originated.
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In this sense, the canon can exhibit the characteristics of the censor, blocking the path
to more expansive literary experiences. The instinct when one studies, for example,
the Scriptural canon, is to assume that its very authoritative closure prohibits any
sense of an open reading of these texts. The canon can only be interpreted
canonically. Though no-one can, the canon can. But, of course, this assumes a very
restrictive view of canonicity.
500 Such a view is determined not simply by any
literary-historical or even theological judgements. Ultimately, canonicity is
determined through the prescriptive utilisation of power and exclusion. It is achieved
through the awareness of the blasphemous and the heretic at the gate or, as Kermode
puts it, ‘the centrifugal force of heresy and schism’.
501 In this regard, we must be
cognisant of the fact that there was no meaningful canon of the New Testament, in the
normally received sense of the word, prior to Marcion. It can be argued that it was his
so-called heresy which engendered the rush to orthodoxy. That being the case, there is
little or nothing to be gained by crying over spilt agrapha. The canon, regardless of the
political machinations and mythical exploits which lay behind its adoption,
nonetheless exists. The question remains, however, is there more than one way to
measure this canon? Can we, despite accepting the texts as we have them, examine
canonicity in a broader way?
A useful interpretative tool in this endeavour is to cultivate the perspective of those
early creators of what has come to be known as canonical or classic literature. What
appears to be crucial in such an examination is how connected the art form (initially
poetry) was to the audience who received it. As Ross indicates, the ‘function of poetry
was defined in terms of social instrumentality’, and that its value ‘measured wholly by
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its utility within a moral order that was determined less by economic profit than by
symbolism, rhetoric and representation’...Consumption was not distinguished from
production’.
502 Canonicity, in this sense, dissolved the utilitarian and the artistic into
one overriding cultural experience of the work of art. The cultural distance between
the ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ of what was later to be defined as ‘literature’ was,
therefore, less pronounced. The emphasis overall was upon production, not
reproduction. Indeed, the term ‘canon’ as we now understand it as a process of
selection, did not exist until 1768.
503 There was a sense of vitality in the creative
process which, one may legitimately argue, was somewhat domesticated by the rise of
the book trade. Fielding indicates this economic turn of events in his Amelia where
Booth, in his encounter with the ‘great Author’, having discovered the many and
various literary opportunities that appeared to present themselves to the educated man,
is made acutely aware of the harsh reality of the literary marketplace:
‘Upon my Word, Sir,’ cries Booth, you have greatly instructed me. I could
not have imagined there had been so much Regularity in the Trade of
Writing, as you are pleased to mention; by what I can perceive, the Pen
and Ink is likely to become the Staple Commodity of the Kingdom.’
‘Alas, Sir,’ answered the Author, ‘it is over-stocked – The Market is over-
stocked. There is no Encouragement to Merit, no Patrons. I have been
these five Years soliciting a Subscription for my new Translation of
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, with Notes explanatory, historical, and critical;
and I have scarce collected five hundred Names yet.’
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The double edge to this encounter is, of course, that, while the Author is correct in his
assessment of the state of the literary marketplace, he is, nonetheless, at the same
moment, doing everything in his power to fleece Booth in order to serve his own
mediocre literary endeavours. The commoditisation of literature becomes then, an
unfortunate critical determinant in the assessment of artistic value. A move has taken
place in the understanding of canonicity in which the work of art is set apart from its
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immediate artistic aim and has, as a result, become a mere artefact. The risk is that
canonicity becomes, potentially, a shopping list of the fashionably mediocre.
But is that not the risk of literature? Is it not one of the dangerous trades? It is surely
the case, as Fielding has illustrated for us above, that there is a sense in which the
canon, by its very nature, is constantly subverting itself.
Canonicity as subversion appears virtually contradictory. However, if we bring to the
canon Derrida’s notion of différànce we may perhaps glimpse that the canon, however
much we like to consider it as aesthetically, intellectually or culturally uniform is, in
fact, embodied with plurality and ambiguity. Bloom has taken notice of this and has
argued that tradition is neither temporally, nor critically or aesthetically stable. In his
terms, canon can be regarded as an ‘exercise in belatedness’, a ‘necessary misprision’
and as ‘daemonic’ insofar as canon, or tradition has no referential aspect.
505 The fact
that Fielding’s Tom Jones finds a place in the canon, despite the protestations of
arguably the greatest critic of the eighteenth century, is surely testimony to that
uncomfortable reality. This is a point only partially acknowledged by Kermode who
values the fact that ‘one member [of the canon] nourishes or qualifies another, so that
as well as benefiting from the life preserving attentions of commentary, each thrives
on the propinquity of all’.
506 Here Kermode relishes the connectedness brought about
by difference, but ignores the more worrisome reality that there is difference between
canonical members. One cannot help but endorse William Carlos Williams’ point in
the light of this, when he states, ‘There is nothing sacred about literature, it is damned
from one end to the other. There is nothing in literature but change and change is
mockery.’
507 It is this changeableness which subverts the notion of canon. In this
sense, we can speak sensibly of membership of the canon comprising, not polite
partners cosily nestling up against one another in some sort of inspired literary love-
in, but instead, misplaced individuals butting up against one another in a crowded
carriage headed for an unknown destination. The canon, though maintaining a
substantial veneer of respectability and decorum, becomes, at the same moment,
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literature’s greatest joke against itself. In other words, the canon looks very much like
a novel – a novel that Henry Fielding might write.
In the light of this, there seems little point, therefore, in calls for any kind of revision
of the canon. After all that is not too difficult – Joseph Smith, Mary Baker Eddy, F.R.
Leavis and Matthew Arnold all testify to the ease by which canons both religious and
secular can be designed or re-designed. But it is worthwhile making a more difficult
demand. That demand is that we continually recognise the fragility of the canon. By
this, I mean that we must find ourselves open to the text before us and, as such,
participate in the reality that its canonisation is an ongoing process. David Jasper
envisages such a process when he writes, ‘the concept of canon… must be tensioned
between the sense of stability and the sense of adaptability, the tension being
maintained by a relentless hermeneutic awareness.’
508 Indeed, I would suggest that the
canon as literature continually calls out to be canonised. As Morrissey has stated, ‘our
continual rediscovery of [the canon’s] seeming closure is also what keeps it open,
always subject to addition and revision.’
509 This call cannot, however, be answered
solely by the canon itself. This cannot be a monologue. The call by the canon is made
to all literature, to all art, to all life. The response to this call is a recognising of the
canon and such recognition forms the resolution of the tension that any deconstructive
critique of mimesis threatens. In this respect, life is once again seen to imitate art, in
the sense that, it is through recognition of the text that we experience life. ‘The
objective in writing is to reveal. It is not to teach, not to advertise, not to sell, not even
to communicate (for that needs two) but to reveal.’
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This is a far less constrained and yet, at the same time, more canonical approach. For
canonicity is less about rule and constraint than about ‘recognition’. Recognition
becomes the yardstick of misplacement. For after all, despite the remarks of either
Johnson in the eighteenth century or Leavis in the twentieth, Tom Jones finds itself in
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the literary canon. How that can be, I believe, is down to Fielding’s own ability to
misplace, both wittingly and unwittingly, his own creation.
Fielding’s awareness of producing a new form of literature, in a sense, actually
misplaces the canon, at least as far as the genre ‘novel’ is concerned. I have already
alluded to the risk of blasphemy inherent in Fielding’s new creation in that he is
mocking the divine creation in producing his works of fiction. This risk can be
broadened to influence the nature of the canon itself. By misplacement, in this
particular context, I mean a creative act which threatens the stability of art both
intratextually and intertextually, in order that art may indeed not merely mirror life
but celebrate it in all its variability. Fielding’s work becomes, then, an example of
how imagination rather than prescription actually forms that body of work continually
reframed and re-imagined as canonical. It is a means to express the notion quietly
proclaimed by Hass that:
In the shadows of our critical heritage, we can now make a new
judgement: a new judgement, and yet by no means a new concept. What if
we suggest, as this new judgement, an old term all too familiar?:
Imagination
511
For it is surely here that both our understanding of realism and its connotative partner,
canon, share their critical roots. The active ingredient in mimetic and canonical
misplacement is, then, the exercise of the imagination. Such an exercise removes from
us the temptation to prescription both at the mimetic and canonical levels, and yet, at
the same time, it provides us with a coherent assessment of multivarious ‘worlds’
intended by the novel form. Imagination, the practice of ‘imaging’ those created
worlds, depends upon both a stable, but at the same time inevitably unique,
perspective.
This appears to resonate with Robert Alter, who, in responding to structuralism’s
‘absolute extension of intertextuality’, puts forward a three-tier approach to the
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understanding of reality based upon the paradigmatic self-conscious novel, Tristram
Shandy.
512 He describes these tiers as ‘hyperconsciousness’, ‘illusion’ and ‘structure-
making’. The first two of these tiers focus on the novel form itself, while the third
turns the lens upon the role of the reader. By hyperconsciousness, Alter implies the
‘sheer arbitrariness and conventionality of all literary means’; in other words,
everything that goes into the production of the text that lies in front of us is
perennially ‘open’. The second tier, ‘illusion’ relates to the trick which is being played
upon the reader as the ‘action’ in the novel is played out. The final tier, (which is akin
to the first) points to the role of the reader as one who is implicated in the formation
of the whole mimetic structure. Such a structure, itself, is also, inevitably, ‘open’.
Alter’s three-tiered approach chimes curiously with a trinity outlined by that pioneer
of intertextuality, Mikhail Bakhtin. In his The Dialogic Imagination (1975), he
suggests that there are also three basic characteristics for the novel – ‘stylistic three-
dimensionality’, ‘radical change effected in the temporal co-ordinates of the literary
image’, and the ‘zone of maximal contact with the present’. Given that Bakhtin is
keen to ground this schema in a concrete socio-political context, namely the
interaction between different language groups (polyglossia) in an ever-expanding
world, one can see from Bakhtin’s list that there appears a broader point of contact
with Alter in that they share a common understanding of the fluidity of the novel as a
genre. As Bakhtin, puts it:
I am not constructing here a functional definition of the novelistic canon
in literary history, that is, a definition that would make of it a system of
fixed generic characteristics. Rather, I am trying to grope my way toward
the basic structural characteristics of this most fluid of genres,
characteristics that might determine the direction of its peculiar capacity
for change and of its influence and effect on the rest of literature.
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The relationship between realism and canonicity is set in relief by the notion of
misplacement – the deliberate use of the imagination to organise a text or texts in such
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a way as to promote both the world in the text and the world of the text. This exercise
of misplacement recognises a fundamental principle put forward by Colin Falck who,
in the conclusion of his assault against what he regards as the excesses of structuralist
theory, baldly states: ‘All reality is aesthetic.’
514 Our construction of reality, therefore,
holds within it a canonical component in that there is a recognition of reality as a
construct. Henry Fielding, in his novels, I would suggest, was more than aware of this
aesthetic or canonical approach to the presentation of reality.
Revelation
The misplacement of both realism and canon in the narrative fiction of Henry
Fielding, already leads us in a specifically theological direction — to the question of
revelation. Given that both realism and canon find themselves misplaced, can we find
a place for the notion of revelation in the fictional world? We are here confronted with
an immediate problem; that is, how we can even comprehend, let alone define an
understanding of revelation. As James Barr states:
The real problem, as it seems to me, is that we have no access to, and no
means of comprehending, a communication or revelation from God which
is antecedent to the human tradition about him and which then goes on to
generate that very tradition.
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Barr goes on to point out that the term revelation is not to be found in the Bible itself.
Indeed, the serious study of the nature and extent of revelation is a relatively recent
theological development, tracing its roots only as far back as the eighteenth
century.
516 One significant reason for this was the, then, live debate concerning the
extent to which human reason may be harnessed in one’s apprehension of the divine.
The Cambridge Platonists sought to defend what they saw as a ‘divine sagacity’ borne
out of our relationship with God. In this schema reason appears expanded and is
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placed on a virtual par with faith. In Cragg’s description, ‘Faith anticipates and
completes the findings of reason, and philosophy is the handmaid of religion.’
517 The
question remained, however, if reason had such importance, what place was there for
revelation? This was to be the battle ground around which the so-called deist
controversy was to rage throughout much of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries.
If we turn now to Fielding, we discern a somewhat ambiguous position regarding the
nature and extent of revelation. We find that Fielding uses the term revelation twice in
Tom Jones. Looking initially at the second of these instances, we discover that it
relates specifically to the deist controversy and involves a dispute between the
religiously orthodox Thwackum and the philosopher, Square. The evil Blifil has
released Sophia’s beloved bird, Tommy, and in his attempt to retrieve the creature,
Tom has fallen out of a tree into the canal. Both Thwackum and Square seek to praise
Blifil for what they regard as exemplary behaviour. Each, of course, claim the credit
as the sole sponsor of such a magnanimous spirit in releasing the bird, and it is at this
point where the rift appears. For Square, Blifil’s generous heart is related to his
appreciation of the ‘Law of Nature’, while for Thwackum, the law of Nature ‘is a
Jargon of Words, which means nothing’.
518 Square responds by stating, ‘If there be
no Law of Nature, there is no Right nor Wrong.’ Thwackum, in turn, accuses Square
of being a deist or an atheist.
Here, then, the fundamental breach between the orthodox and the heterodox is laid
bare. Fielding, in this exchange, has the major component of the debate in place.
Revelation is, for the orthodox, the key component of the entire Christian schema.
Without it, the theological superstructure collapses, and one is left with well-meaning
but empty philosophical notions such as the ‘Law of Nature’. Fielding, of course, is
careful in his presentation to paint both combatants in a less than brilliant light. Their
common vanity is in evidence throughout the external dogmatic discussion, and
indeed, one can see, more than merely colouring the discussion, their demeanour
actually informs as to how Fielding would seek the debate to conclude. But if such
517 G. R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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subtleties are lost on the reader, Fielding drives the point home when he introduces his
most powerful weapon into this intellectual exchange – the ignorant Squire Western:
‘Drink about (says Western) Pox of your Laws of Nature. I don’t know
what you mean either of you, by Right and Wrong. To take away my
Girl’s Bird was wrong in my Opinion; and my Neighbour Allworthy may
do as he pleases; but to encourage Boys in such Practices is to breed them
up to the Gallows.’
519
What Fielding has set up as an intellectual spat, is torn apart by the deliberate placing
of ignorance within the context of confident dogma. Elsewhere, Squire Western is
represented as a coarse buffoon with little to recommend him, and it is for this reason
that his remarks are all the more powerful. The twin towers of theological obfuscation
and philosophical rationalism are demolished in this salvo by a man who knows little
to nothing of either. We are thus left with the disturbing question, if Squire Western is
right, where now for revealed religion or rational thought?
This question is before us when we examine the first occurrence of revelation in Tom
Jones. Once again, revelation finds itself brought to the fore in the context of an
argument. Captain Blifil, newly married to Allworthy’s sister, Bridget, is critical of
what he considers as Allworthy’s ‘fault’ in adopting ‘the Fruit of Sin’, i.e. Tom. To do
so, he argues, was to countenance the act of sin itself. Captain Blifil backs up his
criticism by resorting to a number of biblical quotations, and to refer to the legal
status of bastards arguing that:
‘Tho’ the Law did not positively allow the destroying of such base-born
Children, yet it held them to be the Children of No-body; and that, at the
best, they ought to be brought up to the lowliest and vilest Offices of the
Commonwealth.
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Allworthy’s response is uncharacteristically severe. He indicates his own ability to
interpret the Scripture by systematically demolishing each of Captain Blifil’s points.
519 Tom Jones, IV.iv.106.
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However, his concluding remarks are of most interest when he departs from a strictly
exegetical analysis and speaks of what he describes as, the ‘first Principles of natural
Justice’, facing Captain Blifil with what he regards as the consequences of his own
argumentation:
‘But to present the Almighty as avenging the Sins of the Guilty on the
Innocent, was indecent, if not blasphemous, as it was to represent him
acting against the first Principles of natural Justice, and against the
original Notions of Right and Wrong, which he himself had implanted in
our Minds; by which we were to judge, not only in all Matters which were
not revealed, but even the Truth of Revelation itself.’
521
This latter remark spells out for us the ambivalent attitude Fielding adopts towards the
nature and reach of revelation. From the above, it would appear that some form of
natural justice innate in the human psyche, at the very least, enables us to attune to
what the Revelation requires of us. But Allworthy seems to go further in that this very
capacity allows us, not simply to agree to, or acquiesce with revelation, but to actively
interrogate it. Allworthy’s remarks, here, chime well with those of the self-publicist
and deist (though loyal member of the Church of England) John Toland (1670-1722),
who, in his Christianity Not Mysterious (1696), wrote:
Firstly, no Christian Doctrine, no more than any ordinary Piece of Nature,
can be reputed a Mystery, because we have not an adequate or compleat
Idea of whatever belongs to it. Secondly, That what is reveal’d in
Religion, as it is most useful and necessary, so it must be as easily
comprehended, and found as consistent with our common Notions, as
what we know of Wood or Stone, of Air, of Water, or the like. And,
Thirdly, That when we do as familiarly explain such Doctrines, as what is
known of natural things (which I pretend we can), we may then be as
properly said to comprehend the one as the other.
522
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Without delving into the nature and extent of the deist controversy,
523 it is enough for
us to recognise that, in Fielding, revelation is not the secure foundation upon which he
wishes to base his approach to the divine and by extension to human nature itself.
Can we, however, take a step further back in this particular discussion and ask the
deeper question as to how Fielding’s fiction offers us not simply a forensic
understanding of revelation but an experience of it?
One can begin to answer this question by noting immediately that in Fielding’s fiction
generally and in Tom Jones in particular, the nature of the novel is about continuous
revelation. It is in the nature of comedy to point toward this kind of gradually revealed
truth. There are stock moments and characters who provide us with an alleviation of
the tension that is built up over the course of a novel as to such things as identity,
social status, marriage prospects etc. However, important though this is, once again
we are here merely recognising the structural characteristics of plot. Structure, by
itself, may be an indicator of revelatory capacity of a novel, but it does not provide us
with the understanding or experiencing of that revelation. To reach this level, we
must take a step behind structure and look at language itself.
Paul Ricoeur has sought to respond to the question of how a work of fiction can offer
a genuine revelation, in presenting what he describes as the ‘revelatory function of
poetic discourse’.
524 Ricoeur argues that there are three components to such a
discourse. Firstly, writing provides us with the material we are dealing with, the issue
of the text, as Gadamer puts it. In other words, we are opened to the text and only the
text. Authorial intention has no part to play in our assessment of the revelation that the
text has to offer us. Likewise, the reader cannot be said to confine the horizon of the
text, which stands autonomously. Secondly, the nature of the particular writing has a
role to play. The genre or style of the text provides, what Ricoeur calls, the ‘work of
the text’. Lastly, there is what Ricoeur describes as the ‘world of the text’, which
corresponds not with any intention of the author, structural feature, or indeed
reception by the reader. This ‘world’, rather, ‘lies beyond the text as its reference’. By
means of this three-fold basis, Ricoeur is suggesting that we can move towards what
523 See my comments above in the Chapter: ‘The Art of Blasphemy’ and, more briefly, in the
Conclusion.
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he describes as the revelatory function of poetic discourse. Prior to reaching this goal,
Ricoeur teases out for us the poetic function insofar as it impinges upon language and
its ability to encounter the world. It is this particular activity which breaks down the
hegemony of traditional understandings of truth. As Ricoeur states:
That language in its poetic function abolishes the type of reference
characteristic of such descriptive discourses, and along with it the reign of
truth as adequation and the very definition of truth in terms of verification,
is not to be doubted.
525
Such an attack upon traditional empirical understandings of truth opens the way to
discovering that poetic discourse is aimed at discovering something more significant,
namely the ‘emergence of a depth-structure of belonging-to amid the ruins of
descriptive discourse’.
526 Recalling Aristotle’s maxim that mythos is the way to
mimesis, Ricoeur goes on to conclude:
This conjunction of fiction and redescription, of mythos and mimesis,
constitutes the referential function by means of which I would define the
poetic dimension of language… In turn, this poetic function conceals a
dimension of revelation where revelation is to be understood in a
nonreligious, nontheistic, and nonbiblical sense of the word – but one
capable of entering into resonance with one or the other of the aspects of
biblical revelation.
527
This revelatory capacity based on the autonomy, work and world of the text,
illustrates for us the reality that truth is no longer about verification, but manifestation.
In this respect, the revelatory capacity of poetic discourse (or, for our purposes,
fiction), serves as a means to rescue the biblical text from any simplistic
hermeneutical strategy which seeks to confine the text to a literal or other overly
prescriptive interpretation. The paradox here is that it is this areligious sense of
Revelation which allows the biblical revelation to, as it were, breathe, more freely.
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Ricoeur is cognisant of this and seeks to emphasise the particularity of the biblical
revelation.
Yet if this areligious sense of revelation has such a corrective value, it
does not for all that include the religious meaning of revelation. There is a
homology between them, but nothing allows us to derive the specific
feature of religious language – i.e., that its referent moves among
prophecy, narration, prescription, wisdom, and psalms, co-ordinating
these diverse and partial forms of discourse by giving them a vanishing
point and an index of incompleteness – nothing, I say, allows us to derive
this from the general characteristics of the poetic function. The biblical
hermeneutic is in turn one regional hermeneutic within a general
hermeneutic and a unique hermeneutic that is joined to the philosophical
hermeneutic as its organon. It is one particular case insofar as the Bible is
one of the great poems of existence. It is a unique case because all its
partial forms of discourse are referred to that Name which is the point of
intersection and the vanishing point of all our discourse about God, the
name of the unnameable. This is the paradoxical homology that the
category of the world of the text establishes between revelation the broad
sense of poetic discourse and in the specifically biblical sense.
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I have quoted Ricoeur at length here to establish as accurately as possible his
understanding of the nature and extent of revelation. There are those who will bemoan
Ricoeur’s adoption of a philosophically grounded hermeneutic instead of, as one critic
has put it, learning ‘the simplest biblical truth about how to do philosophy: “the fear
of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom”’.
529 For such detractors, any notion of
providing any ‘natural’ understanding of the way we experience revelation is merely
an expression of human vanity. Though we may dismiss such rhetorical flourishes, in
Wilder’s terms, as an example ‘of violating proper method by a prior dogmatic’,
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there are those with more serious concerns over Ricoeur’s approach. For example,
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Nicholas Wolterstorff disagrees with Ricoeur’s privileging of writing over speech.
This he says, removes from us the active word of God in history, so that ‘by the time
[Ricoeur] has finished, divine speech has disappeared from view and only revelation
of the manifestation is left’.
531 For Wolterstorff, if God cannot be heard to speak then
the notion of revelation becomes emasculated.
Others, however, are aware of the consistency of Ricouer’s hermeneutical project in
his approach to revelation. Kaplan outlines Ricoeur’s approach succinctly:
The task of hermeneutics is not to discover an unmediated reality, but to
continue to mediate reality through new creative interpretations. The
mediating role of creative and imaginative interpretations is always at
work in lived experience. In fact, it is not just my lived experience, but our
entire social existence that is mediated by language, symbolic
representations, and creative interpretations.
532
Such a task means avoiding the extremes of ideology and utopia which are effectively
means by which power may be exercised over others. As Mark Wallace states:
Ricoeur avers that the Heilsgeschichte mindset that is borne by narrative is
dangerous and seductive for a community that considers history a present-
at-hand “possession” under its control. The danger lies in the community’s
confidence that its future is secure because it has the occult knowledge of
the divine masterplan, and in its inability to acknowledge the discordant,
the novel, and the chaotic, which always threaten to undermine its
attempts to domesticate the divine identity through comfortable stories of
sequential narrative coherence.
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To carry out such an avoidance strategy, Ricoeur recognises that one must accept the
limitations of human knowledge but, at the same time, that the very attempt to
understand remains a human activity. The interpretative task, then, is carried out in
the full knowledge of the aporetic nature of human existence. In other words, we
continually interpret in and through an experience of frailty.
And it is here that we are returned to Henry Fielding and his works of fiction, for it is
here that we find both an affirmation and a criticism of Ricoeur’s approach to
revelation. Fielding’s desire to present nothing other than HUMAN NATURE
provides the focus for this dual assessment. This presentation, I would argue, is an
example of the revelation that Ricoeur has in mind. In Fielding’s fiction we have, in
Ricoeurian terminology, an autonomous work which presents us with a world. In this
world we are presented with the truth which emerges from the conjunction of fiction
and representation. We experience a revelation of human nature in all its muddied
greatness and weakness. Fielding’s fiction is an example par excellence of the
traversing of that difficult hermeneutical path which seeks to reveal but not prescribe
the human situation. So Tom, though he is chastised by theologian and philosopher
alike, remains closer to the ‘good nature’ which Fielding describes as:
that benevolent and amiable Temper of Mind which disposes us to feel the
Misfortunes and enjoy the Happiness of others; and consequently pushes
us on to promote the latter, and prevent the former; and that without any
abstract Contemplation on the Beauty of Virtue, and without the
Allurement or Terrors of Religion.
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Here we have encapsulated, not only the contrast between the frail Tom and his
accusers, but also that between a frail hermeneutical strategy (a frail dogmatics) and a
theological or philosophical desire for hegemony. For Fielding, we are to avoid
contemplation of philosophy or the allure of religion/theology, not because they are
intrinsically suspect, rather it is that the temptation of both is to prescribe and that
such prescription has a tendency to ignore the very frailty upon which either discipline
is unavoidably based.
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But Fielding also provides a criticism of Ricoeur, insofar as his fiction indeed presents
us with revelation at all. For all his desire to utilise an areligious sense of revelation as
a means to support the biblical expression of revelation, nonetheless, Ricoeur appears
to privilege that very biblical revelation above fictional expressions. As I have noted,
he argues that the areligious sense of revelation cannot have anything to do with the
religious meaning of the biblical revelation. We hear him speak of the biblical
revelation as hosting a unique hermeneutic insofar as it intends to point to the
unnameable, i.e. God. But surely the biblical revelation points to more than this
unnameable. Is there not to be discerned in the biblical revelation another
unnameable, namely Fielding’s focus – human nature itself? It would appear that
Ricoeur is constricting the very freedom he intends to advance in his hermeneutical
approach.
Is it necessary for us to speak in terms of an areligious sense of revelation as opposed
to a religious meaning? Does not the expression religious meaning clearly imply
revelation? In short, can we make the areligious/religious distinction that Ricoeur
wishes us to make? If this distinction is fragile, then perhaps we can recover a sense
of revelation as less a prisoner of dogma, and more a universal human experience,
which is discovered clearly in the texts of scripture but also in texts such as the novels
of Fielding, which reveal the human condition in all its frail glory.
Fictional Transcendence – Fielding’s Misplaced God
We are now led to a question which must be asked but which, of course, neither can
nor should ever be fully answered: ‘What is the nature of Fielding’s God?’ There is a
sense in which, with all that has gone before, this question would appear more than a
little superfluous. In the face of such glaring ambiguity and unfixity, how can we dare
make the leap to access Fielding’s notion of the divine? A simple and possibly
Fieldingesque response might be, why not? For all the current desire in certain
theological circles to move beyond an onto-theological stance, there is the danger that
such a stance retains the very determinism it seeks to avoid. However, to ask the
question as to the nature of Fielding’s God, I believe, honours the ludicrous, comic
search known as theology and it honours, too, the fact that it is in literature where this248
God can be sought. In other words, in asking the question, we are faced with the
awareness that there is nothing to lose other than a supposed secure, superior status.
The truth is, the question can only be asked and answered in the shadowy light of
human frailty, as Ricoeur has said:
Naming God only comes about within the milieu of a presupposition,
incapable of being rendered transparent to itself, suspected of being a
vicious circle, and tormented by contingency.
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In the light of this, then, to answer the question: ‘What is the nature of Fielding’s
God?’ we must begin with, but not be sidetracked by, the historical spectre of deism.
Much has been written concerning the nature of Fielding’s approach to this particular
theological phenomenon. There has been a particularly spirited debate between Martin
Battestin and Ronald Paulson on this issue.
536 As I have already noted, deism was not
as big a threat to the church as the orthodox portrayed it to be.
537 Nonetheless, as I
have also shown, it does play a significant part in Fielding’s fiction. However, this can
be matched, not only by the presence of Enthusiasm, but also by several particularly
rabid expressions of orthodoxy. Sheer weight of emphasis cannot be marshalled in
Fielding’s fiction to determine his position.
This has, inevitably led to a conflict of scholarly opinion. There are those, like
Battestin, who regard Fielding as a typically staunch Anglican, and others, like
Paulson, who see him as a critical or qualified deist.
538 Without going too deeply into
the arguments by which these positions are arrived at, it is important to stress once
again the determinism which colours both positions. Battestin and Paulson appear
equally adamant that their particular assessment is the accurate one. But once again
both are guilty of the sin of explicationism. In all their meticulous historical analysis,
not only have they failed to agree, but they have, more fundamentally, failed to reckon
with the fiction of Fielding as it is. For, as we have continually seen in this study,
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there is an aporetic element to literature which does more than question any specific
doctrine, but has its source in what I have called misplacement, that is, a parting with
the ineffable, and with it, any kind of security. The deism debate becomes, in this
regard, something of a sideshow to the main event, viz. the ambiguous revelation and
experience of the divine in Fielding’s fiction.
Tentatively following Ricoeur, I have argued that revelation has a legitimate
atheological basis. I have, however, moved beyond Ricoeur insofar as I have sought
to show that there can be no justifiable separation between atheological revelation and
religious meaning. The practical result of this, for our present question, is to recognise
that the revelation of God in Fielding’s fiction cannot be equated with either the
deistic or orthodox positions. We are, instead, presented with a misplaced God. By
this, I mean to suggest that, in his fiction, we encounter the divine as existing beyond
those boundaries of the personal (exhibited most strongly in enthusiasm), or the
impersonal (the basic deistic understanding). Rather, we encounter Fielding’s fictional
transcendent God – a misplaced God who is not there to confirm a doctrinal position
or even more broadly, to provide an explanation for existence. This misplaced God is
not the so-called ‘God of the gaps’, that is, a means to coming to terms with the
unexplainable complexities of life. A description of this sort would merely perpetuate
the prescriptive nature of such a God. The misplaced God, rather, reflects a view of
life which is governed by a frail dogmatics and is thus continually opened toward the
other. Bonhoeffer reflects this when he states:
Life isn’t pushed into a single dimension, but is kept multi-dimensional
and polyphonous. What a deliverance it is to be able to think, and thereby
remain multi-dimensional… We have to get people out of their one-track
minds; that is a kind of ‘preparation’ for faith, or something that makes
faith possible.
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For Bonhoeffer, to be polyphonous is to engage with the whole of life and thereby to
genuinely encounter the other. (It also chimes with Ricoeur’s notion of a
‘polyphonous revelation’). This could well be considered a reiteration of Fielding’s
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own desire in his fiction to show nothing other than HUMAN NATURE. It is in this
encounter with the human condition in all its frailty that places before us the other.
The experience of the novel reveals but does not constrain this encounter. What it
does, as I noted at the beginning of this study, is open a space whereby both theology
and literature in good, yet fragile faith, can speak a transformative word each to the
other. In this respect, neither literature nor theology can claim any degree of
hegemony. As Ricoeur points out, such a faith must have as its reference ‘a culturally
contingent network’ which ‘requires that this faith assume its own insecurity’.
540 Both
theology and literature, then, as they inhabit this space, recognise their own
vulnerabilities, and indeed it is in this very awareness that the transformative word
can be spoken and heard.
This is, indeed, what happens when we read or listen to a story. The paradox of
seeking revelation is that, as John Barton has noted, we actually discover ourselves by
the story ‘opening up to us the possibilities and the problems of being human in God’s
world’.
541 We can go further than this and suggest that,
The possibility of turning to literature for insight into life rests, not on the
closeness of good fiction to reality, but on the closeness of any reality we
can grasp to fiction.
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This idea is further reinforced, albeit from a slightly different angle, by Jorge Luis
Borges who writes:
Why does it disturb us that Don Quixote be a reader of the Quixote and
Hamlet a spectator of Hamlet? I believe I have found the reason: these
inversions suggest that if the characters of a fictional work can be readers
or spectators, we, its readers or spectators, can be fictitious.
543
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We are, in a sense, returned here to Kant and his broad epistemological framework
which leaves humanity ‘making up a world’. Kant’s schema, however, is borne out of
a conviction that there can be no sensible revelation of God available to us. God, in
Kant’s thought, becomes a regulative principle which, precisely because it is supra-
sensible can free us to act ethically. The problem with Kant’s proposal is that, for all
its apparent rational consistency, this is not the God we want to be revealed to us.
Kant’s framework is too precise; it attempts to provide us with an enlightened
structure within which even experiences such as awe, ecstasy and adoration are
subsumed into a constraining metaphysical matrix. However, it would seem to me that
the God we look for, (if we look at all) is a complex, dare one say, messy
conglomeration of parent, judge, lover, mother, father, creator, provider, sustainer,
and much else besides. Indeed, whatever our hearts desire. In other words, the God we
are looking for bears a close resemblance to the misplaced God found in Fielding’s
fiction.
This misplaced God can be found in fiction because, as Ricoeur has shown, following
Heidegger, a text opens up a world to us. In being exposed to this world, we are freed
from the necessity of prescription or dogmatic certitude. As Paul Fiddes suggests:
Stories describe, not how things are, but how they might be. They point to
a way of being beyond the greediness of ego, and so beyond the split of
the consciousness between subject and object.
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Fielding’s misplaced God, then, is to be understood as ‘fictionally transcendent’ in the
sense that the space which is forged by theology and literature’s common frailty
leaves room for a God neither encumbered by dogma, nor anthropomorphised out of
existence. As John Caputo has it:
Far from being able to see God everywhere, the believer has perhaps the
sharpest sense of all of the withdrawal of God. His absence from the
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world. His faith consists precisely in bending in the direction of the God
who withdraws.
545
In other words, God is imagined in this space. Such an exercise in imagination
provides us with the fragile, yet hope-filled, common bond between theology and
literature. It is this bond which, I believe, serves as a concrete extension of the
thinking of Vattimo, when he writes that ‘the God recovered in the postmetaphysical
and postmodern epoch is the God of the Book’.
546 Vattimo’s immediate frame of
reference is the continuous spiritual re-interpretation of the history of salvation, and
the place of Scripture within that tradition. However, I would argue that, in so saying,
Vattimo opens the door to the possibility of that tradition being found beyond the
Scriptural canon and into the broader literary corpus – the God of the Book is, at the
same time, the God of the book.
Both theology and literature share in the comedy of human existence, and in the often
futile, but always persistent, search for meaning. There are those who demur from this
and insist that ‘true Christian laughter stems from the conviction of absolute
certainty’.
547 However, I would suggest that advocates of such an approach forget that
this particular theo/logical hermeneutical circle can only be completed in and through
fragility. The awareness of God’s presence ‘always caught up in the play of presence
and absence’
548 forms a gossamer-like expression of this ever-circling, comedic
dance. And, like most dancing, this dance takes two.
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Conclusion
I shall be very indifferent whether avowed Deists abuse me for having
Religion, or Hypocrites for having none.
Henry Fielding
549
Fictional Theology
In this study, I have sought to forge a particular rapprochement between theology and
literature. I have examined the work of Henry Fielding as a foil to the determinism
which can so easily overpower both artistic spheres to their own detriment, and to the
detriment of any mutually useful dialogue. At first glance, this may have appeared as
an exercise in incongruity, given both the weight of critical study which has sought to
define Fielding in a broadly prescriptive manner and, indeed, the very fact that, as a
comic writer, one may see little scope in identifying any serious link with theology.
However, it can safely be said that incongruity has been a key component to my
investigation. In order to discern any areas of commonality, a sense of insecurity is
required to ratify the integrity of the exploration. Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) has
said, ‘The final wisdom of life requires not the annulment of incongruity but the
achievement of serenity within and above it.’
550 That Niebuhr was speaking in the
context of a culture which, he believed, in its very freedom, posed a threat to its own
existence, offers us further evidence of the importance of our seeking for some kind of
literary/theological rapprochement. However, as I read him, I have to demur from
Niebuhr’s assumption that we can somehow ever rise ‘above’ the experience of
incongruity to some ‘final wisdom’. As I have continually argued, any such
rapprochement can only be forged upon the weak anvil of human fragility.
Niebuhr’s anxiety regarding the critical state of cultural history is given a more
explicitly theological dimension by Gabriel Vahanian. His assessment of the cultural
paucity of Christianity is summed up tartly: ‘The history of religion is the history of
549 Henry Fielding, Contributions to the Champion and Related Writings, ed. by W. B. Coley (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 286.
550 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 54.254
spiritual degeneration.’
551 In so saying, Vahanian argues that Christianity, through its
descent from a gospel of liberty to an icy tradition has lost its first love, namely the
iconoclasm which ‘is a deflation of man’s natural inclination to deify himself, or his
society, or the State, or his culture’.
552 Whilst one may balk at Vahanian’s somewhat
florid style, his premise retains some validity because his broad thesis rests upon the
assumption that theology and literature share a common goal, namely the renewal of
human existence. It is this shared goal of iconoclastic regeneration that I have
presented here.
To that end, I have investigated various key areas of experience which can be said to
be of importance to both literature and theology. I have attempted to show that each of
these areas is infiltrated by what I have described as misplacement. This misplacement
expresses the continuous parting with the ineffable. This is evinced most clearly in
writing, the artistic mode of both theology and fiction. For the work of theology or
fiction is never completed, its hermeneutical path is never fully traversed. Yet, in the
act of reading, this awareness of comic open-endedness, of the parting with the
ineffable, of misplacement, serves as a fragile hermeneutical key upon the text of
human existence before the other.
This sense of alterity is made movingly tangible in a closing scene from Richard
Attenborough’s film version of Shadowlands, the story of C.S. Lewis’s relationship
with Joy Gresham.
553 Lewis, played by Anthony Hopkins, answers his own question,
‘Why do we read?’ thus: ‘We read in order to know that we are not alone.’ This
particular answer is somewhat ambiguous. For, in the very act of reading (except
possibly for public recitation), we inevitably find ourselves alone. Reading is a
solitary activity. And yet, in Lewis’s response, we also discern a tacit awareness of the
other. This knowledge of the other-in-solitude becomes another way of describing the
experience of misplacement and is illustrative of the common hermeneutical strategy
shared by both theology and literature.
551 Gabriel Vahanian, Wait Without Idols (New York: George Braziller, 1964), p. 21.
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On this basis, I have sought to release Fielding from the literary prison of socio-
historical criticism in order that a broader, deconstructive approach may be applied to
his fiction. This breakout being accomplished, we found ourselves free to explore the
contemporary theological and literary implications of works which, paradoxically, due
to their historical importance, can, all the more powerfully, serve to show the
significance of this liberated approach.
As a consequence, I have studied the nature and effect of Fielding’s comedy as a first
step towards glimpsing this continuous parting with the ineffable. I have sought to
show that, in many respects, Fielding’s comedy does not follow the well-trodden
comic path upwards to the happy ending, as had been traditionally understood.
Fielding, while acknowledging his debt to the likes of Aristotle and Aristophanes,
breaks free from any formulaic approach to comedy, seeking instead to forge his own
iconoclastic path and offer us a more ambiguous form which, as Walter Allen
succinctly put it, ‘seeks to show the age its face’.
554 One means to achieve this, for
Fielding, was his re-working of parable. Such re-visioning explodes hitherto well-
accepted securities that traditional stories such as the Parable of the Good Samaritan
were believed to provide. The joke, in this case (as, indeed, in the original parable),
serves to comically unsettle all those who, in one way or another, exhibit the human
trait known as affectation.
Similarly, in our examination of Fielding’s work, we are confronted with his
subversion of the epistemological framework which allows us to assume some
measure of control over our existence. More than this, Fielding undermines the entire
creative process, leaving us wondering about what is real and what is not. The critical
outworking of this is that both the literary and theological universes, existing as they
are in a creation built on words, are thereby also subverted and left not only less
secure, but at the same moment, increasingly aware of their interdependence. Fielding
levels the playing field between the two, leaving them bound by a common fragility.
More specifically, in Fielding’s fiction we are brought to a greater understanding of
the somewhat tortured relationship between the word and the Word. The boundaries
554 Walter Allen, The English Novel (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 63.256
by which the territories of fictive and factual writing are traditionally demarcated
become, in Fielding, comically blurred. Such blurring ultimately extends even to the
Bible being regarded as, in some sense, fictive, and his own work considered as
popular scripture.
The practical outworking of all of this is that, at both a critical and ethical level,
hitherto secure frontiers are also misplaced. Criticism itself is discovered to be a work
of art and, following from this, theological assessments, which are themselves
defining, or critical acts, and as Kaufman has suggested, ‘works of the
imagination’,
555 must be similarly regarded. To this end, notions of what constitutes
blasphemy are to be considered at best provisional insofar as at both etymological and
practical levels, the word remains ambiguous.
In the same way, ethical considerations are opened beyond the narrow confines within
which both convention and dogma have so often sought to restrain them. Terms such
as Prudence and Providence are equally undermined by Fielding in such a way as to
allow us the freedom to see them in a brighter theological and literary context. Justice,
too, is affected by this deconstructive approach and in Fielding’s fiction we are to
reckon with the uncomfortable reality that justice is at the mercy of narrative, and, as
a consequence, criminality becomes a more diffuse appellation. This is because, in the
novels of Fielding, we are exposed to a narrative which, as Johnson puts it, ‘mingles
good and bad Qualities in their principal Personages, that they are both equally
conspicuous.’
556 Johnson, of course, saw this as a major weakness in Fielding’s
fiction. For my purposes, however, he unwittingly points to exactly the quality of
human frailty, that potent admixture of rough and smooth, good and evil, which
serves as the necessary fuel for the artistic fires of both literature and theology.
Further, I have investigated the theological and literary connotations of key concepts
such as mimesis and, by extension, canon. I have sought to show that, through the
application of misplacement, the understanding of both can be expanded beyond
555 Gordon D. Kaufman, ‘Theology as Imaginative Construction’, The Journal of the American
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hitherto traditional assessments. Each can be said to inhabit a more open space that
allows for continuous interaction rather than mere prescription.
Finally, and building on the above, I have examined the fundamental issue of
revelation and the nature of God itself. In the same way that our understanding of
canon is liberated, so, too, we can view the fiction of Fielding as offering us a world
from which genuine revelation can be found; a revelation which does not privilege a
single, unique hermeneutic, but, instead, recognises and celebrates its own
polyphonous nature. This misplacement of revelation, when applied to God, reveals to
us the role that imagination plays in our apprehension of the divine. God is regarded
as ‘fictionally transcendent’, in that God is imagined in the space wherein we allow
the artistic word which is shared by theology and literature to be spoken without
prejudice.
In bringing my study to a close, it is instructive to glance at James Wood’s recent
study on laughter and the novel which begins thus: ‘Comedy, like sex and death, is
often awarded the prize of ineffability.’
557 By this, he suggests that, as I noted in my
second chapter, any definition of comedy and its effects can appear more than elusive.
His choice of the word ineffable, however, obviously chimes with our major theme.
Demurring from the fatalism surrounding the analysis of the nature and purposes of
comedy, Wood proceeds more positively to define what he calls a ‘comedy of
irresponsibility’, which he locates chiefly in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century
fiction. The comedy of irresponsibility, he argues, has its roots in the tension that
exists between religious and secular comedy. This particular tension is outlined by
Wood:
If religious comedy is punishment for those who deserve it, secular
comedy is forgiveness for those who don’t. If correction implies
transparency, then forgiveness – at least, secular forgiveness – implies
deliberate opacity, the drawing of a veil, a willingness to let opacity go
free.
558
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This ‘willingness to let opacity go free’, I would suggest, is another way of referring
to what I describe as parting with the ineffable. What is interesting, once again, is that
Wood, like Hitchens at the beginning of this thesis, brings in a contrast between the
religious and the secular in order to develop his understanding of the role of literature
and, specifically in Wood’s case, comedy. However, unlike Hitchens, Wood has a
more sophisticated understanding of the religious sensibility. For Wood, the term
‘religious’ means ‘the dream of transparency, the victory of knowing over the haze of
unreliability, the existence of a stable system of human categorisation and a certain
odour of didacticism’.
559 Granted that this is no ringing endorsement, it does,
however, illustrate well for us an awareness of the temptation in the theological realm
towards a ‘metaphysics of presence’.
Again, unlike Hitchens, Wood also recognises the critical threads which mesh
literature and theology together. He makes the comment that ‘religious comedy does
not write its will to secular comedy and then expire’.
560 Moreover, he points to the
fact that secular comedy is by no means immune to the very didacticism which can
plague the religious. In short, Wood seems amenable to some form of mutual
understanding between literature and theology insofar as each can be susceptible to
the same temptation to determinism.
Though in sympathy with Wood’s general approach, what I have been arguing in this
study is that, not only is the ‘comedy of irresponsibility’ to be found earlier than
Wood appears to suggest, i.e., in the work of the eighteenth-century novelist, Henry
Fielding, but that comedy itself is a positive constituent element of both the novel and
theological reflection. Instead of irresponsibility, then, solely being a mark of the
instability expressed in the so-called modern or postmodern novel, it is also to be
found in what I have described as a ‘frail dogmatics’ – theological reflection which
takes seriously the ludicrous nature of the human condition.
Both fiction and theology, then, share the same literary and psychological basis in
human frailty and both straddle the treacherous path between being and non-being. To
this extent, fiction can be regarded as theological in the same way that theology can
559 Ibid., p. 13.
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be seen as fictive. Each is like the other, for each is an endless, fragile interpretative
act. Further to this, we can see that all of us, religious or otherwise, live in a story-
world that must in some way be read. The rise of the novel (prior, even, to Kant’s
exposition of the subject), points to this disturbance in the otherwise secure
epistemological firmament. The telling of the story points to our own lives as fragile
stories to be related and in some sense understood. In so telling, we are confronted
with the loss of the pure ‘ego’, the definitive self – the mark of the modern. This
entire unsettling process (what Caputo might describe as ‘the theology of the
event’),
561 is the experience of parting with the ineffable and it is shared, willingly or
unwillingly, by both literature and theology as they, fallibly and fictionally, share in
telling the human story.
Richard Holloway offers his own idiosyncratic perspective on this when he writes:
One of the consolations of literature is the way it transmutes the tragic
comedy of life by noticing it. The same can be said of existential religion.
The genius of a sane religious sensibility is the way its myth-making
keeps the balance between tragedy and comedy, pessimism and optimism,
the former saving us from the intoxicating dangers of utopian thinking, the
latter saving us from the despairing immobilism that denies any possibility
of hope.
562
Holloway’s point is that it is in the noticing of the vicissitudes of life rather than in the
determination to prescribe that life, which marks out the activity of both literature and
theology. Further, when we recognise that one of the root meanings of the verb to
notice is ‘to celebrate’, then our sense of the continuous parting with the ineffable as a
means to entering a hope-filled space becomes all the more acute.
Coming full circle, and having suggested in my Introduction that the neo-orthodoxy
Barth propounded served as a potential antagonist to the kind of rapprochement this
study has sought to foster, there remains, paradoxically, a suspiciously deconstructive
and hopeful opening in his dramatic understanding of humanity caught, as it were,
561 John Caputo, ‘Spectral Hermeneutics’, in After the Death of God, pp. 47-85.
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between finitude and infinitude. Barth’s astonishing description of the resurrection in
his The Epistle to the Romans well illustrates this:
The Resurrection, which is the place of exit also bars us in, for it is both
barrier and exit. Nevertheless, the ‘No’ which we encounter is the ‘No’ –
of God. And therefore our veritable deprivation is our veritable comfort in
distress. The barrier marks the frontier of a new country, and what
dissolves the whole wisdom of the world also establishes it. Precisely
because the ‘No’ of God is all-embracing, it is also His ‘Yes’.
563
This could be Derrida speaking with a Swiss-German accent. The serious point is, of
course, that, despite appearances, there appears room, even in the Barthian schema,
for the kind of openness to the other that is indicative of the mutual frailty endorsed in
this study. Indeed, in this regard, Graham Ward is led to state:
It seems to me that Barth has the potential to present a radically orthodox
voice that is genuinely postmodern and, therefore, post-secular – a voice
we need in the turmoil of today’s nihilistic indifference.
564
Such optimism, I believe, can apply, more specifically, to the relationship between
literature and theology. The novel, as I have shown with reference to Henry Fielding,
exhibits those areas of human concern which are shared by a theology that refuses to
bow to any form of determinism and is, itself, open to the other. Equally, theology’s
recognition of its own artistic and, indeed, fictive status, frees us to discern the
theological significance of the novel form. In this sense, both literature and theology,
though distinctive, are joined in a common, comedic strategy that is never complete.
The production of art is a natural outcome of the joyous frailty of the human condition
and, in this production, whether it be theology or a work of literature, there is a
continual, flawed coming to terms with parting with the ineffable. If there is a
common thread between theology and literature, it is that neither can ever be
563 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, p. 38.
564 Graham Ward, ‘Barth, modernity and postmodernity’, in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth,
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ultimately prescribed. Both are bound by an ineffable hermeneutical cord which is
unravelling even as it binds.
Does my study, then, provide the rapprochement I have been seeking? Have I
succeeded? The difficulty in responding to such a question is that, in so answering, we
fall into the same deterministic trap which we have been at pains to avoid. Success in
this sense is always a failure, for it merely succeeds in perpetuating the system-ridden
structures that serve as battlements behind which each may find security from the
other. The cost of parting with the ineffable is that those defences are breached
leaving us with the play of interpretation that defies ultimate closure. In his
development of what he describes as a ‘hermeneutics of love’, Alan Jacobs suggests
that the temptation to consistently provide a ‘correct’ interpretation does not
necessarily serve us well:
One seeks to avoid error because one cannot love properly when confused
or deceived. However, the avoidance of error – like attentiveness to
authorial purposes – does not in itself achieve anything of intrinsic
worth.
565
Error is the bogeyman of modernist interpretation. In our release from the constraints
of unrelenting determinism, however, we finally realise that error, as bogeyman, does
not exist. Error is the by-product of frailty, and in the same way that frailty cannot be
avoided, neither too can the capacity to err. This is not to say that we must not strive
towards a reading but that such a reading cannot ever be considered free of error. In
this sense, every reading becomes a ‘wandering’ in the plain sense of ‘erring’. Every
reading then, can be considered, like Tom Jones, a ‘foundling’, insofar as it exhibits
that instability of character and waywardness of purpose which forms the fragile
essence of Fielding’s famous protagonist. To err is, indeed, human.
Success, then, we must be aware, can be a politically loaded term. By now, one would
have recognised that any notion of success must, like all else in the present study, be
misplaced. In this regard, it is vital to acknowledge that this thesis, too, must submit
565 Alan Jacobs, A Theology of Reading: The Hermeneutics of Love (Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), p.
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itself to the cultural space. It cannot sit outside. If it remained so, it would be a mere
apology for the course I am suggesting. In order to offer its word, it too, must find
itself misplaced. What, then, does misplaced success look like?
We could do worse than look at St Paul’s definition in his second letter to the
Corinthians, that misfit group who exhibited much that marked the frailty of the
human condition, and who, indeed, could fit very well into the pages of a Fielding
novel:
We are in difficulties on all sides, but never cornered; we see no answer to
our problems, but never despair; we have been persecuted, but never
deserted; knocked down but never killed; always, wherever we may be,
we carry with us in our body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus,
too, may always be seen in our body.
566
It is no surprise to discover from this exercise in theological irony that, according to
Fielding, ‘[St. Paul’s] Writings do in my Opinion contain more true Wit than is to be
found in the Works of the unjustly celebrated Petronius’.
567 In the passage above, we
are confronted with the success of the downtrodden. It is the topsy-turvy success of
the Christian clown who sees joy in despair and life in death. It is just such misplaced
success that I would wish for this current project. It is a means for us, at last, to get the
joke regarding the word and the Word and all that this entails. For, it is in the
weakness rather than the power of the word that we reach for one another. It is in the
folly of the word rather than the wisdom of the word that we find ourselves in the
sacred space. It is in the misplacement of the word that we find the word which just
might communicate.
566 II Corinthians 4. 8-10.
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